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Abstract	
 
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: how and why was the social 
welfare system in Egypt altered under the government of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)? 
Literatures on the determinants, objectives and structures of social welfare regimes 
predominantly assume democratic systems of government. They claim that the political influence 
of organised labour is the most important driving force for the expansion of social welfare systems. 
This driving force is effective only in open, democratic political arena. This thesis therefore argues 
that the case of Egypt requires us to consider social welfare regimes within the context of 
authoritarian resilience. 
According to this corpus of work, institutional change under authoritarian regimes can best be 
explained as a product of government survival strategies, strategies which seek to maximise the 
interests of the ruling elite, especially their political leaders (rather than the political influence of 
organised labour which drives social welfare systems in democratic countries). Although the ruling 
elite under authoritarian rule use social welfare systems in their survival strategies, the strategies 
differ in their context or ideology. Egypt’s first President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, designed and 
introduced a social welfare system which supported his primary goal of industrialisation. The 
income-redistribution aspects of his social welfare system were designed to mobilise popular 
political support for his regime from the middle and low-income classes, especially urban workers. 
His successor, Anwar al Sadat, relied still further on the income-redistribution function of the social 
welfare system, as a means of partially compensating those elements of society which could be 
considered ‘losers’ from his policy of economic opening (infitah). Whereas his policies expanded 
the economic base of regime support from the working class and the public sector to the growing 
business elites, he fortunately obtained several external resources, such as economic aid (from the 
United States, in particular), fees from the Suez Canal and oil exports. By exploiting these 
resources as sources to expand the social welfare system, Sadat was able to compensate the ‘losers’ 
iii 
and to maintain political legitimacy with these lower classes through welfare re-distribution 
instruments. His strategy strengthened the populist feature of the social welfare system. 
This thesis argues that change in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era was 
bounded by the logic of the ‘social contract’, which was reinforced by the expansion of populist 
welfare provision during the Sadat era. Sadat’s strategy led to fiscal deficit and prevented economic 
growth in the Mubarak era. Rationalisation of the programmes was indeed advocated by the 
international financial institutions and the Mubarak government did appear to initiate reforms. 
However, when looked at closely, the thesis reveals that these reforms did not result in significant 
reductions in government expenditures on social welfare as was supposedly intended. Despite a 
decline in external resources, the regime maintained expenditures, ‘thinning’ out the benefits of the 
welfare system where it could, but never fully engaging in deep structural reform. 
Mubarak’s government was caught in an unresolvable dilemma. Economic liberalisation in 
general created a new alliance between the ruling elite and the growing class of businessmen. 
However, the authoritarian regime still relied on a legacy of claims to redistributive justice for its 
legitimacy. As a decline in external resources cut away the regime’s capacity to deliver this through 
structural aspects of the economy, the regime increasingly relied on social welfare programmes to 
alleviate poverty and assuage political grievances. Regime fear of direct political protests 
increasingly drove social welfare policy, with the regime compensating for the effects of 
liberalisation in one side of the economy by spending money it could ill afford in another. The 
strategy was itself a fundamental contradiction and inherently unsustainable. As a result, a decline 
in distributive resources revealed a failure in the social welfare system – enduring fiscal 
misallocation and neglecting social problems (such as poverty and unemployment). 
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1 
Introduction	
 
A.  Research Background and Motivations: Social Problems and the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt 
On 25 January 2011 Egyptians began to demonstrate against the long-lasting regime, 
demanding the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. Although the demonstration was not well 
organised, it spread to the whole country. The participants included highly educated members of the 
upper and middle classes – both women and men. This ‘revolution’ surprised the world and even 
Egyptians themselves, “for it was probably unprecedented in scale in Egyptian history, and there 
had been no early signs that an event of this magnitude would take place” (Amin 2011: 1). On 11 
February 2011, the Egyptian authoritarian regime, which had survived for approximately thirty 
years, collapsed with the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. 
A feeling of euphoria spread throughout the country on hearing the news that the 
president had stepped down. Egyptians spent the night dancing and singing in the 
streets, celebrating the end of a regime that, even if a few found it useful for their own 
purposes, very few really liked and hardly anybody respected (Amin 2011: 2). 
When the revolution successfully ended with the resignation of a dictator, most Egyptians felt 
optimistic about their future. 
Their optimistic expectations were however disappointed. In 2012, the first democratic 
presidential election was held, in which Mohammed Mohammed Morsi was elected President. He 
was welcomed as the first democratically-elected president in the country, but his policy gradually 
led to divisions between Islamists and secularists. Whereas his supporters were based on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its associated political party – the Freedom and Justice Party, the main 
leaders of the 2011 revolution were secularists. Although the economic situation was still worse 
(high inflation rate, low economic growth and unemployment), the government strengthened its 
authoritarian features: 
In Parliament, the Brothers [Muslim Brotherhood] eviscerated legislation that would 
have introduced more progressive taxation. They spurned a draft labor law that would 
have guaranteed the right to form independent unions through free workplace elections. 
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Instead, they proposed to “regulate” strikes and sided with employers in the wildcat 
work stoppages that persisted after Mubarak’s ejection. In early summer, the 
International Labor Organization blacklisted Egypt in for failing to live up to the labor 
conventions to which it is a signatory (MERIP 2013). 
Finally, the country experienced a counter-revolution, which overthrew the Morsi government in 
July 2013. The first democratically-elected president in the country was forced to step down after 
only one year in power. 
Achieving social justice was the most important issue for Egyptians both before and after the 
2011 revolution. This is obvious from the fact that the lack of distributive justice was an ‘engine’ 
for this revolution. Moreover, social justice has not been achieved in the country even after the 
revolution. Many Egyptian citizens have suffered from various types of social risks, such as 
unemployment, insufficient wages and shortage of foodstuffs (especially bread). Even after the 
2011 revolution, many Egyptians organised strikes and demonstrations to demand improvements of 
their living standards. However, their demand was not satisfied yet: 
Walk down any back alley in the Egyptian capital, or even along one of Cairo’s main 
thoroughfares, and you’re likely to see scenes of shocking poverty. If the miserable 
grey buildings that shelter millions of impoverished souls don't get to you, the scores 
of street children – tirelessly weaving between cars and Chinese-made motorbikes – 
will (Feteha 2013). 
Poverty is widespread and many young Egyptians are suffering from unemployment or severe 
working conditions (such as informal-sector jobs without social insurance coverage). 
Some scholars assert that neo-liberal economic policy was the main factor of such social 
problems (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a). In 2007 the World Bank praised the government’s 
liberalisation efforts, describing the country as the ‘world’s top reformer’. 
Egypt has been offered as a model of the sort canvassed in the 1970s when Mexico 
was ‘top reformer’ and in the 1980s when Argentina was presented as an example to 
the world. Mexico fell from grace the debt default of 1982 and Argentina collapsed in 
ignominy with the crash of 2001, thrusting millions of people into poverty and despair 
(El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009: 3). 
As the Mubarak government obediently implemented neo-liberal economic policy that was 
prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank, some scholars call Egypt a ‘laboratory for 
3 
neo-liberalism’ (El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009). 
However, it should be noted that levels of social expenditure during the Mubarak era were still 
high. At that time, Egypt still spent more on social welfare programmes than average developing 
countries in Latin America and East Asia. Social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Egypt was 
4.8% in 1995 whilst average social expenditure during the period of 1972-1999 in Latin America 
was 2.9% and in East Asia was 2.4% (World Bank 2005: 12). Moreover, the ratio of social 
expenditure on social policies (including education, health and subsidies) to total public 
expenditure increased, from 18.1% in 1990/91 to 25.6% in 1999/2000. Simultaneously, the social 
expenditure per capita drastically increased from £E 145.5 to £E 377.1 (Galal 2003: 2-3). 
How did the social welfare system work during the Mubarak era? Despite its practical 
importance, comparative politics does not pay attention to social welfare in Egypt. Recent research 
in comparative politics focused more on the behaviour of elites than on the rest of citizens to 
understand the durability of the authoritarian regime. They were interested in how authoritarian 
leaders manipulated institutions for their survival in order to change the elites’ behaviour, such as 
elections (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2005), political parties (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 
2008) and legislatures (Gandhi & Przeworski 2006). However, the authoritarian regime was shaken 
by popular demonstrations, not by elites’ tactics. Consequently, political scientists failed to explain 
the ‘Arab Spring’ (Gause 2011) and therefore do not have a useful tool to explain the relationship 
between the authoritarian regime and social welfare provision. 
The corpus in welfare-state studies has excluded countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), including Egypt, from the analysis. Although scholars recently began to focus on social 
welfare systems in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe through comparative 
perspectives,1 these works omit the MENA region from their analyses. This is because the existing 
literature on welfare state is theoretically based on democratic politics. Thus, the literature is 
mainly interested in Western democratic and newly democratised countries. This bias in welfare 
                                                     
1  See Haggard & Kaufman (2008) and Mares & Carnes (2009), for example. 
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state studies is clear from the fact that studies on social welfare systems in newly democratised 
countries started after they had experienced democratic transitions. Nonetheless, social welfare 
systems under authoritarian rule are also important and needed to be analysed. 
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: how and why was the social 
welfare system in Egypt altered under the government of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), focusing on 
the relationship between the dynamics of the authoritarian rule and social welfare provision. Social 
welfare systems were also constructed under authoritarian rule and function in logic differently 
from those in democracies. Egypt, which maintained an authoritarian regime even after the ‘third 
wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1991), is a good case for the analysis of social welfare 
systems under authoritarian rule. This research provides the readers with a new perspective on 
social welfare studies, addressing the importance of the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders 
as a driving force for maintaining and changing social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. 
 
B.  Research Methodology: Historical Institutionalism 
To answer the research question, this thesis uses the new institutionalist approach, which is 
divided into three sub-approaches: (1) sociological institutionalism, (2) rational-choice 
institutionalism and (3) historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor 1996). According to Peter Hall 
(1986: 19), the concept of ‘institutions’ is used “to refer to the formal rules, compliance procedures, 
and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units 
of the polity and economy”. This definition includes not only formal organisations but also 
informal rules and procedures. Although some scholars exclude informal ones from the definition 
of institutions (Streeck & Thelen 2005), this research uses the concept of institutions as 
aggregations of both formal organisations and informal rules. This thesis assumes that a social 
welfare system is an aggregate of ‘institutions’, which include not merely formal organisations 
(such as social welfare programmes), but informal rule (such as the ‘social contract’2). Moreover, 
                                                     
2  The argument on the ‘social contract’ is often mentioned in works on contemporary MENA 
politics and peculiar to MENA politics. Social contracts are established as a result of “an 
authoritarian bargain, with citizens trading restrictions on political participation in exchange for 
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as conventional social welfare programmes (such as social insurance and social assistance) have 
developed less in MENA countries, including Egypt (Silva, Levin & Morgandi 2012: 56), their 
alternatives – food subsidies, for example – have played an important role in social welfare systems, 
contributing to poverty alleviation in these countries  (World Bank 2002: 81). 
Unlike the behaviourist approach, the new institutionalist approach assumes that actors’ true 
preferences are not necessarily represented by their behaviour. In behaviourism, preferences 
expressed by actors are their real preferences and preferences are revealed through behaviour. In 
contrast, the new institutionalist approach is interested in the distinction between expressed and real 
preferences. It addresses the reasons why someone under a particular set of circumstances may 
make a political choice that is different from others with the same preferences (Immergut 1998: 
6-7). 
They may believe that the outcome they hope for is not feasible and that they should 
therefore vote for an alternative that is not their first choice but one that has the 
advantage of being realizable. Or, the “true” interests of individuals or groups may not 
be entirely clear (Immergut 1998: 7). 
The new institutionalist approach analyses what, particularly what kind of institutions, encourages 
actors to make a specific choice, not other plausible alternatives. 
Among the three institutionalist sub-approaches, this thesis uses the historical institutionalist 
one for the following reasons. First, historical institutionalism is better at analysing long-term 
institutional change than other institutionalist sub-approaches and has developed various theoretical 
frameworks and concepts to do so (see Chapter 1).  
Second, historical institutionalism adopts an eclectic approach when understanding the role 
which institutions play in structuring behaviour. Rational-choice institutionalists consider humans 
to be rational individuals who can calculate their costs and benefits and behave to maximise their 
benefits. In rational-choice institutionalism, institutions are frames that determine individual’s 
strategic behaviour. In contrast to rational-choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalists 
                                                                                                                                                                
economic security and the public provision of social services, welfare, and other benefits” 
(World Bank 2004: 3). The ‘social contract’ is an informal institution that determines preference 
of authoritarian leaders and often narrows the range of their choices. 
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regard humans as fundamentally social beings. “In this view, humans are neither as self-interested 
nor as ‘rational’ as rational choice scholarship would have it, but are ‘satisficers’ who act habitually” 
(Steinmo 2008: 126). In this approach, institutions are not frames to determine actors’ behaviour 
but shape their habits and common sense. Peter Hall & Rosemary Taylor (1996) depicts their 
approaches as the ‘calculus’ approach (rational-choice institutionalism) and the cultural approach 
(sociological institutionalism).  
Historical institutionalism adopts an eclectic approach between the ‘calculus’ approach and the 
‘cultural’ approach. 
Human beings are both norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested rational actors. 
How one behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on the rule. While this 
statement may seem rather obvious, it has huge implications for how we should study 
politics. If all three of these variables (individuals, context and rules) are important in 
choice situations, then there can be no a priori way of knowing what one should study 
when trying to explain political outcomes (Steinmo 2008: 126). 
Because of its eclectic method, historical institutionalism is considered important. As Hall & Taylor 
(1996: 957) remarks: “Many of the arguments recently produced by this school could readily be 
translated into rational choice items, while other display clear opening toward the new 
institutionalism in sociology”. This thesis uses the eclectic method to understand the preferences of 
actors (Egyptian authoritarian leaders, in particular). 
Historical institutionalism addresses the importance of revealing causal mechanisms of 
institutional changes. Research in the ‘qualitative culture’, which is represented by historical 
institutionalism, considers the identification of mechanisms as crucial to causal inference. 
Mechanisms help in causal inference in two ways. The knowledge that there is a 
mechanism through which X influences Y supports the inference that X is a cause of Y. 
In addition, the absence of a plausible mechanism linking X to Y gives us a good 
reason to be suspicious of the relation being a causal one. … 
Although it may be too strong to say that the specification of mechanisms is always 
necessary for causal inference, a fully satisfactory social scientific explanation 
requires that the causal mechanisms be specified (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010: 54). 
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However, social sciences do not reach a consensus on the definition of ‘causal mechanisms’. 
James Mahoney (2001a) identifies 24 types of the definitions in the literature. As not only political 
scientists but sociologists and philosophers of science have proposed their definitions in the last 35 
years, the definitions became confusing. 
They serve to open the black box of lawlike probability statements that simply state 
the concurrence or correlation of certain phenomena or events. … But a central 
disagreement remains whether causal mechanisms deserve an ontological status 
distinct from variables (Falleti & Lynch 2009: 1146). 
The problem is that most of the works deal with ‘causal mechanisms’ as a synonym with 
‘intervening variables’. 
If we posit that an explanatory variable causes a dependent variable, a “causal 
mechanisms” approach would require us to identify a list of causal links between the 
two variables. This definition would also require us to identify a series of causal 
linkages, to define causality for each pair of consecutive variables in the sequence, and 
to identify the linkages between any two of these variables and the connections 
between each pair of variables (King, Keohane & Verba 1994: 86). 
 
However, as Tulia Falleti (2006: 12) points out, “if causal mechanisms were to be reduced to 
intervening variables, which could be operationalized and measured using other methods,” the 
qualitative method “would lose most of its comparative advantage”. Mahoney (2001a: 578) also 
addresses the shortcoming in his literature review article: 
The specification of a mechanism helps researchers make an observed association 
more intelligible by filling in the black box between independent and dependent 
variables. Yet, while the notion of mechanism as intervening process is useful, this 
definition unfortunately does not go beyond correlational assumptions. Causal 
mechanisms as intervening variables must be identified and analyzed with 
correlational tools. Indeed, a variable’s status as a “mechanism” as opposed to an 
“independent variable” is arbitrary. With this definition, then, a correlation is 
“explained” simply by appealing to another correlation of observed variables. 
It could be argued that the causal relations should be considered as ‘mechanismic’ rather than 
correlational. 
Mahoney (2001a) defines causal mechanisms as ‘unobservable entities’ that generate 
outcomes of interest. This definition enables us to go beyond correlational analysis in two ways: 
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First, it assumes that the activation of a mechanism actually generates an outcome in 
the sense that the mechanism is sufficient to produce the outcome of interest; that is, if 
the mechanism actually operates, it will always produce the outcome of interest. This 
notion differs from most conventional analyses, which typically assume that a causal 
variable increases or decreases the probability of having higher or lower values on an 
outcome, net of the effects of all other variables. 
The second distinctive feature of casual mechanisms concerns their status as 
unobserved entities. Causal mechanisms are posited relations or processes that the 
researcher imagines to exist; they do not refer to any particular set of empirical 
conditions. As a consequence, they cannot enter into a correlational analysis as an 
empirical state to be measured across cases for its covariation with some outcome 
[italics in original] (Mahoney 2001a: 580-581). 
 
However, Falleti & Lynch (2009) point out a deterministic feature of Mahoney’s definition and 
argue that a definition of ‘causal mechanisms’ should be considered, focusing on the interaction 
with contexts. 
Mechanisms, as portable concepts distinct from the variables attached to particular 
cases, operate in different contexts. And because mechanisms interact with the 
contexts in which they operate, the outcomes of the process cannot be determined a 
priori by knowing the type of mechanism that is at work (Falleti & Lynch 2009: 1148). 
According to their definition, although a causal mechanism is portable, it does not mean that it 
operates in every context. The interaction between the mechanism and contexts determines the 
outcome. Therefore, the same mechanism in different contexts may lead to different outcomes 
(Falleti & Lynch 2009). Their definition of ‘causal mechanisms’ indicates that this thesis needs to 
analyse how mechanisms of change in a social welfare system worked in the Egyptian context. 
To reveal the causal mechanisms, this study uses process tracing. Process tracing can be 
defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011: 823).3 Charles Tilly 
also addresses the importance of process tracing as a tool to demonstrate causal mechanisms. 
[Researchers can believe theoretical propositions] “not because of large-N statistical 
                                                     
3  This analytic process corresponds to what Collier, Brady & Seawright (2010) call 
causal-process observations (CPOs). Although some scholars use the concept of CPOs in their 
argument (see Brady (2010), for example), this study consistently refers to ‘process tracing’ to 
avoid using two labels for the same research method (Collier 2011). 
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analyses … but because for a large range of times, places, and situations they can 
construct relevant, verifiable causal stores resting on differing chains of causal-effect 
relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories” (Tilly 
1997: 48). 
 
There are two reasons why this study uses process tracing. First, statistical analysis (a large-N 
study) is not suitable for this study because (1) it deals with long-term institutional change – a 
change in the Egyptian social welfare system since the 1920s, whose causal relations were not 
straightforward and need to be traced piece by piece through process tracing; (2) Egypt does not 
have credible, long-term data on social welfare programmes; and (3) this study analyses the 
behaviour of the ruling elite, which is difficult to reveal using statistical data. Only process tracing 
enables us to reveal the causal mechanisms as this study focuses on one case – the social welfare 
system in Egypt. Second, process tracing provides us with methodological advantages in two areas. 
(1) Process tracing is able to establish causal direction: ‘if X and Y are correlated, did X cause Y, or 
did Y cause X?’ “Causal process tracing focused on the sequencing of who knew what, when, and 
what they did in response, can help address this question” (Bennett 2010: 209). (2) Process tracing 
enables us to answer a question: ‘If X and Y are correlated, is this because X caused Y, or is it 
because some third variable caused both X and Y?’ 
Process tracing can help establish whether there is a causal chain of steps connecting 
X to Y, and whether there is such evidence for other variables that may have caused 
both X and Y. There is no guarantee that researchers will include in their analyses the 
variable(s) that actually caused Y, but process tracing backward from observed 
outcomes to potential causes – as well as forward from hypothesized causes to 
subsequent outcomes – allows researchers to uncover variables they have not 
previously considered (Bennett 2010: 209). 
For these methodological advantages, process tracing enables us to reveal the causal mechanisms 
of change in the Egyptian social welfare system. 
 
C.  Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis argues that change in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era was bound 
by the logic of the ‘social contract’, which was reinforced by the expansion of populist welfare 
10 
provision during the Sadat era. In the Sadat era, the government exploited the social welfare system 
as a source to compensate for the ‘loser of economic open policy (infitah) and to obtain the popular 
support. Although this strategy strengthened the populist feature of the social welfare system, it led 
to fiscal deficit and prevented economic growth in the Mubarak era. Despite the fact that the 
populist social welfare system should be rationalised to become a more efficient instrument for 
poverty alleviation, the Mubarak government was unwilling to implement drastic social reform 
because it might destabilise the social order (e.g., demonstrations against the government). The 
social and economic deprivations of most Egyptians in the Mubarak era strengthened the logic of 
the ‘social contract’, which demanded that rulers should provide social welfare benefits to the ruled 
in return for their lack of their political liberty. Consequently, the Mubarak government postponed 
social reform that was essential for poverty alleviation. Furthermore, the social welfare system 
suffered from fiscal misallocation and neglected social problems (such as poverty and 
unemployment). 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 demonstrates, through a literature review, 
that the roles of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule differ from those in democracies. 
Under authoritarian rule, the survival strategies of political leaders work as a driving force for the 
expansion of social welfare systems and are determined by their relationship with the launching 
organisations (supporters at the time of their regime formation). Second, this chapter considers the 
relationship between political and economic structural changes and social welfare systems under 
authoritarian rule. It focuses on two structural changes since the 1970s: (1) neo-liberal economic 
reform, structural adjustment in particular, and (2) the introduction of multiparty election systems. 
Third, this chapter shows the theoretical framework, which is based on historical institutionalism, 
and explains four key concepts which will be used in the following chapters to understand 
long-term change in a social welfare system under authoritarian rule: (1) critical junctures, (2) path 
dependence and (3) reactive sequence. Fourth, it discusses research methods. 
Chapter 2 discusses the development of the Egyptian social welfare system since the 
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inter-war period. It demonstrates that the 1952 Revolution was a critical juncture for the 
development of the social welfare system and removed obstacles for the development. To 
understand the dynamics of the social welfare development, this thesis focuses on the economic 
and political structures and their relationship with the social welfare system. Whereas the social 
welfare system during the Nasser era mainly aimed to contribute to the industrialisation project, its 
main role changed during the Sadat era to an instrument for populist distribution. An income gap 
caused by the economic open-door policy (infitah) created the ‘have-nots’. To compensate for the 
‘have-nots’, the government expand the social welfare system and reinforced its populist feature. 
Such populist expansion was legitimised by a form of ‘socialism’ that was totally different from 
what Nasser had manifested – Arab socialism. Although his ‘socialism’ was a mere manifesto that 
the government would deliver social welfare benefits by expanding the social welfare system, it 
reinforced a discourse of the populist social contract and restricted the options that the Mubarak 
government could take. 
Chapter 3 focuses on how the changing political and economic structures during the Mubarak 
era influenced the development of the populist social welfare system. This chapter asserts that the 
social welfare system was driven by its own dynamics regardless of political and economic 
structural change. The government maintained the populist feature of the social welfare system, 
avoiding drastic social reform. Social deprivation caused by the political and economic structural 
change obliged the Mubarak government to maintain the existing social welfare system. While the 
fiscal deficit meant that the government would be unable to further expand the system, the logic of 
the social contract (and distributive justice in particular) which was strengthened in the Sadat era 
made it difficult for the government to concentrate its resources on poverty alleviation by 
reforming social welfare programmes. The Mubarak government continued to spend heavily on an 
inefficient social welfare system. The dynamics of the social welfare system eroded its function as 
a poverty alleviation instrument and resulted in misallocation of resources. This chapter analyses 
how exactly the role of the social welfare system changed by focusing on two specific social 
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welfare programmes: (1) the food subsidy programme (Chapter 4) and (2) the public employment 
programme (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of social welfare development in Egypt to (1) historical 
institutionalism and (2) welfare-state studies. First, it discusses the importance of informal 
institutions under authoritarian rule as well as in democracies by demonstrating that an informal 
institution of the populist ‘social contract’ made a difference between what the two hypotheses 
anticipated and the actual changes in the Egyptian social welfare system. Also, it addresses the 
importance of the original timing and sequence of change in the Egyptian political and economic 
structures in path-dependent changes in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era. Second, 
this chapter discusses implications to welfare-state studies. As the existing literature on welfare 
state has the ‘democratic bias’, it excludes authoritarian cases (like Egypt) from the analysis. This 
thesis overcomes such bias by revealing that the pattern of social welfare development in Egypt is 
distinct from Western countries and newly democratised countries in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and East Asia. Also, this chapter focuses the concept of ‘equifinality’, which means that 
there are multiple causal paths leading to the same outcome, by comparing welfare reform in Egypt 
to that in Western countries. Although causal mechanisms in each of the two cases quite differed, 
both experienced path-dependent changes in social welfare systems, not drastic welfare reform. 
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Chapter	1	
Social	Welfare	Systems	under	Authoritarian	Rule:	The	Theoretical	Analysis	
 
This research focuses on the roles of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. The 
literature on the welfare state regards democratic environments as an essential condition for the 
development of social welfare systems. Scholars in welfare state studies tend to pay considerable 
attention to social policy in democracies and consider social welfare systems under authoritarian 
rule to be trivial. As Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 16) points out, however, “the thesis that 
democracy leads to larger welfare states confronts the historical oddity that the first major welfare 
state initiatives occurred prior to democracy and were powerfully motivated to arrest its 
realization”. In the European cases, this criticism is applicable to the Bismarck government in 
Germany and the von Taaffe government in Austria, which are regarded as pioneers of legislation 
for social insurance. Moreover, it does not seem that regime type accounts for development of 
social welfare programmes in developing countries. The overwhelming majority of social insurance 
programmes were formed under non-democratic rule. For instance, when disability insurance, 
which is a social insurance programme “to cover workplace injuries that could leave workers 
incapacitated”, was first adopted, more than 70% of the 73 countries included in the sample were 
non-democratic. “Both old-age insurance and sickness insurance show similar patterns, with twice 
as many autocratic nations instituting these programs as democracies” (Mares & Carnes 2009: 97). 
This chapter demonstrates, through a literature review, that the roles of social welfare systems 
under authoritarian rule differ from those in democracies. In order to achieve this goal, first, it 
focuses on the differences of dynamics of social welfare systems between the two, reviewing the 
classical literature on the welfare state (power resource theory, in particular). The existing literature 
assumes that, in democracies, the expansion of social welfare systems is motivated by organised 
labour and is justified by the concept of social citizenship. In contrast to democracies, the survival 
strategies of political leaders work as a driving force for the expansion of social welfare systems 
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under authoritarian rule and are determined by their relationship with launching organisations 
(supporters at the time of their regime formation). Second, this chapter considers what impact 
political and economic structural changes have on social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. 
It focuses on two structural changes since the 1970s: (1) neo-liberal economic reform, structural 
adjustment in particular, and (2) the introduction of multiparty election systems. Third, this chapter 
shows the theoretical framework, which is based on historical institutionalism, and explains key 
concepts which will be used in the following chapters to understand long-term change in a social 
welfare system under authoritarian rule. 
 
 
1-1. The Politics of Social Welfare: Democracy vs. Non-Democracy 
 
A.  Characteristics of the Welfare Development in Democracies: The ‘Bottom-Up’ Approach 
Although the existing literature on the welfare state is based on the experience of 
nation-building in Western Europe, it offers several implications for the development of social 
welfare systems under authoritarian rule. ‘Modernisation theory’ is the most influential corpus in 
the theoretical development of the welfare state.1 According to Reinhard Bendix (1964), the 
traditional relationship between masters and servants was replaced by the individualistic 
relationship in the process of modernisation. “Prompted by the economic opportunities and 
equalitarian ideas of an emerging industrial society, employers explicitly reject the paternalistic 
world view, but the same constellation of forces also gives rise to new forms of social protest” 
(Bendix 1964: 2). Such social dynamics prompted a shift in the ruling structure, from the 
ruler-subject relationship to government ruled by the citizens, where the concept of citizenship was 
universal. Civil and political rights encouraged citizens to apply pressure on the government 
through social protest and to obtain their social rights by building the modern welfare state (Bendix 
1964; Rokkan 1970). 
                                                     
1  As for the modernisation theory, for example, see Apter (1965), Lipset (1959) and Rostow 
(1971). 
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Modernisation theory has two implications when considering the relationship between the 
welfare state and democracy. First, modernisation theory assumes the linear development model of 
the welfare state, in which industrialisation promoted the development of civil associations and, 
consequently the expansion of social welfare systems under democratic conditions. Second, 
citizenship developed from civil rights (rights necessary for individual freedom) to political rights 
(rights for political participation) and to social rights (universal welfare provision). This thought is 
based on the concept of ‘citizenship’ by Thomas H. Marshall (1950). He regards the embodiment of 
social rights, social citizenship in his terminology, as the final stage of the development of 
citizenship and defines the rights as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11). Marshall’s 
concept of social citizenship addresses the importance of de-commodification, “that citizens can 
freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they 
themselves consider it necessary” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). These scholars, basing their ideas 
on modernisation theory, assume that, as universal suffrage encouraged the citizenry to participate 
in political activities, social rights were more guaranteed and people were more de-commodified. 
The current literature endorses the view of modernisation theorists that political openness 
promotes the expansion of social welfare systems.2 Consequently, social welfare systems in 
democracies are better than those under authoritarian rule, in which democratic instruments, such 
as parliaments and political parties, are cosmetic (Avelino, Brown & Hunter 2005; Lake & Baum 
2001; Przeworski et al. 2000). David Lake & Matthew Baum (2001) address the following logic, 
demonstrating that democracies would provide a higher level of public services than other types of 
regimes. 
Politicians differ not in their goals but in the institutional contexts in which they seek 
to satisfy their desires. Democratic politicians operate in environments where 
                                                     
2  There are several exceptions. Harold Wilensky (1975), for example, asserts that the difference 
of a polity does not have a significant impact on a level of social expenditure. In his argument, a 
level of economic development is the most important factor in the expansion of the welfare 
state. 
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competition is sufficiently high and the costs of political participation sufficiently low 
that they are constrained from earning rents. In this context, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that they are only seeking election. Autocratic politicians operate in 
environments where the costs of competing for office and political participation are 
substantially greater, freeing them from tight constraints by the mass of citizens and 
revealing their true preferences more clearly. When politicians are not tightly bound 
by the citizens they oversee, they use the monopoly power of the state to earn rents for 
themselves (Lake & Baum 2001: 618). 
According to their argument, politicians in democracies behave so as to maximise their utility as 
well as those under authoritarian rule do. In democracies, politicians’ behaviour increases social 
expenditure because the politicians need to mobilise a wide range of the population through 
distributions. In contrast, authoritarian politicians have little incentive to increase social 
expenditure because they do not care about the population in the absence of effective democratic 
institutions. In other words, the development of social welfare systems depends on pressure from 
below in a political structure with effective democratic institutions. 
Although the current literature asserts that pressure groups in general play an important role in 
the expansion of social welfare systems in democracies, the classical literature on the welfare state 
addresses the critical role of organised labour (and leftist political parties) in the politics of social 
welfare provision in democracies (the power resource theory). Walter Korpi (1983) demonstrates 
that political participation in an open political arena enables organised labour to play a pivotal role 
in the development of social welfare systems. In such an environment, powerful social democratic 
parties, which are supported by organised labour, lead to the formation of ‘institutional’ social 
policies, which benefit a wide range of the population. In contrast, governments with weak 
working-class parties introduce only residual types of social welfare policies, which cover only the 
poorest citizens. 3  This is because political actions (rather than economic collective action, 
including strikes) are the less risky and more rational way to achieve their demands if they are well 
organised and have strong collective resources. In this context, social democratic parties are more 
likely to implement the expansion of the social welfare systems to mobilise a wider range of the 
                                                     
3  As for the ‘residual’ type of the welfare state, see Titmuss (1976). 
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population. 
In democratic countries, the conflicts of interest between the classes find expression 
not only in industrial relations but also in politics. A marked shift of the expressions of 
these conflicts from labour market to the political arena can take place in countries 
where socialist parties gain a strong and stable hold over government power and can 
begin to employ political means to influence the distributive processes in society 
(Korpi 1983: 181). 
 
The importance of organised labour is obvious from the fact that rights of de-commodification 
have differently developed in Western welfare states, and that countries with well-organised trade 
unions develop more generous social welfare systems than those with weak organised labour. In 
countries where social assistance programmes are dominant, social welfare programmes are not 
connected to work performance. The states however only have responsibility for those who fail in 
the market. Thus, the rest of the population are encouraged to apply for private insurance. The 
result is that the social welfare systems have weak de-commodification effects, strengthening the 
market’s functions – the liberal model. In contrast, welfare provision is based on individuals, not on 
the family in countries in which universalistic social welfare systems are dominant (such as 
Scandinavian countries). Furthermore, the level of provision is much higher than the liberal model. 
The de-commodification of workers has been a priority in their social welfare policies 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 26-29). 
When examining the causal relationship between strong organised labour and the development 
of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule, it is necessary to consider other explanations for 
the relationship. The first explanation is that strong organised labour might be an obstacle rather 
than a driving force for the expansion of social welfare systems. Authoritarian leaders might regard 
politically powerful trade unions as potential challengers against their rule and oppress the labour 
movement. In this situation, authoritarian leaders do not have an incentive to expand social welfare 
systems. Alexander Hicks (1999) also excludes authoritarian countries from his analysis on the 
European welfare development in the interwar period because the relationship between 
governments and organised labour in democracies is different from that of authoritarian regimes. 
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The second explanation is that the causal relationship might be the reverse of what the 
‘power-resource’ model assumes. Whereas the power-resource model thinks that strong organised 
labour strengthens social welfare systems (Korpi 1983), studies on authoritarianism suggest that 
social welfare systems are utilised as tools to strengthen the political power of the working class. In 
Latin America, for example, populist governments (e.g., the Peron government in Argentina) 
expanded social welfare programmes to gain political support from the working class (O’Donnell 
1973). Organised labour under authoritarian rule does not have autonomy from the government, 
unlike democracies, and tends to be pro-government. In many cases, executives of unions are 
appointed by authoritarian governments. These members are a privileged class and do not have an 
incentive to lead anti-government labour as long as their privileges are protected. In this situation, 
an autonomous labour movement is regarded as anti-government and frequently oppressed by 
authoritarian governments in the MENA region (Bellin 2002; Posusney 1997). The literature 
suggests that, in contrast to democracies, the relationship between organised labour and political 
leaders is determined by political leaders – which organisations they are allied with (i.e., 
conservative landlords, capitalists, rural peasants or urban workers) and that top-down decisions 
have a significant impact on the development of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. 
 
B.  The Importance of State Actors in Non-Democracies: The ‘Top-Down’ Approach 
Neo-Marxist works suggest the importance of the top-down approach in the expansion of 
social welfare systems. Some of them,4 unlike classical Marxist works, insist that “the state enjoys 
relative autonomy from the capitalist class; the possibility of the state acting in the general interests 
of capital is dependent on its distance from particular capitals” (Pierson 2007: 51). The state might 
embody a policy which sacrifices the individual capitalists’ interests in order to accomplish an 
ultimate goal – reproducing the capitalist social relationship. Welfare-state policy is also a strategy 
for the ultimate goal from the neo-Marxist view. 
                                                     
4  Although the mainstream neo-Marxists pay more attention to the contradiction within the 
welfare state than to the welfare-state development (O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984), this argument 
is not related to my research topic. Therefore, this thesis does not discuss their works. 
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The social security system is concerned with reproducing a reserve army of labour, the 
patriarchal family and the disciplining of the labour force. Only secondarily and 
contingently does it function as a means of mitigating poverty or providing ‘income 
maintenance’ … Thus the possibility of securing a fundamental shift in the structure of 
class inequality in favour of the working class through administrative and policy 
reform or working-class political struggle within the state apparatus is severely 
constrained by the essential form and functions of the state as a capitalist state 
(Ginsburg 1979: 2). 
This view is in contrast to the power-resource theory, which insists that the political strength of 
organised labour is a driving force for the expansion of social welfare systems. 
Although the neo-Marxist approach addresses the idea that the state plays a pivotal role in the 
development of social welfare systems, it does not answer questions about who is the most 
important actor in the politics of social welfare within the state. Although neo-Marxists deal with a 
‘state’ as an individual unit for their analysis (Ginsburg 1979; O'Connor 1973; Offe 1984), a ‘state’ 
is far from a unit and consists of various actors who maximise their benefits within its structure. 
This chapter therefore focuses on two state actors: (1) bureaucrats and (2) political leaders of 
authoritarian regimes. The first actor is bureaucrats. The literature on the welfare state also 
emphasises the fact that bureaucracies played an important role in the development of social 
welfare systems in the West European countries (Heclo 1974) and Japan (Calder 1988; Campbell 
1979; Pempel 1982). In these cases, these organisations are relatively autonomous from the 
pressure groups and parliamentary members, which is considered the most important factor in 
developing welfare-state programmes, such as old age pensions and health care (Orloff & Skocpol 
1984; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). 
Moreover, some scholars also address the role of the bureaucracy in public policies in the 
developing world. It is necessary to refer to two important models when we examine the 
importance of bureaucratic organisations in public policies in developing countries: (1) 
bureaucratic authoritarianism and (2) the developmental state. 
The first model, the model of bureaucratic authoritarianism, is elaborated upon by Guillermo 
O’Donnell (1973). He creates this model, based on the historical experience of swinging back to 
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authoritarian regimes in 1960s’ Latin America. At that time, Argentina and Brazil experienced “the 
end of the period of extensive, horizontal industrial growth based on [the] substation for imports of 
finished consumer goods” (O’Donnell 1973: 57-58). Simultaneously, technocrats, whose presence 
in political decision-making had increased during this state of industrialisation, had a significant 
role in public policies (especially economic policy). They began to regard such industrialisation 
policies as one of the biggest obstacles to further economic growth. In order to remove such 
obstacles, they allied themselves with military technocrats and overthrew existing ‘populist’ 
regimes. After this coup d’état, technocrats led economic reform initiatives, which were based on 
neo-liberal thought, to encourage foreign capital investment (O’Donnell 1973). As such economic 
reform made progress, social welfare programmes were retrenched in Latin America.  
The second model is that of the developmental state, which also addresses the importance of 
autonomous bureaucracies for successful public policies. This model is derived from the historical 
experience of economic success in East Asia, or the ‘East Asian miracle’ (World Bank 1993).5 This 
model considers an autonomous bureaucracy to be a factor which facilitates a credible commitment 
to long-term economic development in East Asia. 
This element of the strategy, which drew selectively on the experience of Singapore, 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, called for able and well-paid administrators who were 
insulated to a significant degree from political pressures and empowered to take 
development initiatives aimed at maximizing the growth of output and employment. In 
this context, insulation had a particular meaning: such bureaucrats, while being 
embedded within the system, were less likely to be diverted from the pursuit of 
long-run goals by political demands that were frequently myopic (Yusuf 2001: 6). 
In most developmental states (except Japan), the autonomous bureaucracy is protected from 
pressure of interest groups and politicians by authoritarian leaders. Although these works do not 
                                                     
5  Contents of the miracle can be summarised in the following two points. First, these East Asian 
countries could keep high economic growth without deterioration in living standards, which was 
contrary to historical experience and contemporary evidence in other regions. These cases have 
improved various social development indices, such as income gap and illiteracy rates. Second, 
they could attain high economic growth as well as social development in spite of their 
authoritarian characters. These authoritarian governments created several incentives for exports, 
such as macroeconomic stability, deliberately undervalued exchange rates, and export financing, 
which promoted investment from foreign countries. Responding to these incentives, foreign 
investors were willing to invest their projects (World Bank 1993). 
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necessarily refer to the relationship between autonomous bureaucracies and the development of 
social welfare systems, bureaucrats intentionally kept social welfare systems undeveloped and 
distributed resources instead towards education for the accumulation of human capital (Haggard & 
Kaufman 2008). 
However, the causal impact of state bureaucrats on the development of social welfare systems 
is restricted. Whether bureaucrats remain autonomous from interest groups is determined by the 
survival strategies of authoritarian leaders. If authoritarian leaders consider autonomous 
bureaucrats to be necessary for their survival, they make bureaucracy independent from interest 
groups because their initial goal is to maintain their government and privileges. Moreover, they 
often take measures to mobilise mass support because they cannot maintain their government 
unless they sustain the support of the critical subset of the population – whether it is spontaneous or 
forced by the governments (Magaloni 2006). Mass support increases politicians’ incentives to 
continue staying within the ruling coalition and lessens incentives for potential challengers against 
the authoritarian government – whether within the ruling coalition or in the opposition – to 
challenge the incumbents. In addition, as the ruling costs for mobilising mass support are lower 
than those through coercive ways, authoritarian leaders are willing to create instruments to mobilise 
mass support. 
They must distribute benefits to regime supporters, while withholding benefits from 
(or otherwise punishing) regime opponents. Benefits include subsidies, cash transfers, 
public goods, housing and health services, and jobs. The particular mixture of 
incentives that dictatorships will rely on typically depends on the particular resources 
the regime has at its disposal (Ezrow & Franz 2011: 56). 
Social welfare programmes are also thought to be one of such instruments and utilised as part of 
their survival strategies by political leaders. 
Under authoritarian rule, popular protests function as a signal for authoritarian leaders. 
Whereas authoritarian leaders form social welfare systems in accordance with their survival 
strategies, protests signal to authoritarian leaders that they should improve social welfare provision 
(Forrat 2012). Recent social welfare provision in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) offers an 
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interesting example of this strategy. In the PRC, a failure in social welfare provision for 
unemployment and pensions triggered widespread protests in the 1990s. In response to the protests, 
the central government was forced to transfer payments to pensioners and unemployed workers. In 
2005, the Hu Jintao administration announced that the central government would take measures to 
alleviate the burden of the rural population, for example, through direct cash transfer for medical 
needs. In the PRC, “the provision of acceptable welfare measures is tied up closely with regime 
legitimacy. Such responses to legitimacy crises are possible because the economy in a macro sense 
is enjoying rapid growth” (Frazier 2006: 17). Whereas authoritarian leaders increased social 
welfare provision in response to popular protests in the Chinese case, political leaders might take 
anticipatory measures because of their fear of popular protests in some cases, especially the Soviet 
case. Seweryn Bialer (1980: 161) depicts Brezhnev’s social policy as follows: 
The responsiveness [by the leadership to certain aspirations] can be described as an 
anticipatory reaction with regard to workers …. The lessons of worker dissatisfaction 
in East European countries, and especially the workers’ uprising in Poland, have not 
been lost on Soviet leaders. In a country where such a high premium is placed on 
stability, where organized dissent movements are active, where mass terror is absent, 
where popular expectations have long been encouraged, where the opening of Soviet 
society to foreigners has made material comparison more possible than in the past, the 
party must pay more attention to the material satisfaction of the population. 
Whereas the survival strategies of political leaders play a pivotal role in the development of social 
welfare systems under authoritarian rule, popular protests are subordinate in the dynamics of the 
social welfare systems. 
Several scholars recently began to shed light on how social welfare systems have evolved 
under authoritarian rule. 6  Stephen Haber (2006) proposes a model on the development of 
                                                     
6  Formal theorists also began to examine the relationship between the behaviour of political 
leaders and public policies. The theoretical outcomes suggest the importance of distributive 
policies, such as social welfare, in non-democratic regimes. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006), for 
instance, demonstrate that increasing income gaps in autocracies enhance the possibility of 
collapse of these regimes by utilising a game-theory model. Furthermore, Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003) show the ‘selectorate theory’ and that the difference of political survival strategies 
between autocracy and democracy has a significant impact on the distribution of public and 
private goods. The selectorate (S) is “the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a 
prospect of gaining access to special privileges doled out by leaders.” The winning coalition 
(W) is “the subgroup of the selectorate who maintain incumbents in office and in exchange 
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authoritarian social welfare systems, conceptualising ‘launching organisations’. To take power, 
authoritarian leaders need launching organisations, such as the military, a political party, or a royal 
family. Although the launching organisations play a critical role in coming into power, they might 
also be a predominant challenger because they control the apparatus which might potentially 
remove incumbent political leaders, for example, by coup d’état. In the early years of authoritarian 
rule, political leaders often engage in power struggles with the organisations that co-operated with 
them to take power (Haber 2006: 696). According to Haber, there are three political equilibria for 
authoritarian leaders when observing the relationship between the leader and launching 
organisations. Isabela Mares & Matthew Carnes (2009) use his model to explain the different 
pathways of the development of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule, from the 
relationship between authoritarian leaders and their launching organisations. 
The first equilibrium is the terror strategy. In this strategy, authoritarian leaders attempt to 
eradicate the power of their launching organisations through coercive measures, such as terror, 
torture and purges. When they succeed, they obtain unconstrained power and discretion in the 
decision-making. Because of the regime’s characteristics, the political leaders exploit national 
wealth as if it was their asset and have no incentive to distribute it to the population as a social 
policy (Mares & Carnes 2009: 98). This strategy is rarely used for the following three reasons, 
however. First, it is a highly risky choice. If the political leaders fail to remove launching 
organisations from the political arena, leaders of the organisations are likely to aim to remove the 
political leaders. Second, authoritarian leaders need to create another terror organisation to carry 
out the terror strategy. Third, this strategy undermines the governing ability of the regime (Haber 
2006: 698-700). 
The insecurity regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa are thought to be examples of the outcome of 
                                                                                                                                                                
receive special privileges” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: xi). Whereas their model indicates 
the qualitative and quantitative difference of social welfare policy between democracy and 
non-democracy, it also seems to emphasise that the varieties of W’s size lead to a diversity of 
social welfare programmes among non-democratic regimes. These models suggest the 
importance of distribution policies, such as social welfare policy, under authoritarian rule, but it 
is difficult to apply them to qualitative and small-N studies directly. 
24 
terror strategies. In this case, political leaders are interested only in exploiting their national 
resources for their restricted supporters and themselves. They exploit “opportunities for wealth in 
politics (through access to government revenues, including aid, and bribery opportunities), mining, 
timber exploitation, larger-scale manufacturing and trade, ‘capitalist’ farming, the higher levels of 
the bureaucracy, [and] military” (Bevan 2004a: 97-98). As governments do not provide social 
welfare programmes to citizens in this region, the citizens suffer from widespread poverty, poor 
health, and a lack of skills and education. In such conditions, temporal declines in agricultural 
products (for example, because of climate change) often trigger the deterioration of living standards. 
In urban areas, neo-liberal economic policy eliminated food subsidies and public employment, 
which increased poverty in many countries. Moreover, these countries are fragile because of high 
population growth (increasing the dependent population), epidemic diseases (HIV/AIDS, in 
particular) and climate change. A large proportion of citizens in this region lives in poverty. 
Consequently, these citizens have to choose (1) social inclusion through their identity or belonging 
or (2) voluntary (or involuntary) exit. In the former, people may have to acquiesce in inferior status 
in the community. In the latter, people have to emigrate to other countries (the voluntary exit), or 
involuntarily exit in the form of death or escape as refugees (Bevan 2004b: 225-230). 
The second equilibrium is the co-option strategy. In this strategy, authoritarian leaders attempt 
to co-opt members of the launching organisations by buying the members’ loyalty to the 
authoritarian leaders. “The heart of this system is the creation of economic rents by reducing 
competition through regulatory barriers to entry, such as selectively allocated import permits, 
preferential tax treatment, or the requirement of licenses or concessions to enter particular lines of 
economic activity” (Haber 2006: 701). In the short term, this strategy can accomplish high 
economic growth because the authoritarian leaders distribute rents to a small number of the 
population. This rent-sharing system might however distort the economic system and tend to 
misallocate resources (Haber 2006: 701-702). This strategy has distinct implications for the design 
of social welfare systems. “Consistent with a set of economic policies premised on the creation of 
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monopolies, we expect to see the establishment of “restrictive” social policies, characterized by 
narrow coverage and generous benefits” (Mares & Carnes 2009: 99). The restrictive social welfare 
systems cover a small number of workers in the state-owned or private sector industries. They are 
promised high levels of benefits out of fear that they will resort to labour activism. Resources for 
the generous programmes are created by the monopoly rents these industries enjoy (Mares & 
Carnes 2009: 99). 
The neo-patriarchal distribution in the Arab world could be categorised as part of this 
equilibrium. Hisham Sharabi (1988) demonstrates that neo-patriarchy characterises the social 
structure of the Arab world. Although the society is superficially modernised, the social 
relationship in the neo-patriarchy is based on traditional ties (such as religions and clans) unlike 
modern Western countries. 
Despite all ideological appearances, the individual’s basic affiliation in “modernized,” 
neopatriarchal society is to the family, the clan, the ethnic or religious group. … In 
social practice the authority of father, tribal head, and religious leader (rather than 
considerations of nation or class) determines the direction and object of individual 
allegiance. This practice strengthens both personal loyalty and dependence, cultivated 
early within the family , and bolsters them within the larger social whole in the system 
of patronage and the distribution of favor and protection (Sharabi 1988: 45). 
Whereas the patronage system provides members of the groups (including those at the lower rank) 
with protection and material benefits, it helps to strengthen the loyalty of group members to the 
group and their identity (Sharabi 1988: 45-48). 
The third equilibrium is characterised as organisational proliferation. In this case, authoritarian 
leaders actively create other organisations to let the new organisations compete with the existing 
launching organisation(s) and to raise cost of its collective action through the following two 
mechanisms: “it forces its leadership to coordinate with the leadership of the other, newly created, 
organizations (which might otherwise come to the rescue of the dictator during the coup); and/or it 
raises the cost of coordination within the launching organization by aligning the incentives of its 
membership with the leadership of another organization” (Haber 2006: 702). Because of these 
characteristics, social welfare provision is provided to the citizens through each organisation. The 
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most successful example of this strategy was Mexican authoritarianism between 1929 and 2000. A 
large number of the population had enforceable economic rights and enjoyed generous welfare 
provision. 
The lack of competition, in turn, allowed industrial workers in PRI-affiliated labor 
unions to have a property right to lifetime job security, as well as rights to a range of 
social welfare benefits that were not available to the general population, such as health 
care, subsidized housing, and retirement pensions. Even groups as disparate as Mexico 
City’s collective taxi drivers, who were members of the PRI’s National Confederation 
of Popular Organizations, obtained a special property rights: they were given exclusive 
routes that prevented the development of a competitive fringe of collective taxis 
(Haber 2006: 704). 
At the same time, this strategy makes social welfare programmes highly fragmented because, as the 
Mexican case indicates, the strategy is likely to accompany state-corporatism, in which each 
organisation is separately associated with the authoritarian leader. “This regime model “will, most 
likely, resemble the ‘conservative welfare regimes’ of advanced industrialized democracies, where 
we find policy privileges granted to civil servants and a large number of occupational groups” 
(Mares & Carnes 2009: 100). 
To summarise, this thesis reveals that the logic of social welfare development under 
authoritarian rule is different from that in democracies. Most scholars in welfare-state studies adopt 
the bottom-up approach to understand understanding the development of social welfare systems 
and their works have contributed to the theoretical development in welfare-state studies. However, 
their theoretical framework is only applicable to democracies, in which freedom of association is 
guaranteed. In democracies, pressure from below, especially the political influence of organised 
labour, plays an important role in the expansion of social welfare systems. In contrast, this thesis 
addresses that mass are generally passive under authoritarian rule and therefore the top-down 
approach is useful when analysing the development of social welfare systems under authoritarian 
rule. Although the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders are the most critical factors in the 
development of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule, popular protests occasionally play 
a important role in the development, functioning as a signal to improve social welfare provisions 
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under authoritarian rule. Second, the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders are determined by 
the relationship between authoritarian leaders and their launching organisations. Moreover, there 
are three paths to the development of social welfare systems in accordance with their survival 
strategies: (1) the terror strategy, (2) the co-option strategy and (3) the organisational proliferation 
strategy. 
Whilst these three strategies are useful to analyse change in authoritarian social systems at a 
stage of their formation, survival strategies of authoritarian leaders are altered by external factors, 
such as economic and political systems and other institutions. Since the 1970s, developing 
countries as well as Western, industrialised countries have experienced the restructuring of social 
welfare systems, as neo-liberal economic thought became dominant in the countries. In this 
restructuring, Western democracies implemented social welfare programmes and changed the 
institutional features in some cases, considering arrangements of existing institutions and pressure 
groups (Pierson 2001). It could be asserted that a similar retrenchment could be observed in 
authoritarian developing countries. Since the 1970s, these countries also experienced pressure to 
move towards political liberalisation. The next section discusses the impacts of the two types of 
liberalisation on social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. 
 
 
1-2.  The Politics of Social Welfare Restructuring: Two Hypotheses 
 
Since the 1970s, developing countries – whether democratic or authoritarian – have 
experienced several changes that have had a significant impact on social welfare systems. The first 
change was economic liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in particular. 
Economic liberalisation was preferred by international donors, such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the US government. In the name of SAPs, international donors requested drastic social welfare 
reform. Democracies have difficulties in implementing such drastic reform because politicians tend 
to avoid unpopular policy including drastic social welfare reform. In contrast, as there are fewer 
obstacles in the absence of efficient democratic instruments, political leaders easily implement the 
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rationalisation of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis 
assumes that the role of social welfare systems would shift to a minimal instrument for poverty 
alleviation. The second change was (quasi-) competitive elections, which provided authoritarian 
leaders with a mechanism to utilise the social welfare systems for their survival and converts the 
institutional goal (Hypothesis 2). This hypothesis assumes that the role of social welfare systems 
would change to a ‘machine’ of authoritarian leaders in (quasi-) competitive elections. 
 
A.  Economic Liberalisation, Structural Adjustment and the Welfare Retrenchment 
Since the 1970s, policy makers began to pay more attention to a neo-liberal approach as the 
failures of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) were revealed. Scholars pointed out several 
reasons for the failures: (1) poor export performance, (2) inefficiency of resource distributions, (3) 
underemployment, (4) poor agricultural performance and (5) corruption. The first reason was poor 
export performance. Although developing countries increased the amount of exports, the main 
buyers of their goods were neighbouring countries, not Western industrialised countries. This 
situation did not meet the original goal – to change the trade patterns between the First and Third 
Worlds, and maintained the need to import finished commodities of capital goods. Although local 
producers successfully replaced imports, the technology and facilities used to produce the 
commodities were imported from industrialised countries. Furthermore, protective barriers 
weakened the competitiveness of their domestic industries and were not effective in promoting 
exports. Consequently, the balance of payments worsened, although this strategy had partly aimed 
at improving the balance by reducing imports. The second reason was the inefficient distribution of 
resources. As trade barriers raised domestic prices, people could buy less than they could in a 
free-trade regime. This restricted the amount of domestic consumption. Moreover, protective 
barriers made firms lazy. They had few incentives to develop new technology in their own country, 
which caused poor product quality and low productivity. The third reason was underemployment. 
ISI strategies aimed to promote the development of capital-intensive industries. The strategies 
created few jobs and restricted the growth of a domestic market. The benefits of economic 
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development were only distributed to restricted groups, such as the owners of the capital and a 
small group of industrial workers. The fourth reason was that the strategies did not only neglect but 
penalised the agricultural sector. States in developing countries transferred wealth in the 
agricultural sector to the modern industrial sector by keeping agricultural producer prices low. This 
choice reduced farmers’ incentives to improve productivity in the agricultural sector. The fifth 
reason was corruption caused by the strategies. The mechanisms of ISI gave states various types of 
discretion. The discretion made room for corruption because the strategies required the state’s 
active intervention in the industrial sector (Rapley 2007: 47-52). 
In response to failures in ISI strategies, neo-classical theorists accordingly asserted the need to 
minimise the role of the state for efficient economic development. The neo-liberal tendency of 
economic policy was accelerated by the formation of conservative governments in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. This change had a significant impact on the policy of international 
financial institutions, especially the World Bank, which were thought to cause drastic changes in 
the Egyptian social welfare system as well. 
The World Bank, which in the 1970s, through its “basic needs” approach, had aimed to 
relieve the misery of the world’s poorest citizens through grassroots development 
projects, suddenly shifted to a neoclassical approach in 1980. Instead of investing in 
specific projects, the Bank began providing loans to governments facing 
balance-of-payments difficulties on the condition that these governments agree to 
implement structural adjustment policies (Rapley 2007: 77). 
This neo-liberal policy was dominant in international financial institutions in the 1980s because its 
opponents were weak both in policy and academic circles (Rapley 2007: 75-79). 
In the MENA region, the neo-liberal tendency was embodied in the form of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs are the most powerful ‘engine’ for economic liberalisation 
and have had a significant impact on the development of social welfare institutions in MENA 
countries. SAPs comprise conditions the recipient governments must agree to when they need to 
borrow money from the World Bank and IMF. Although the contents of SAPs differed and were 
adjusted in a specific country, the ingredients became similar, along the lines of the ‘Washington 
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Consensus’ (Nonneman 1996a: 7). The features can be divided into ten categories: (1) fiscal 
discipline; (2) reordering public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform, enlarging the tax base and 
reducing marginal tax rates; (4) liberalisation of interest rates; (5) a competitive exchange rate; (6) 
trade liberalisation (e.g. low tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers); (7) liberalisation of 
inward foreign direct investment, (8) privatisation of state-owned enterprises; (9) deregulation; and 
(10) legal security for priority rights (Williamson 2003). SAPs aim at reviving economic growth in 
the long term through reducing the role of the state in the market and restructuring the economy in 
favour of the private sector. 
What impact does neo-liberal economic reform have on social welfare systems under 
authoritarian rule? The existing literature suggests that neo-liberal reform, including SAPs, would 
lead to two significant changes in social welfare systems under authoritarian rule: (1) a decline in 
social expenditure and (2) the rationalisation of the social welfare systems. 
The first change is a decline in social expenditure. As neo-liberal economic reform encourages 
governments in developing countries – whether democratic or authoritarian – to open the economy 
to foreign investments, a large number of economic losers are created, who are likely to put 
pressure on governments to obtain compensation for their economic loss via high-level welfare 
provision. Whereas this process has a positive influence on an increase in social expenditure in new 
democracies, it leads to the retrenchment of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. In new 
democracies, the pressure of economic losers for social compensation gives the governments an 
incentive to obtain support from the losers by increasing social expenditure. This expansion of 
social welfare systems in new democracies is caused by effective democratic instruments (such as 
free elections, open legislatures and the freedom of association), by which economic losers can 
organise movement for compensation and exert pressure on ruling elites. In contrast, the lack of 
effective democratic instruments restricts popular influence on public policy under authoritarian 
rule. Under authoritarian rule, people do not have effective measures to represent their complaints 
about economic loss peacefully. Also, the cost of their collective action is quite expensive, because 
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these actions are generally restricted by authoritarian governments (Adsera & Boix 2002; Avelino, 
Brown & Hunter 2005). Neo-liberal economic reform, SAPs particularly, would therefore lead to 
the retrenchment of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. 
The second change is the rationalisation of social welfare systems. Although the IMF and the 
World Bank point out the inefficiency of the social welfare system in recipient countries and argue 
for the downsizing of social welfare expenditure, these organisations also offer technical and 
administrative advice on the rationalisation of social welfare programmes to improve their quality. 
Whilst these organisations had considered social welfare programmes as mere tools for economic 
growth and paid little attention to them until the beginning of the 1990s, their attitude has gradually 
changed. Since the 1980s, UNICEF has put an emphasis on the importance of considering 
humanitarian issues during SAPs, showing a slogan of ‘adjustment with a human face’. It focuses 
on the worsening situations for women and children in many cases in developing countries since 
the SAPs. At the same time, this organisation claims that international financial institutions should 
take into consideration the impact of SAPs on vulnerable people (Jolly 1991). 
Reacting to this criticism, the IMF and the World Bank now attempt to assess the impact of 
SAPs on the poor and to take measures to ease these impacts. The World Bank (1990) referred to 
the importance of government measures towards poverty alleviation for the first time in its official 
publications since SAPs started. It also proposes reform plans for social welfare systems in 
developing countries. Generalized subsidies, for example, are considered an example of inefficient 
social welfare programmes. The IMF and the World Bank express concern about their negative 
impact on the implementing countries’ budgets and domestic economies. The World Bank proposed 
that the SAP-implementing governments should transform generalised subsidies into targeted 
safety nets because otherwise the financially secure enjoy more subsidies than the poor. The report 
proposed alternatives, such as a quota of subsidised food staples to households, food stamps, 
in-kind transfers and direct cash transfers, which do not disturb market mechanisms (World Bank 
1990: 93). More recently, the World Bank began to participate in assessing poverty-reduction 
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strategies (PRS), developed by the recipient governments through partnerships with civil society. 
PRS papers describe the financial needs to improve macroeconomic and social protection policies 
for economic growth and poverty alleviation. The World Bank finances Poverty Reduction Support 
Credits and Development Policy Credits to help governments implement PRS.7 
Authoritarian rule provides leaders with a favourable environment to implement drastic reform. 
According to Deepak Lal, for example, non-democracies are able to implement unpopular 
economic reform more effectively than democracies. In democracies, the government is under 
constant pressure to avoid economic reforms painful for citizens in democracies, in which it needs 
to deal with various competing interest groups. This environment makes the government adopt 
irrational policies in democracies. He argues that harsh reforms are compatible with 
non-democratic regimes (Lal 1997). This policy rationalisation is also thought to be in accord with 
the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders. The policy rationalisation alleviates poverty, which 
eases citizens’ complaints about authoritarian governments and, therefore, enhances their ability to 
continue to rule. This mechanism is supported by several pieces of research dealing with the 
relationship between citizens’ living conditions and the possibility of the dictators’ overthrown – 
for example, Acemoglu & Robinson (2006). Gerd Nonneman also mentions that “domestic political 
calculations may lead a regime or a leader to opt for policy of economic liberalization as a symbol 
of distance from preceding regime. It may, in other words, be a way of gathering legitimacy as a 
‘new born’” (Nonneman 1996b: 37). 
The best example was Pinochet’s Chile. After the 1973 coup d’état and the collapse of 
Allende’s socialist government, Augusto Pinochet appointed many Chicago-educated monetarists 
as policy advisors. Their neo-classical theories were gradually put into practice. They 
recommended a programme of monetarist shock therapy to resolve balance-of-payment problems 
in the country. At the same time, the social welfare system in the country drastically changed. The 
old-age pension programme, for example, significantly changed and began to cover not only civil 
                                                     
7  See the World Bank’s website (http://go.worldbank.org/F7F0ODVEJ0/). 
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servants but all workers. Further reform was implemented in the 1980s. In 1980 the government 
introduced a new savings-based pension programme, which eliminated employer contributions and 
forced workers to save at least 10% of their taxable income in their personal accounts. After 1981, 
this programme became mandatory for all dependent workers. Since the revision, the new pension 
programme is administered by private funds and workers can freely choose the funds (Castiglioni 
2001: 40). The pension programme also has a system to guarantee minimum income: 
The law also provides that the state should grant a minimum pension to all insured 
workers with 20 years of contributions, so that if a worker reaching retirement age 
does not attain the minimum pension level, the state will make up the difference 
(Castiglioni 2001: 41). 
 
The changes in the Chilean social welfare system under Pinochet’s rule have two political 
implications: (1) the ruling coalition and (2) the importance of social welfare in a neo-liberal 
economy. The first implication is that the regime changed its ruling coalition (from a coalition with 
leftist groups, such as urban workers, to that with industrial capitalists) along with the introduction 
of neo-liberal economic and social policy. The Pinochet regime was categorised as bureaucratic 
authoritarianism. This bureaucratic-authoritarian regime aimed at the ‘normalisation’ of the 
economy, based on support from industrial capitalists. Along with the normalisation, the regime 
promoted capital accumulation, which benefited the large oligopolistic private capital. At the same 
time, it attempted to exclude a previously active popular sector from the national political arena. 
“This political exclusion [was] achieved by destroying or capturing the resources (especially those 
embodied in class organizations and political movements) which [had] supported this activation” 
(O’Donnell 1979: 292). 
The regime involved “closing the channels of access for the representation of popular 
and class interests. Such access is [was] limited to those who [stood] at the apex of 
large organizations (both public and private), especially the armed forces and large 
oligopolistic enterprises (O’Donnell 1979: 293). 
In other words, the formation of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime was an attempt to eliminate the 
political influence of the launching organisation – workers and other leftist groups. 
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A similar tendency could be found in the transformation of authoritarian rule in some MENA 
countries, including Tunisia and Algeria. Neo-liberal economic reform was promoted by a shift in 
the ruling coalitions: 
Beginning earlier, but accelerating in the 1990s, the populist ruling coalitions in the 
Arab republics have been replaced by coalitions that still include the military, but rely 
more on commercial agriculture, private industrialists, export sectors, and 
upper-echelon state agents who have moved into the private sector usually with the 
benefit of privatized state assets (King 2009: 7-8). 
 
The second implication is that the new type of authoritarian regime still needed minimal social 
welfare provision, although maintaining fiscal discipline was equally important. The ruling elites 
and its allied members (such as business group members) had two reasons to maintain the 
minimalist social welfare system for their survival. Firstly, a minimalist social welfare system is 
useful for economic growth because it improves human capital, which is a basis of economic 
development, in the country by improving children’s nutritional and educational conditions (Silva, 
Levin & Morgandi 2012: xi). Secondly, the new authoritarian regimes were eager to create various 
poverty alleviation programmes. The World Bank has also addressed poverty alleviation in 
developing countries since the 1990s (World Bank 1990). This is because poverty alleviation would 
contribute to the stabilisation of society. This is why authoritarian leaders maintain minimalist 
social welfare systems even after neo-liberal economic reform. 
When focusing on qualitative changes to social welfare systems during and after neo-liberal 
economic reforms (SAPs, in particular) under authoritarian rule, it should be noted that neo-liberal 
economic reform does not lead to a mere decline in social expenditure. It also promotes the 
rationalisation of social welfare systems. 
Hypothesis 1 – Policy Rationalisation Hypothesis: Authoritarian leaders would 
rationalise social welfare systems. 
The rationalisation of social welfare systems is thought to be a rational choice for authoritarian 
leaders on two counts. First, the rationalisation is generally managed with the World Bank’s 
technical support and advice to SAP implementing governments. Obeying the proposal enhances 
35 
the reputation of the authoritarian leaders among international donors, such as the United States, 
the World Bank and the IMF. Second, authoritarian leaders can afford to invest in projects for 
economic growth and industrialisation by rationalising social welfare systems. This change would 
benefit the new supporters (i.e., business elites) and enable authoritarian leaders to reinforce a basis 
of their regime by strengthening a tie with the new supporters. Consequently, it could be asserted 
that neo-liberal economic reform would encourage authoritarian leaders to replace existing 
inefficient programmes with new programmes, which are more efficient for poverty alleviation (i.e., 
rations of food staples, food stamps, in-kind transfers and direct cash transfers). 
 
B.  Political Liberalisation and Changes of the Social Welfare System under Authoritarian Rule 
The second change in authoritarian countries was political liberalisation. Since the 1970s, 
authoritarian countries have experienced partial political liberalisation, allowing opponents to 
organise political parties. Partial political liberalisation provided opponents with a chance of 
democratisation. Since the Carnation Revolution in Portuguese occurred in 1974, the ‘third wave’ 
of democratisation has had a significant impact on authoritarian countries and increased the number 
of authoritarian countries that experienced democratic transition. In the early 1990s, many people 
around the world felt optimistic about democratic change, witnessing the withdrawal of military 
leaders from Latin America, a collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in the Republic 
of South Africa. 
As the third wave spread to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, and 
elsewhere in the 1990s, democracy promoters extended this model as a universal 
paradigm for understanding democratization. It became ubiquitous in U.S. policy 
circles as a way of talking about, thinking about, and designing interventions in 
processes of political change around the world (Carothers 2002: 6). 
The ‘transition paradigm’ became dominant in academics and communities of policy makers in 
developed countries, especially the United States. 
Despite the expectations about democratisation, many countries in the developing world 
remained authoritarian or went back to authoritarian rule in the mid-1990s. 
Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling “transitional” 
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are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, 
more than a few are not following the model (Carothers 2002: 6). 
Even countries controlled by dictators are more likely to have effective democratic instruments, 
through which opponents challenge the incumbent dictators. Current works in political science 
gradually deviate from the ‘transition paradigm’ and label this type of authoritarian regimes in the 
‘grey zone’ as ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ 
(Ottaway 2003) or ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006). The most important instrument 
among these regimes in the ‘grey zone’ is (quasi-) competitive elections. 
Why do authoritarian leaders need to implement quasi-competitive elections? The factors 
could be divided into two: international factors and domestic factors. The first factor is changes in 
international pressure on democratisation. Western foreign policy changed with the end of the Cold 
War. Western countries, the United States in particular, encouraged authoritarian countries to 
democratise through military and diplomatic pressure, and foreign aid. In the 1990s Western 
government began to provide authoritarian countries with conditional loans that would assist free 
and fair elections, and the protection of human rights. Thus, democracy was embedded in Western 
foreign policy. This change raised the external cost of authoritarian rule and encouraged elites in 
authoritarian countries to bring democracy to their countries. Consequently, authoritarian regimes 
introduced multiparty elections, which made retrogression to the single-party system costly 
(Levitsky & Way 2010: 17-20). 
The second factor is the domestic reason that implementing quasi-competitive elections is a 
rational choice for authoritarian leaders. Firstly, quasi-competitive elections enable authoritarian 
leaders to co-opt elites who could be challengers to the regime. Beatriz Magaloni (2006) explains 
how quasi-competitive elections give incentives to members of the ruling party with reference to 
the Mexican case. 
Autocratic regimes reward with office those [lower-level] politicians who prove most 
capable in mobilizing citizens to the party’s rallies, getting voters to the polls, and 
preventing social turmoil in their districts. The autocracy thus forces politicians to 
work for the benefit of the party and to have a vested interest in the survival of the 
regime (Magaloni 2006: 8). 
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Secondly, winning elections has a signalling effect on elites within the ruling coalition. Barbara 
Geddes (2005) suggests that elections under authoritarian rule work as a signal of the regime’s 
strength through super-majorities. This signal reveals the resource imbalance between the regime 
and the potential challengers and makes them reluctant to organise active movement against the 
authoritarian regime. Her hypothesis is applicable to the Vietnamese case (Malesky & Schuler 
2008). Thirdly, elections function as instruments to co-opt opposed groups. Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) 
demonstrates that authoritarian governments often exploit electoral systems to divide oppositions. 
Some opponents are permitted to enjoy spoils and privileges and participate in policy-making and 
legislative elections. Others are illegalised. This division is based on their ideologies or the size of 
their organisations. Legalised opposition groups become reluctant to cooperate with illegal 
counterparts because of the incentives to stay in this position under this condition. Whereas these 
functions of quasi-competitive elections mainly influence elites, elections under authoritarian rule 
have a significant impact on the citizenry as well. 
The function that most scholars point out is patronage distribution to voters. As authoritarian 
leaders monopolise resources, voters tend to support incumbent leaders regardless of their 
preferences. 
Particularly when the state controls a vast public-sector and state-dependent private 
economy, citizens from all economic strata remain dependent on the state. … 
[B]ecause elections are generally about access to state resources, rather than a 
competition over the rules of the game, voters tend to support candidates who have 
close relations to incumbent elites, and the majority of elites who choose to run in (and 
win) elections are those who are relatively close to the regime (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 
2009: 412). 
Magaloni (2006) names their behaviour as the ‘tragic brilliance’ of the regime: “Citizens’ choices 
are free, yet they are constrained by series of strategic dilemmas that compel them to remain loyal 
to the regime” (Magaloni 2006: 19). It could be asserted that social welfare programmes are also 
exploited for patronage purposes. 
This strategy through social welfare programmes is found in Venezuela and Turkey, for 
example. The first case was Venezuela under Chávez’s rule. Venezuela’s regime under President 
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Hugo Chávez was categorised as authoritarian, although he was elected by a democratic election. 
Since he was elected to the Presidency in 1999, Venezuela had shifted from partial semi-democracy 
towards competitive authoritarianism, concentrating all power in the executive branch into the 
president (Hidalgo 2009: 79). 
His years in office have been marked by executive encroachment and control over all 
manner of state institutions, a steady erosion of institutional checks and balances upon 
executive power and, ultimately, a withering away of democratic governance (Sanchez 
2008: 325). 
Under his rule, important decisions were made by president decrees rather than legislation. In 2006 
the Venezuelan parliament gave President Chávez the special power to legislate by presidential 
decrees for eighteen months. During the period, the president issued 66 decrees (De Venanzi 2010: 
59). 
Despite the authoritarian character of his regime, President Chávez obtained support from 
marginalised people in democratic politics, such as the vulnerable, by exploiting the discourse of 
‘socialism of the twenty-first century’ and providing welfare programmes to them. During his 
presidency, social expenditure as percentage of GDP drastically increased, from 23.6% in 1998 to 
30.97% in 2006 (De Venanzi 2010: 68). President Chávez created social welfare programmes that 
he labelled ‘missions to save the people’.8 The programmes included healthcare in the poorest 
areas (Misión Barrio Adentro), a programme to reduce the illiteracy rate (Misión Robinson), and a 
food subsidy programme to supply cheap foodstuffs directly to the poor by creating discount stores 
(Misión Mercal). According to financial statements by the state-owned oil company, the fund spent 
more than US$ 5 billion (approximately 4.5% of GDP) on these programmes in 2004 
(Penfold-Becerra 2007: 63-65). 
The government was also willing to deliver identification cards to citizens, especially the 
vulnerable, because vulnerable people tend to support President Chávez and identification cards are 
required for elections (Misión Identidad). 
Chávez’s ability to link the social benefits of the programs with his need to assure the 
                                                     
8  As for the evaluation of these programmes, see España (2008). 
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political mobilization of his popular base through the Misión Identidad became the 
cornerstone of his political strategy. Although a large portion of the population 
supported the opposition, Chávez was able to target low-income voters by using the 
misiones to redistribute resources and regain political allegiance. The lack of 
institutional constraints also allowed the government to monitor voters’ behavior and 
exercise credible political threats to citizens through the Lista Tascón [a list of the 
signatures of citizens who petitioned for the recall of President Chávez between 2003 
and 2004], increasing the exit cost for those potential voters thinking about shifting 
allegiance to the opposition (Penfold-Becerra 2007: 75). 
 
Resources for these programmes were raised from oil windfalls received by the state-owned 
oil company and were controlled by the president, not by the central bank or the parliament. 
Therefore, the government did not need to observe the government’s budgetary rule. For example, 
it helped adults who had not graduated from high school to complete their high school (Misión 
Ribas). This programme was administered by the Ministry of Oil and Energy, not by the Ministry 
of Education, and was financed directly by the state-owned oil company. Resources for the 
programme were distributed more to areas in which the majority were pro-Chávez voters 
(Penfold-Becerra 2007: 73-79). Manuel Hidalgo (2009) characterises his rule as ‘petro-socialism’. 
Chávez’s survival strategy was to mobilise marginalised people through generous welfare provision 
to compete with oppositions, addressing the concept of ‘socialism of the twenty-first century’. 
The second case is Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule. Although he was also democratically elected 
to Prime Minister (and President, later), his rule is also criticised as authoritarian by the media. 
Thousands of police and hundreds of prosecutors and judges have been moved from 
their positions since the corruption investigation began in late December. A new law 
has increased the government’s power over the judiciary, even though key provisions 
were thrown out by the constitutional court. The court also found Mr Erdogan’s ban on 
Twitter, which the government previously maintained in defiance of an order by a 
lower tribunal, to be without legal basis (Dombey 2014). 
Prime Minister Erdoğan banned access to YouTube and Twitter. The current authoritarian 
characters triggered protests against the government in 2013. 
Unlike the first, Venezuelan case, the Erdoğan government took neo-liberal measures. When 
Prime Minister Erdoğan took office in 2003, Turkey’s economy was faced with a crisis: “The 
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Turkish lira was devalued by nearly 50%, devastating the savings and incomes of, by some 
estimates, 95% of the population, and the poverty threshold fell below what it had been in 1994” 
(Patton 2006: 513). The government therefore tackled macro-economic stabilisation in accordance 
with the IMF's proposal. To win the general election in November 2002, his ruling party (AKP) 
mentioned the importance of social safety nets for those who were damaged by the economic crisis, 
but after the election the AKP govern willingly eschewed populist measures, stabilising the 
macro-economy (Patton 2006: 513-515). Indeed, AKP grew based on support from the 
conservative, pious business elite, who supported Erdoğan’s economic reform. “It is this socially 
conservative but economically liberal business elite that forms the backbone of the AKP’s support” 
(Barkey & Çongar 2007: 66). The AKP government successfully forms a broad coalition. 
This unprecedented alliance brought together pro-Islamic reformists, bankers and 
financial professionals, and owners of small and medium-sized businesses working in 
sectors that were relatively independent of the state. The new alliance defied 
traditional party loyalties, winning the support, for instance, of both resolutely secular 
and staunchly Islamist business associations (Tepe 2005: 71). 
Because of the government character, the present government’s approach to welfare reform is an 
amalgam of liberal residualism and social conservatism. “This conservative liberalism with an 
Islamic touch dominates the reform process without a serious countervailing opposition from the 
advocates of a rights-based approach to social policy” (Bugra & Keyder 2006: 213). 
The government reinforces residualist characteristics of the social welfare system, exploiting 
the system for elections. There are several features when focusing on Erdoğan’s strategy through 
social welfare provision. The first feature is to exploit the social assistance programme, delivered 
by the Social Solidarity Fund, to mobilise those who were excluded from the Bismarckian social 
insurance programme in a way similar to Hugo Chávez’s. When Prime Minister Erdoğan took 
office, the government began to increase expenditure on the programme, from only 1.376 billion 
lira (US$ 560 million) in 2002 to 30.4 billion lira ($12.4 billion) in 2014, and justified the policy by 
addressing the necessity to ‘achieve EU averages’ (Cetingulec 2015) 
The coverage of the Green Card [a means-tested medical assistance scheme] was 
expanded, with improved access to health benefits, and conditional cash transfers to 
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poor families based on both the children’s school attendance and vaccination records, 
and payable to the female head of the household, were introduced. These measures 
most probably had a positive impact on the votes that the governing AKP received in 
the East and Southeast Anatolia where poverty levels are extreme (Bugra & Candas 
2011: 521). 
At the local level, municipality governments controlled by the AKP deliver additional assistance to 
millions of people. “When this aid is added to the national social assistance [programme], the 
number of families benefiting is much higher than 3 million, and the number of people benefiting 
exceeds 13 million” (Cetingulec 2015). 
The second feature is to exploit charity associations as a tool for the survival. The Erdoğan 
government addressed the role of religious associations in social welfare, using the discourse of 
Islamic philanthropy. An AKP-affiliated politician, for example, founded an NGO to manage 
micro-credit in the poor south-eastern region. At the municipality level, municipality governments 
found ‘social funds’ which collect contributions from local companies. Local companies are willing 
to pay a contribution, looking for a return “in the form of privileges accorded to these companies in 
their business-related interactions with the local political authorities” (Bugra & Candas 2011: 522). 
These activities lack transparency and have no systematic mechanism of means-testing. Their 
distributions are discretionarily made by their donors or members of their executive boards (Bugra 
& Candas 2011: 522). 
These two cases suggest a hypothesis based on the relationship between the survival strategies 
of authoritarian leaders and income distribution instruments after introducing (quasi-) competitive 
elections under authoritarian rule: 
Hypothesis 2 – Pork Barrel Hypothesis: Authoritarian leaders exploit social welfare 
systems and target specific groups (or social strata) with generous welfare provisions 
to win (quasi-) competitive elections. 
The introduction of multiparty elections forces authoritarian leaders to compete with their 
opponents and win (quasi-) competitive elections. Authoritarian leaders can also make a portion of 
the citizenry depend on the state’s largesse, or social welfare provision in this case, for their 
livelihood (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009: 412). It is therefore rational for authoritarian leaders to 
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distribute social expenditure to specific groups, the vulnerable in particular, rather than to make a 
payment to a wide range of the population. 
In summary, the political and economic structural changes since the 1970s – (1) neo-liberal 
economic reform, structural adjustment in particular, and (2) the introduction of multiparty election 
systems – have a significant impact on social welfare systems under authoritarian rule. The former 
change would lead to the rationalisation of social welfare systems (Hypothesis 1). Whereas 
authoritarian leaders are isolated from popular pressure to oppose drastic social reform in the 
absence of effective democratic instruments, obeying the proposal on drastic social welfare reform 
enhances the reputation of authoritarian leaders among international donors, such as the United 
States, the World Bank and the IMF. Furthermore, the rationalisation of social welfare systems 
enables authoritarian leaders to invest in projects for economic growth and industrialisation. As a 
result, it could be asserted that neo-liberal economic reform would encourage authoritarian leaders 
to replace existing inefficient programmes with new programmes, which are more efficient for 
poverty alleviation (such as ration of food staples, food stamps, in-kind transfers and direct cash 
transfers). The latter change would lead to the expansion of social welfare systems with the 
introduction of (quasi-) competitive elections under authoritarian rule (Hypothesis 2). The 
introduction of multiparty elections forces authoritarian leaders to compete with their opponents 
and win (quasi-) competitive elections. To win (quasi-) competitive elections, authoritarian leaders 
exploit social welfare systems and target specific groups (or social strata), the vulnerable in 
particular, with generous welfare provision. 
 
 
1-3. The Theoretical Framework 
 
Although the previous section indicated the two hypotheses, they are too simplified to 
understand long-term change in social welfare systems. Many historical institutionalists propose 
various theoretical frameworks to analyse long-term institutional change. James Mahoney (2000) 
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points out that the current research on long-term institutional change has three key features. The 
first feature is that “path-dependent analysis involves the study of causal processes that are highly 
sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence.” The second 
feature is that “in a path-dependent sequence, early historical events are contingent occurrences that 
cannot be explained on the basis of prior events or ‘initial conditions.’ Since these early historical 
events are of decisive importance for the final outcome of the sequence, this criterion rules out the 
possibility of predicting a final outcome on the basis of initial condition”. The third is that, “once 
contingent historical events take place, path-dependent sequences are marked by relatively 
deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of as ‘inertia’ – i.e., once processes are set into 
motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in motion and 
continue to track this outcome” (Mahoney 2000: 510-511). In addition, Paul Pierson also 
characterises these works using four dimensions: 
(1) Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to positive feedback, 
a range of outcomes is generally possible. 
(2) Contingency. Relatively small events, if occurring at the right moment, can have 
large and enduring consequences. 
(3) A critical role for timing and sequencing. In these path-dependent process, when an 
event occurs may be critical. Because early parts of a sequence matter much more than 
later parts, an event that happens “too late” may have no effect, although it might have 
been of great consequence if the timing had been different. 
(4) Inertia. Once such a process has been established, positive feedback will generally 
lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to change [italics 
in original] (Pierson 2004: 44). 
Their two types of the characterisation indicate that historical institutionalism is suitable when 
analysing a causal mechanism in small-N studies, like this research. 
Current work on historical institutionalism criticises the existing approach in historical 
institutionalism for the ‘punctuated equilibrium model’, which is premised on the strict division of 
two mechanisms: institutional formation and the durability of institutions. Therefore, current 
research does not consider earlier research using the punctuated equilibrium model to be suitable 
for explaining institutional changes. According to their argument, the older model cannot explain 
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institutional change without external shocks and can manifest only drastic institutional change 
through external shocks. James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen (2010) draw on a new framework to 
explain institutional change. Their work attempts to answer why the roles of a specific institution 
substantially change although the institutional arrangement is stable on the surface (Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010). 
However, it should be noted that the existing historical institutionalist approach also has 
several useful concepts for explaining long-term, gradual institutional changes. Although models in 
the earlier works were static and might not explain institutional changes (Arthur 1989; David 1985), 
most works in historical institutionalism do not consider institutional characters to be unchangeable. 
As Kathleen Thelen (1999: 385-386) remarks, “for those who are disadvantaged by prevailing 
institutions, adapting may mean biding their time until conditions shift, or it may mean working 
within the existing framework in pursuit of goals different from ― even subversive to ― those of 
the institution’s designers”. Moreover, if actors become aware that there are few incentives to 
maintain institutions which were beneficial for them before, institutional change happens 
(Mahoney 2000: 516-526). When focusing on these characters in historical institutionalism, this 
thesis introduces three key concepts to analyse long-term changes to the social welfare system 
during Mubarak’s Egypt: (1) critical junctures, (2) path dependence and (3) reactive sequence. 
 
A.  Critical Junctures 
The first concept of ‘critical junctures’ is defined as “a period of significant change, which 
typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is 
hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier & Collier 2002: 29). Although there are many 
junctures which determine a pathway of institutional development, some of them are ‘critical’ 
because, once a choice is selected, it becomes impossible to return to the initial point. “Once a 
particular option is selected [at a critical juncture], it becomes progressively more difficult to return 
to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2000: 513). James 
Mahoney emphasises the importance of actors’ choices: 
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In many cases, critical junctures are moments of relative structural indeterminism 
when wilful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal 
circumstances permit ... these choices demonstrate the power of agency by revealing 
how long-term development patterns can hinge on distant actor decisions of the past 
(Mahoney 2001b: 7).  
Once an actor makes a choice (i.e., survival strategies of authoritarian leaders in this case), this 
decision becomes a critical juncture and builds institutional legacies that will restrict options 
following authoritarian leaders in the future. 
This concept of ‘critical junctures’ is not new and has been referred to in various classical 
works (Gerschenkron 1962; Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Moore 1967). These scholars regarded 
institutions as enduring productions of the past political struggle, addressing the importance of 
timing and sequence of historical changes. Although they put an emphasis on critical junctures in 
their works, they tended to overlook a mechanism to reproduce and reinforce the institutions they 
analysed. For instance, their terms of ‘freezing’ and ‘crystallization’ seem misleading because these 
words suggest “that things stand still, when in fact we know intuitively that organizations such as 
political parties or unions with roots in the nineteenth century must adapt to myriad changes in the 
environment in order to survive into the twentieth century” (Thelen 1999: 391). The classical works, 
therefore, “obscure more than they reveal unless they are explicitly linked to complementary 
arguments that identify the mechanisms of reproduction at work” (Thelen 1999: 391). 
Ruth Collier & David Collier (2002) therefore conceptualise ‘critical junctures’, focusing on a 
process to create the legacy. They divide such a process into three elements: 
(a) Mechanisms producing a legacy: The legacy often does not become explicit right 
after the critical juncture but is formed through several processes to crystallise the 
legacy; 
(b) Mechanisms reproducing the legacy: In addition to the producing mechanisms, 
there are on-going political and institutional effects to reinforce the legacy; and 
(c) Stability of the core attributes of the legacy (Collier & Collier 2002: 29-31). 
Their work addresses how a critical juncture creates several mechanisms, some of which are 
self-reinforcing, to lead to path-dependent institutional changes. 
It is necessary to consider details on the concept of critical junctures. Hillel David Soifer 
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criticises that the conceptualisation is not sufficient to use to explicitly explain causal mechanisms 
of long-term institutional changes. He proposes the distinction between permissive conditions and 
productive conditions in critical junctures. Permissive conditions can be defined as “necessary 
conditions that mark the loosening of constraints on agency or contingency and thus provide the 
temporal bounds on critical junctures” (Soifer 2012: 1572). They could be likened to “a window of 
opportunity in which divergence may occur, and that divergence may have long-term consequences” 
[italics in original] (Soifer 2012: 1575). Productive conditions “in the presence of the permissive 
conditions, produce the outcome or range of outcomes that are then reproduced after the permissive 
conditions disappear and the juncture comes to a close” (Soifer 2012: 1573). Although each type of 
condition is necessary, the two are jointly sufficient to lead to a specific outcome. 
It should be noted that, to discuss ‘critical junctures’ for the development of social welfare 
systems under authoritarian rule, it is necessary to mention the relationship between political and 
economic structures, and social welfare systems. As discussed above, existing literature on welfare 
states suggests that political and economic structures determine actors’ behaviour and the design of 
social welfare systems. Scholars dealing with the power resource mobilisation theory assume that 
modern welfare states are constructed on the basis of democratic institutions. Walter Korpi (1983), 
for example, argues that democratic institutions enabled organised labour to influence the 
expansion of a social welfare system in Sweden. They assume that the relationship between a state 
and citizens (especially organised labour) determines the design of social welfare systems in 
industrialised countries (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983). More recently, many scholars have 
asserted that economic systems have a significant impact on the design of social welfare systems in 
industrialised countries, contrasting coordinated market economies to liberal market economies 
(Ebbinghaus & Manow 2001; Hall & Soskice 2001; Kitschelt et al. 1999): 
In coordinated market economies, a dense network of business organizations as well 
as the provision of patient capital by firms facilitates high levels of investment in firm- 
or industry-specific skills. The presence of these institutions of nonmarket 
coordination affects the social policy preferences of employers and workers in these 
economies and the formation of cross-class alliances in support of social policies that 
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protect investment in skills. … By contrast, in liberal market economies, firms’ 
incentives to undertake long-term investments in the skills of their workers are lower 
because of weak employers’ associations and fluid capital markets. In this context, 
cross-class alliances among employers and employees are less likely to form, and 
business is more likely to press for the deregulation of labor markets and for 
reductions in social policy benefits (Mares & Carnes 2009: 101-102). 
 
The same assumption could be found in studies on social welfare in (authoritarian) developing 
countries. Most scholars assume that development strategies – export-led industrialisation 
strategies or ISI strategies – have a significant impact on the design of social welfare systems 
because social welfare systems are expected to contribute to industrialisation (Wibbels & Ahlquist 
2007, 2011). In countries that adopted export-led industrialisation strategies, capitalists were likely 
to need a skilled workforce and low labour costs in the labour market to ensure domestic industry 
remained internationally competitive. They preferred investing in human resources through 
education to redistribution through large social welfare systems. Consequently, the amount of 
expenditure on social welfare was restricted and social welfare systems did not drastically develop 
in these countries. In contrast, in countries that adopted ISI strategies, capitalists sought a large 
number of workers who were capable of domestic industrial production. These workers were 
expected to be consumers who could purchase their commodities. As social welfare systems 
continued to stimulate domestic consumption by generously distributing resource to workers and 
protecting workers from various social risks (injury and sickness, in particular), capitalists were 
generally tolerant of large social welfare systems. Consequently, ISI strategies are likely to shape 
large social welfare systems (Mares & Carnes 2009: 102). Although this approach does not 
consider actors’ political motives, it suggests a strong connection between economic strategies (and 
economic structures that were established by these strategies) and social welfare systems. 
Stephan Haggard & Robert Kaufman (2008) assert that a turning point for the development of 
social welfare systems in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe was in the mid-twentieth 
century and that there were two key components to explain the development: (1) a critical 
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realignment and (2) economic development strategies (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 44-72).9 A 
critical realignment is defined as “a discontinuity in both the composition of the political elite and 
in the political and legal status of labor and peasant organizations and mass political parties” 
(Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 45). Repertoires of economic development strategies include ISI, 
export-led industrialisation and socialist industrialisation strategies. When reframing their concepts 
in accordance with the framework of this thesis, each component could be divided as follows: 
A permissive condition of the critical juncture: a discontinuity (or change) in the 
political elite 
Productive conditions of the critical juncture: political strategies towards labour, 
peasant organisations and mass political parties; and economic development strategies. 
Under the permissive condition, the obstacle for the expansion of social welfare systems (such as 
dominant actors who are not interested in the expansion) is removed. Under the productive 
conditions following the permissive condition, new political leaders shape social welfare systems, 
which endure for a long time. 
Latin America: The permissive condition in Latin America was the formation of a reformist 
challenge to the agro-export oligarchies, which had been dominant since the mid-nineteenth 
century. In the oligarchic regimes, political participation was limited to upper and middle classes. 
Challengers to the old regimes created the productive conditions. First, the new regimes attempted 
to co-opt organised labour, for example, by passing comprehensive labour codes (the 
organisational proliferation strategy). Second, the regimes deepened ISI strategies. They were 
adopted to protect domestic manufacturing through high rates of trade tariff, a multiple-exchange- 
rate system, and subsidies. Although domestic industries had been protected since the initial stage 
of ISI strategies in the mid-1930s, the strategies were deepened to promote the domestic 
manufacture of consumer durables, intermediates and even capital goods in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Mexico between the 1960s and 70s. ISI strategies led to labour-market dualism 
(between formal and informal sectors) and the exclusion of the agricultural sector. These political 
                                                     
9  In addition to the two components, they address the importance of regime types (democracy or 
authoritarianism) as a factor to explain the development of social welfare systems. 
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and industrial strategies determined the character of the social welfare systems, which were more 
favourable to urban, formal-sector workers than to citizens in the urban informal sector and the 
agricultural sector. Social-insurance-based pension programmes, for example, covered urban 
formal workers whilst urban residents in the informal sector were excluded or provided with 
minimal welfare provision (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 46-51, 61-65). 
East Asia: The permissive condition was the formation of anti-communist regimes. Political 
leaders did not adopt the organisational proliferation strategy and repressed labour and popular 
movements. The regimes were allied with industrial capitalists and distributed rents to them (the 
co-option strategy – Productive Condition 1). Their economic development strategies were 
export-led industrialisation. The regimes prioritised economic growth over egalitarian income 
distribution, obtaining legitimacy through economic growth (Productive Condition 2). Although the 
political leaders were eager to promote foreign investments and distribute rents for expert-led 
industrialisation projects, they lacked incentives to expand social welfare systems. Instead, they 
promoted active investment in human resources and education, which fitted the preferences of 
capital for highly-skilled workers. Investments in fundamental education and occupational training 
were essential in order to upgrade labour quality and accomplish further economic growth. These 
countries in East Asia therefore paid more attention to educational expenditure than social 
insurance programmes and restricted the size of social welfare systems under authoritarian rule 
(Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 51-56, 65-69). 
Eastern Europe: The permissive condition was the formation of communist regimes and the 
political dominance of Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union. The communist regimes 
attempted to control all political, social and economic activities. They eliminated other political 
parties and independent associations and attempted to integrate these organisations into the 
Communist Party (the organisational proliferation strategy – Productive Condition 1). In 
addition, the regimes made a comprehensive and controlling economic plan (Productive Condition 
2). In contrast to the East Asian case, the industrialisation strategies adopted by Eastern European 
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countries created comprehensive social welfare systems, in which the government played an 
overwhelmingly large role. The government was in charge not only of guaranteeing full 
employment but providing basic foodstuffs. As these countries lacked private markets for insurance 
and social services, the government planned and implemented all social welfare services (e.g., 
pensions and healthcare). Also, this model can be characterised by the fact that their social welfare 
systems covered not only urban workers but rural workers. The policy of collectivising agriculture 
provided a by-product that the universalist welfare institutions, such as social insurance and 
services, enabled the communist governments to control the rural sector (Haggard & Kaufman 
2008: 56-59, 69-71). 
What were the permissive and productive conditions for the development of social welfare 
systems in MENA countries, including Egypt? Although Haggard & Kaufman (2008) do not refer 
to the MENA case, it is possible to assume these conditions by comparing the three cases in their 
work. The permissive condition was the appearance of nationalist leaders, such as Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk in Turkey, Habib Ben Ali Bourguiba in Tunisia and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. The 
productive conditions were (1) co-option of organised labour and peasants and (2) the ISI strategy, 
similar to the Latin American case. The ISI strategy put an emphasis on the role of the government 
in the process of industrialisation. Along with this strategy, these countries undertook populist 
measures to co-opt organised labour and peasant groups into their ruling coalition (the 
organisational proliferation strategy). Consequently, the social welfare systems were expanded 
and favourable to employees in the urban formal sector (Hinnebusch 2006; Richards & Waterbury 
2008). This thesis examines what impact these critical junctures, which the Egyptian social welfare 
system experienced during the Nasser era, thereafter had on the development of the Egyptian social 
welfare system, focusing on the relationship between political and economic structures and the 
social welfare system. 
 
B.  Path Dependence 
The second important concept is ‘path dependence’, which is also defined by several scholars 
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in institutionalism, historical institutionalism in particular. Margaret Levi (1997), for example, 
defines the concept as follows: 
Path dependence does not simply mean that ‘history matters.’ This is both true and 
trivial. Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or 
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other 
choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an 
easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better is a tree, rather than path. From 
the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is 
possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other ― and essential if the 
chosen branch dies ― the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to 
follow (Levi 1997: 28).  
This concept can be understood in the mechanism of positive feedback. Once an institution creates 
a network of interests groups, political decisions are influenced by such networks, which are likely 
to strengthen this institution in order to further their interests. In such a mechanism, the creation of 
an institution leads to the self-reinforcing process, which makes it difficult to change from one 
pathway of the institutional development to another (Pierson 2004). This self-reinforcing process 
has a significant impact on the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders through social welfare 
systems under authoritarian rule. 
It should be noted that the distributional effects of institutions and power asymmetry have 
significant impacts on mechanisms of positive feedback in politics. According to Pierson (2004), 
for example, actors able to control a specific institution have an incentive to expand their influence 
and powers by utilising such an institution. As Kathleen Thelen (1999) states, moreover, 
institutions are not neutral mechanisms for coordinating actors’ interests but reflect power 
asymmetry among actors in a political arena. This type of literature emphasises that a specific 
institutional arrangement continues contributing toward the empowerment of a certain group and 
restricting others’ political influence. “The distributional biases in particular institutions or policies 
‘feed back’ so that over time, some avenues of policy become increasingly blocked, if not entirely 
cut off as decisions at one point in time can restrict future possibilities by sending policy off onto 
particular tracks” (Thelen 1999: 394). 
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Cases of positive feedback can be often found in studies on the welfare state in Western 
industrialised countries. Take Esping-Andersen (1990), for example. His ‘conservative-corporatist’ 
model10 offers an example of positive feedback. This type of the welfare state is based on the 
notion of a single breadwinner. In these countries, therefore, it is pointed out that women have few 
incentives to enter the labour market, which is one of the reasons why ratios of female labour 
market participation are low in this model. Wolfgang Streeck (1992) provides another example of 
the positive feedback mechanism. His research on the German political economy demonstrates that 
an institutional arrangement in the German social welfare system (e.g., vocational training 
programme and centralised bargaining system) determines private firms’ strategies, which are 
likely to reinforce existing institutions. Business pursues strategies based on high-skill and 
high-value-added production, which locks in the German pathway of economic development. 
This framework has been developing along with the literature on the welfare state. Theda 
Skocpol’s (1992) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers is a good example. She demonstrates that the 
“fragmentation of the state, as well as the organization of party competition along patronage lines, 
actively mediated against the development of a unified working class that could then spearhead the 
movement for comprehensive social policies in the United States” (Thelen 1999: 394). At the same 
time, she asserts that this political structure reinforced the existing social policies that the US 
government implemented. After the Civil War, social welfare provision for veterans and their 
widows created a strong interest group involved in social policies. Its lobbying encouraged the 
government to develop social policies for them and marginalised interests of other groups in these 
policies. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare state strengthens Skocpol’s argument on 
positive feedback. Although strong organised labour offers an engine for developing the generous 
welfare programmes in the universal model, this pathway is contrasted to the US case, which is an 
example of the liberal model. His explanation is compatible with what Skocpol attempts to 
demonstrate in her book. 
                                                     
10  He categorises welfare state in Western industrialised countries in into three: (1) the universalist 
model (represented by Scandinavian countries), (2) the conservative-corporatist model and (3) 
the liberal model (represented by Anglo-Saxon countries). 
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The concept of positive feedback is currently applied to cases of social welfare development 
outside Western, industrialised countries. Developing countries experienced expansion of social 
welfare systems in response to two structural changes since the 1970s. The first significant change 
is economic liberalisation. The second is democratisation. Unlike the Middle Eastern case, most 
countries in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe experienced democratic transition 
between the 1980s and 1990s (the ‘third wave’ of democratisation) (Huntington 1991). These 
changes encouraged social welfare systems in these three regions to drastically expand, which 
increased their social expenditure. Expansion was determined by institutional legacies from the 
mid-twentieth century. Economic liberalisation revealed that social welfare programmes were 
important to mitigate social risks and encouraged the losers of economic liberalisation to struggle 
for their social rights. Democratisation provided them with a chance to increase their benefits 
through social and political movement. At the same time, democratic transitions created 
opportunities for subordinate actors (the launching organisations) to utilise institutional structures 
for their own interests. 
In Latin America, the main welfare programme (such as the social insurance programme) 
targeted the urban middle class and workers in the formal sector. Although this programme had not 
covered workers in the countryside, democratisation contributed to the formation of strong pressure 
groups, such as trade unions. These groups had an influence over the decision-making process. 
Moreover, “public-sector unions, particularly those with institutionalized influence over the 
management of social-security funds, were often able to exert important concessions in the course 
of pension reform. The highly centralized health and education sectors also proved resistant to 
change” (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 200). In Eastern Europe, trade unions also played an 
important role in the expansion of social welfare systems. They functioned as representatives of 
workers, defended their entitlements and created a new social safety net. “Eastern European unions 
continued to encompass a much larger segment of the workforce than those in Latin America or 
East Asia. At least in some cases, they were also able to mobilize support for large-scale protests 
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and even general strikes in defense of entitlements” (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 199). The 
resistance to social welfare reform in Latin America and Eastern Europe was caused by the 
feedback effect. The institutional structure that was constructed during the previous authoritarian 
rule provided specific actors (e.g., trade unions) with resources to resist the reforms. 
In contrast to these two cases, in democratised East Asian countries the limited welfare 
provision under the previous authoritarian rule provided politicians with incentives to expand the 
social welfare systems as a way of winning elections. Trade unions did not play an important role 
in the expansion of social welfare systems because of the weak union movement in this region. 
Instead, conservative governments took the initiative in the expansion of welfare provision. The 
absence of leftist groups therefore had several effects on the character of the expansion. 
In Korea and Taiwan, for example, politicians were attracted first and foremost to 
broad middle-class entitlements – pensions and particularly healthcare – and in 
Thailand a number of initiatives were less redistributive in design that they might have 
been. When government either initiated unemployment insurance or expanded it, …. 
They did so in conjunction with initiatives designed to increase labor-market 
flexibility (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 259). 
Even after the expansion, the main goal of social welfare programmes did not change, and the 
social welfare systems contributed mainly to economic development rather than income 
distribution. 
In comparison with the three cases above, the MENA case was thought to be more 
path-dependent because democratic transitions did not occur in this region. Although most MENA 
countries began to implement partial economic liberalisation in the 1970s, its effects differed from 
those in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe for three reasons. The first factor was that the 
economic liberalisation policy was restricted and did not overcome the dominance of the public 
sector in the economy (Richards & Waterbury 2008). The second was the lack of democratic 
transition, as discussed earlier. The third factor was that MENA countries, even non-oil producing 
countries, benefited from a rise in oil prices in the 1970s. A drastic increase in oil prices increased 
not only revenue from oil exports in oil-producing countries but also foreign aid in non-oil 
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producing countries (Richards & Waterbury 2008: 50-57). Economic liberalisation created a 
number of losers, like other cases in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe. Although 
pressure was exerted on the governments and social expenditure increased, this expansion was not 
an effect of democratisation and the result of positive feedback effect under authoritarian rule. In 
the 1970s, MENA countries (including the non-oil producing countries) benefited from a rise in oil 
prices, which gave their authoritarian leaders an opportunity to exploit the existing social welfare 
systems. The authoritarian leaders undertook further populist measures to obtain popular support by 
using economic rents that were created by oil price hikes. At the time, governments expanded 
social welfare programmes, especially subsidies for fuel and foodstuffs. This populist tendency 
continued until the beginning of SAPs in the 1990s.11 
 
C.  Reactive Sequences 
Although most scholars tend to explain path dependence as an outcome of positive feedback, 
there is another factor for path dependence: ‘reactive sequences’. James Mahoney (2001b) 
addresses differences between two different periods in path dependence: (1) institutional and 
structural reproduction and (2) reactive sequences. Whereas a period of institutional and structural 
reproduction is characterised by positive feedback and self-reinforcing mechanisms, a period of 
reactive sequences follows a period of positive feedback.  
Reactive sequences are triggered by actors’ resistance to prevailing institutions or structures. 
Counter-reaction to the actors’ resistance may also occur. 
The mechanisms driving reactive sequences differ substantially from those that 
characterize processes of structural and institutional reproduction. Whereas 
mechanisms of institutional and structural reproduction are marked by self-reinforcing 
and positive-feedback processes, reactive sequences are characterized by 
transformative and backlash processes in which there is movement toward reversing 
previous patterns (Mahoney 2001b: 10). 
This concept is important when analysing changes in the social welfare system in the Mubarak era 
because his era could be characterised as one of different acts of resistance to the existing social 
                                                     
11  As for the Jordanian case, see Andoni & Schwedler (1996) and Ryan (1998). 
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welfare system. 
Since the 1980s, social welfare systems in MENA countries (including Egypt) have been 
strongly influenced by various structural changes, as discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter: (1) structural adjustment and a shift of the ruling coalition, and (2) political liberalisation. 
These structural changes encouraged actors (authoritarian leaders, in particular) to amend existing 
social welfare systems. First, structural adjustment forced them to rationalise the social welfare 
systems (see Hypothesis 1). However, this tendency was limited by popular protests. The IMF and 
the World Bank suggested that governments in the MENA region should implement further reform 
to rationalise subsidy programmes and create social safety nets more favourable to the vulnerable 
(IMF 2014; Silva, Levin & Morgandi 2012). Nonetheless, inefficient social welfare programmes 
(such as energy and food subsidies) still survive. In Jordan, for example, food subsidies were de 
facto maintained by the government even during structural adjustment (Kawamura 2015). 
Second, the introduction of multiparty elections stimulated them to concentrate resources on 
specific social groups, such as vulnerable people, in order to mobilise them in (quasi-) competitive 
elections (see Hypothesis 2). However, MENA countries do not have the fiscal discretion to 
mobilise specific groups for the three factors. The first factor is that international donors are 
sensitive to increases in fiscal deficits in aid-recipients countries. The second factor is that MENA 
countries prioritise national security expenditure over social expenditure (UNDP 2009). The third 
factor is that authoritarian leaders failed to implement social welfare reform. Therefore, what 
authoritarian leaders in this region can do is to maintain existing populist social welfare systems 
within tighter fiscal restrictions. This tendency is obvious from the following IMF report: 
MENA countries spend on average much more on subsidies than other regions, and 
have increasing difficulty financing them. Total pretax energy subsidies in 2011 cost 
$237 billion – equivalent to 48 percent of world subsidies, 8.6 percent of regional GDP, 
or 22 percent of government revenue. They amounted to $204 billion (8.4 percent of 
GDP) in oil exporters and $33 billion in oil importers (6.3 percent of GDP). For 2012, 
preliminary IMF estimates show that pretax subsidies for diesel and gasoline only, 
which represent about half of total energy subsidies in MENA, were 3.8 percent of 
regional GDP. Food subsidies are also common in MENA countries, though less costly. 
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In 2011, they amounted to 0.7 percent of GDP for the region, though they were 
distributed unevenly among countries (Sdralevich et al. 2014: ix). 
 
To analyse such path-dependent change in the Egyptian social welfare system, this thesis 
focuses on two cases: (1) the food subsidy programme (Chapter 4) and (2) the public employment 
programme (Chapter 5). These two cases are suitable to test the two hypotheses for two reasons. 
First, these two social welfare programmes contributed to the import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy in the Nasser era. The food subsidy programme functioned as a mechanism for transferring 
wealth in the agriculture sector to the industrial sector by providing inexpensive foodstuffs to urban 
workers. The public employment programme aimed to supply human resources to the expanding 
public sector by guaranteeing public sector jobs to graduates of higher education institutes (the job 
guarantee scheme). Second, these two programmes were considered to be obstacles to further 
economic growth in the Mubarak era. In the wave of economic liberalisation, international donors 
attributed the fiscal deficit to these two programmes. Additionally, they believed these programmes 
distorted the economic system. The Mubarak government therefore found it difficult to justify the 
value of these programmes, compared to conventional social welfare programmes (such as social 
insurance and social assistance). These programmes were thought to be vulnerable to (both political 
and economic) structural change. Pressure was exerted on the Mubarak government to reform (and 
eliminate) these programmes. These programmes were therefore ideal illustrations of how the 
social welfare system was altered by structural, political and economic change and yet resisted such 
structural change. 
This thesis reveals how these social welfare programmes ‘path-dependently’ changed. It could 
be asserted that these programmes (the food subsidy programme and the public employment 
programme) survived through the Mubarak era. Although the government might cut expenditure on 
these programmes during the Mubarak era, their key institutional features established in the Nasser 
era (especially their formal features) did not change. To understand the institutional change, 
therefore, this research investigates institutional continuity and change from the Nasser era until the 
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Mubarak era (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
 
 
1-4.  Research Methods 
 
To reveal the causal mechanisms of change in the Egyptian social welfare system, it is 
necessary to demonstrate how authoritarian leaders, President Hosni Mubarak in particular, dealt 
with the social welfare system in the survival strategies. Although the best research method is to 
interview those responsible for the Egyptian social welfare policy in order to explore their 
intentions and test hypotheses, this thesis does not interview actors related to the social welfare 
system (such as authoritarian leaders and the ruling elite). First, this thesis includes a politically 
sensitive topic – assessing public policies under the previous regime (the Mubarak regime). Egypt 
has experienced two regime changes since the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010 and the subsequent 
overthrown of the Morsi government by the military in 2013. It is difficult to find suitable 
interviewees during such a politically sensitive periods and personal safety is an issue. Second, key 
civil servants have already retired or moved to other departments. Therefore, there are not many (if 
any) suitable bureaucrats to interview. Even though it is possible to interview current bureaucrats 
responsible for the case social welfare programmes, it is difficult to obtain useful information other 
than mere anecdotes or their individual opinions. For these reasons, this thesis does not use 
interviews as the main source to test the hypotheses. 
Instead, this thesis draws largely on secondary sources. There are various secondary sources 
on this topic, as many scholars have already published articles and books on the political economy 
of Nasserism, structural adjustment, political structures of modern Egyptian authoritarianism and 
specific welfare cases (such as food subsidies and reforms of the public sector). This thesis 
attempts to use their findings to test the two hypotheses, adopting process tracing method to reveal 
the causal mechanism of change in the social welfare system. Although it is impossible to reveal 
strategies and intentions of actors, information in secondary sources enables the author to infer 
their intentions and strategies. However, it should be noted that their works are biased as they 
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analyse cases from their perspective. To correct the bias and inter actors’ intentions more carefully, 
this thesis also uses several primary sources: (1) statistical data, (2) newspaper articles, (3) 
government publications and (4) interviews (only for cross-checking). 
(1) Statistical data: This study uses several types of statistical data, which track quantitative 
change. As many scholars have focused on the political economy of Egyptian authoritarianism, 
especially Nasserism, there is a plenty of statistical data on changing in political and economic 
structures and the social welfare system in academic literature. Additionally, international 
institutions, such as the World Bank and think tanks have published statistical data. Data on food 
subsidies, for example, is available in reports published by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and the World Bank. 
Government statistics issued by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) cover a wide range of areas and provide useful data for this study. The CAPMAS 
collects data specific to price subsidies, including food subsidies, and publishes A Study of 
Subsidised Baladi Bread (CAPMAS 2014). Data offered by these institutions includes expenditure 
on food subsidies and the efficiency of the programme as a poverty alleviation programme. Data on 
public sector employment can be collected from several think tanks in Egypt, such as the Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies (ECES) and the Economic Research Forum (ERF), because these 
think tanks analyse the impact of public sector employment on the economy, the budget and human 
development. Their data reveals wage levels in the public sector and levels of wage satisfaction for 
public sector workers. The CAPMAS regularly publishes the Annual Bulletin of Civil Servants in 
the Government, Public and Public Business Sector (CAPMAS 1986-2012), which indicates 
change in the number of employees in the public sector. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) 
constantly publishes the Economic Review quarterly and the Annual Report annually, which are 
used to reveal the amount of expenditure on public sector wages. This data indicates what impact 
the survival strategies of authoritarian leaders had on specific programmes and beneficiaries (for 
example, public sector workers in the case of the public employment programme). 
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It should be noted that the credibility of statistical data is limited. First, most of the 
publications referred to in this study do not cover the whole analytical period that this study covers. 
This study needs to combine several sources of statistical data published by different authors, 
which may fail to indicate continuous changes in expenditure on the case programmes (such as 
food subsidies and public employment). This study, for example, refers to expenditure data on 
government employees’ wages published by the CBE (CBE 1983-2002/03, 2004/05-2012/13). In 
some cases, the statistical data books in different publication years report the different amounts of 
expenditure in a specific fiscal year. It might be because the government changed the standard of 
collecting the data or because the government intentionally changed the data for some reasons. 
Consequently, it is not clear how much the government actually spent on the case programmes (i.e., 
the public employment programme in particular). As each set of data may use the original standard 
to collect and organise the data, it is necessary to take these continuous changes with a pinch of salt. 
Second, the credibility of government statistics also needs to be mentioned. Generally speaking, 
governments have an incentive to distort the statistical data for several reasons. For example, 
economic and social reform is supervised by international donors during structural adjustment. 
Consequently, the governments might report distorted statistical data to these donors in order to 
enhance their reputation by showing that the governments sincerely implement the economic and 
social reform that the international donors suggest. This situation was applicable to Egypt (see 
Hypothesis 1). As most of the statistical data published by international organisations (such as the 
World Bank and the IMF) and research institutes represented by the IFPRI were based on statistical 
data offered by the government, it is necessary to recognise that this data might be also biased in 
the same way as statistical data published by the government itself. 
(2) Newspaper articles: Newspapers often report public statements by government members, 
such as the president and ministers in Egypt. These statements are useful for understanding the 
attitudes of the ruling elites towards the social welfare system. The Egyptian Gazette, which is the 
government official newspaper, has covered government statements since the 1952 Revolution. In 
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addition to The Egyptian Gazette, this thesis also draws on several newspapers written in English – 
Al-Ahram Weekly and Ahram Online. However, the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime 
may have led to distortion and restrictions in their articles and reduced their credibility. Articles 
published in the period of interest might be distorted as a result of the editors’ self-censorship or 
government censorship. Moreover, whereas Arabic newspapers mainly target domestic readers, 
English-language newspapers in the Arab world are often tailored to ‘sell’ an image to external 
communities and contain different content to Arabic-language newspapers. Thus, this thesis uses 
articles in international newspapers, such as the New York Times, the Financial Times, The Times, 
The Economist and Reuters as a double-checking , which could correct articles’ distortions 
stemming from authoritarian political bias, to some extent. 
However, it should be also noted that there is always bias in domestic or international 
newspapers. The first is a bias caused by the authoritarian character of the Egyptian regime. This 
thesis uses both domestic and international newspapers to double check information. International 
newspapers are relatively free from self-censorship or censorship by the Egyptian government, 
compared to domestic newspapers, but their articles are also written based on news sources 
obtained from domestic news sources and government figures. As the government tends to restrict 
information that is unfavourable to it, readers are only given information that is favourable to the 
Egyptian government or trivial. In other words, information that is unfavourable to the Egyptian 
government does not come to the surface. 
(3) Government publications: Government publications shed light on how the government at 
the time thought about the social welfare system and programmes in the case studies. As Egypt has 
a legacy of socialism, the Egyptian government constantly publicised master plans for economic 
development from the Ministry of Planning (MoP) – the Five Year Plans (see MoP (1977) and MoP 
(1982), for example). In these plans, the government mentioned the relationship between economic 
development and the social welfare system and therefore the publications help us understand how it 
would deal with social welfare programmes. Although the contents of the statements were 
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superficial, the public statements addressed the importance of social welfare programmes in 
economic development. As discussed above, it is necessary to consider the authoritarian characters 
of the Egyptian regime and to modestly assess their statements when testing the hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, government publications are important tools of analysis. 
(4) Interviews (for cross-checking): The author interviewed (1) scholars, (2) journalists and 
(3) those working for international institutions during fieldwork conducted in Cairo, Egypt in May 
2014. All of the interviews were conducted in their offices and in English. The first category is 
scholars. The author selected interviewees who specialise in Egyptian social welfare policies and 
publish articles in English-language academic journals or reports published by Egypt-based think 
tanks (such as the ECES and the ERF). They work at local universities (such as the American 
University in Cairo, the German University in Cairo and Cairo University) or think-tanks (such as 
the ECES, the ERF, the Population Council, and the Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic 
Studies). Some of them were introduced by Prof. Bahgat Korany (Professor at the American 
University in Cairo) and others were directly contacted by the author. The second category is 
journalists working for Al-Ahram, who were introduced by Prof. Bahgat Korany. Some of them 
provided the author with several reports written in Arabic, which are referred to in this thesis. The 
third category is the local staff working for UNICEF and the World Bank. Dr. Daniela Pioppi 
(Senior Fellow at the Instituto Affari Internazionali, Italy) introduced them to the author during 
fieldwork. Some of them gave the author publications, statistical data and anecdotes related to the 
topic of this thesis. 
The author could not interview government officials and politicians who were responsible for 
social welfare policy during the Mubarak era. Most of them were already retired or moved to other 
departments and it is impossible to find them to conduct interviews. Although the author 
interviewed journalists and experts on social welfare policy in Egypt instead, most of the 
information provided by the interviewees can be substituted to the published information because 
they were not necessarily involved in a policy-making process of social welfare programmes at the 
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time. This thesis therefore uses the interviews only for cross-checking. Although they are not 
directly mentioned in this thesis, the statistical data and publications they offered are cited in this 
thesis. In addition, as it is difficult to assess their credibility, their anecdotes are not cited in this 
thesis. These interviews did, nevertheless, enable the author to improve the theoretical arguments in 
the thesis by reflecting on interviewees’ comments and arguments. 
 
 
*************** 
In the following chapters, this thesis traces a causal mechanism of how the Egyptian social 
welfare system had changed since the interwar period until the Mubarak era. Chapter 2 explains 
the development of the social welfare system since the inter-war period, focusing on its relationship 
with political and economic structures. This chapter is divided into two parts. The former part 
focuses on a critical juncture for the development of the social welfare system in the Nasser era. 
Permissive and productive conditions of the critical juncture were as follows: 
A permissive condition of the critical juncture: the 1952 Revolution (by which 
political actors who had been dominant in the previous era were excluded from the 
political arena and obstacles for the expansion of the social welfare system were 
eliminated) 
Productive conditions of the critical juncture: the nationalisation of British and 
French companies during the Suez War and following Arab socialist policies (which 
encouraged the Nasser government to expand the social welfare system for ideological 
justification through generous income distribution). 
The latter part of this chapter explains the populist expansion of the social welfare system during 
the Sadat era, focusing on the positive feedback effect and structural reproduction. An income gap 
created by the economic open-door policy (infitah) forced encouraged the Sadat government to 
search for another source of the legitimacy. An increase in external resources (such as the Suez 
Canal fees and oil revenues) enabled the government to expand populist welfare provision to ease 
popular discontent with the infitah. The Sadat government exploited the ideology of ‘socialism’ to 
legitimise the expansion, which intensified the populist features of the social welfare system and 
generated positive feedback. As a result, the populist social welfare system was reproduced and 
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strengthened during the Sadat rule. Chapter 3 focuses on path-dependent change in the social 
welfare system during the Mubarak era. As the economic and political structures that had sustained 
the populist social welfare system changed, the Mubarak era was categorised as a period of 
‘reactive sequence’. This chapter analyses how the social welfare system was now driven by its 
own dynamics regardless of political and economic structural change. Social deprivation caused by 
political and economic structural change obliged the Mubarak government to maintain the existing 
populist social welfare system. While the fiscal deficit restricted the ability of the government to 
further expand the system, the discourse of the ‘social contract’ which had been strengthened by the 
positive feedback in the Sadat era made it difficult for the government to implement drastic social 
reforms. The Mubarak government continued to spend heavily on the populist social welfare 
system, neglecting financial misallocation in the system. To understand the detailed causal 
mechanism of change in the social welfare system, the following two chapters focuses on two 
specific social welfare programmes – the food subsidy programme (Chapter 4) and the public 
employment programme (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter	2	
The	Development	of	the	Social	Welfare	System	in	Modern	Egypt	
 
This chapter discusses the development of the social welfare system since the inter-war period. 
It demonstrates that the 1952 Revolution was a critical juncture for the development of the social 
welfare system by comparing the system between the pre-revolution and the Nasser era. To explain 
this historical development, first, it explains how social welfare programmes were established and 
developed in the era of the British Protectorate. At the time, the development of the social welfare 
system was restricted by the political economic and economic structures: (1) a triangular power 
struggle between the British authority, the King & the landlords and (2) an initial stage of 
industrialisation. Under such conditions, political leaders had no incentive to expand the system. 
Second, the chapter focuses on the drastic expansion of the social welfare system in the Nasser 
era. It considers two sets of conditions for the critical juncture: permissive and productive 
conditions. The 1952 Revolution – the permissive condition – removed obstacles blocking the 
expansion of the social welfare system by excluding the British Authority and the Palace from the 
political arena and eliminating the political power of the landlord class through the agrarian reform. 
Following the revolution, Egypt experienced the Suez Crisis – one of the productive conditions. 
Accordingly, socialist ideas were consolidated among the ruling elite after nationalisation. As a 
result, the social welfare system consisted of two layers: (1) industrial programmes and (2) 
residualist programmes. The industrial programmes were pro-labour and connected to Nasser’s 
industrialisation project. In contrast, the residualist programmes were important for strengthening 
the legitimacy of the regime, although they did not directly contribute to his industrialisation 
project. Although social welfare programmes could be divided into two categories, they had 
generally populist features and aimed to achieve distributive justice. This feature led to 
path-dependent change in the social welfare system thereafter. 
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Third, the chapter explains the populist expansion of the social welfare system in the Sadat era. 
The economic open-door policy (infitah) created an income gap. Whereas the ‘haves’ obtained 
more wealth, the ‘have-nots’ suffered from inflation. Unlike the Nasser government, which was 
sustained by his popularity, the Sadat government needed to ease the complaints of the infitah 
losers. Moreover, the introduction of multiparty elections benefited the business elites who 
increased their wealth through the infitah. At the time, an increase in external resources (such as the 
Suez Canal fees and oil revenues) encouraged the government to ease the complaints through 
generous welfare provision. To resolve the deficit of distributional justice, the Sadat government 
reinforced the populist characteristics of the social welfare system. Consequently, social insurance 
was expanded to cover the more vulnerable, such as casual workers and the self-employed. At the 
same time, a new non-contributory pension programme was introduced (the Sadat Pension). As a 
consequence, the boundary between industrial and residualist programmes was blurred. 
Simultaneously, the populist expansion of the social welfare system changed the features of 
existing social welfare programmes, such as the food subsidy programme (Chapter 4) and the 
public employment programme (Chapter 5). Such populist expansion was legitimised by a form of 
‘socialism’ that was totally different from what Nasser had manifested – Arab socialism. The Sadat 
government exploited the concept of ‘socialism’ to legitimise the expansion. This concept was 
developed after the food riots in 1977, which indicates that, as discussed in Chapter 1, mass 
movements were reactive to decisions of authoritarian leaders, unlike democratic countries where 
they played an important role in the development of social welfare systems. Although his 
‘socialism’ was a mere manifesto that the government would deliver social welfare benefits by 
expanding the social welfare system, it reinforced the populist social contract discourse and 
restricted the other options that the Mubarak government could pursue (as will be explained in 
Chapter 3). 
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2-1.  The Social Welfare System in the Era of the British Protectorate 
 
The quality of social welfare programmes before the 1956 Revolution was poor. These poor 
social welfare programmes can be explained by examining the political and economic structures in 
the era of the British Protectorate. Although the Khedivate of Egypt had been an autonomous 
province of the Ottoman Empire, the First World War changed its status. As the Ottoman Empire 
entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria, Britain occupied Egypt and declared the 
establishment of the British Protectorate over Egypt to maintain the sea lane to India. The British 
Authority deposed the ruling khedive and his successor declared himself the Sultan of Egypt. At the 
same time, the British Authority abolished the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suspended the 
constitution and suppressed anti-British movement (Quraishi 1967: 32-33). 
 
A.  The Political Economy of the British Protectorate 
In the era of the British Protectorate, the economic structure could be characterised as the early 
stage of industrialisation. At the time, Egypt was at an ISI’s initial stage. In theory, when this stage 
finishes, simple manufacturing imports are replaced by the domestic products in an industrialising 
country. To shelter such industries as textiles, clothing, household utensils, and food products, from 
foreign manufacturers, the government introduces protective measures, such as high tariffs. As a 
result of such protective policies, the consumer-goods industries rapidly developed in Egypt: 
In 1932 Egypt imported 22,500 tons of cotton goods, eighteen years later the quantity 
had fallen to 5,000 tons. Over roughly the same time-span output of cotton yarn rose 
from 3,000 to 50,000 tons and production of fabrics from 93 million metres in 1938 to 
225 million metres by 1950. … By 1939 Egyptian manufacturers already met almost 
local demand for sugar, alcohol, cigarettes, milled cereals, glass, shoes, cement, soap, 
and furniture (O’Brien 1966: 223-224). 
At the time, the role of the state in economic development was restricted to regulation, maintenance 
of irrigation and limited support to business. The private sector played an important role in industry, 
agriculture, finance and service (Harik 1997: 17-18). 
In the 1920s industrialisation prompted the growth of a labour movement. In February 1921, 
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the first National Centre of Trade Unions was established. This organisation was strongly 
connected with the Socialist Party, which adopted communism thereafter, and had approximately 
3,000 members. These members were workers in big companies, such as Egyptian Oil Industries, 
the National Spinning Company, and Abu-Shanab Oil factory. This communist-controlled 
organisation was utilised as a tool for advertising anti-capitalist propaganda. For communists, 
workers’ complaints were merely a resource to use to attack industrialists. The communists incited 
strikes and occupation of factories, such as the factory occupation at the National Spinning 
Company and the Egyptian Oil Industries on 22 February 1924. These incidents resulted in the 
arrests of the ring-leaders (Deeb 1979a: 189). Although the number of urban workers was relatively 
small in the inter-war period, their power was stronger: 
The Industrial Census of 1927 gives 215,000 as the number of those employed in 
industry, while in 1937, the figure was 273,000, giving an increase of 58,000 or 27%. 
The working class was geographically concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria: 49% in 
1927 and 47% in 1937 of the total number of workers were employed in these two 
main cities. Thus the concentration in those cities of the workers could have made the 
class potentially more powerful than it appeared to be in sheer numerical strength 
[underline in original] (Deeb 1979b: 12). 
 
The political structure at the time was characterised by a triangular power struggle between the 
Palace, the British Authority and the Wafd Party. The Wafd Party was established along with a rise 
of Egyptian nationalism after the First World War. It aimed to counterbalance the British Authority 
and the Palace and further the struggle for independence from British rule. Although the party was 
based on rural middle class and high-status urban groups, such as “the professionals (lawyers and 
doctors in particular), non-bazaar business men and financiers, industrialists, and the intellectuals 
(professors, students, authors, newspaper editors)” (Binder 1966: 224-225), it successfully 
mobilised a broad range of social classes and played an important role in the nationalist movement 
against the British rule in 1919. Eventually, their efforts led to the formal independence of the 
country from British rule in 1922 and the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution. However, the 
Wafd Party was too weak to truly challenge the British rule. Indeed, the Wafdists needed the 
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support of the British Authority to challenge the Palace and to return to power in 1942. Moreover, 
the party was not a unified political party, as it was divided into several factions heavily dependent 
on personal leadership (Ayubi 1995: 106-107). 
The political actors, political parties in particular, were likely to carry favour with the labour 
movement. The Wafdists were most successful in organising their labour movement and 
emphasised the communist threat, recognising the importance of industrial peace between 
employees and employers. The Wafdist trade unions established their national centre, the General 
Union of the Workers of the Nile Valley in 1924. The president, ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, thought of 
the General Union as an intermediary between employees and employers (Deeb 1979a: 191). The 
Great Depression activated the labour movement in the early 1930s. The impact of the Great 
Depression on the labour market in Egypt was significant. The economic crisis encouraged 
employers to cut wages and to lay off workers. After the economic crisis, wages were reduced by 
more than 40% in comparison with wages in 1923 and employers increased the use of child labour 
in order to cut labour costs. To alleviate such social problems, the General Union of Labour 
Syndicate of Egypt sought to bring in new progressive labour legislation, such as social insurance, 
limiting maximum working hours, and the equity of Egyptian and foreign workers in privileges and 
wages (Deeb 1979b: 233-237). 
The labour movement was however restricted for three reasons. First, although the Wafdists 
were progressive in comparison to supporters of the Palace, most Wafdists regarded trade unions as 
a threat to political security and insisted that trade unions remain illegal. Wafdist Prime Minister 
Ismail Sidqi (1930-33) was apprehensive that, although the Wafdists cooperated with the General 
Union of Labour Syndicates, the General Union would increase its influence in the Wafd Party. He 
was also an industrialist and became vice-president of the Federation of Industries in 1929 (Deeb 
1979a: 198). Second, progressive social policies were opposed by institutions representing 
industrialists’ interests, even though various Wafdist governments after the Sidqi administration 
recognised the importance of winning labour movement around to their side and attempted to 
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implement progressive policies again: 
The Wafdist Cabinet tried to pass a law organizing trade unions but was faced with 
stiff opposition from the Advisory Labour Council and the Labour Department headed 
by R. M. Graves. The Advisory Labour Council had a total membership of thirty-six 
but of which two members only represented the workers. The major objections to the 
proposal came from the representative of the Federation of Industries, Henri Naus, 
who was against the organization of trade unions on the basis of establishment or 
factory, for he preferred them to be organized on the basis of crafts. He was also 
opposed to the establishment of branches of trade unions because this would have 
been tantamount to the formation of a federation of trade unions. These ideas incurred 
strong opposition from the Wafdist trade unions which accused the Advisory Labour 
Council [of] being unrepresentative and of hampering the enactment of legislation 
(Deeb 1979a: 200). 
Third, progressive Wafdists were not actively involved with this issue. As the Palace often harassed 
Wafdists, the Wafd Party prioritised issues of national unity over complex social problems and did 
not represent the interests of peasants in order to maintain its organisational cohesion (Binder 1966: 
224). Thus, workers’ interests were not fully represented by political parties under the monarchical 
rule, despite the active labour movements. 
 
B.  The Limited Social Welfare System in the Era of the British Protectorate 
These political and economic structures constrained the development of the social welfare 
system in this era. Although some modern social policies had been introduced in the nineteenth 
century, the beneficiaries were restricted to small social groups, including bureaucrats. A pension 
programme was introduced in 1854, but it covered only bureaucrats, such as civil servants and 
military personnel (El-Meehy 2009: 76). Although active unionists proposed several progressive 
proposals, the proposals were rejected by the landlord and industrialist class, and the Palace. As the 
government began to recognise the importance of comprehensive social policies, it formed a 
commission on this topic, chaired by ‘Abd al-Rahman Rida. The Rida Commission put forward 
several far-reaching proposals, referring to progressive welfare states in Europe. It argued that the 
government should make “the employer responsible for providing housing, food, schooling and 
health care, [limit] the working day to nine hours, and [prohibit] the employment of children under 
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twelve” (Tignor 1982: 26). Despite its proposals, the Egyptian Federation of Industries argued “that 
industrial conditions in Egypt were different from those in Europe, that Egypt was at an early stage 
of industrial growth and was seeking to attract foreign and domestic capital through the cheapness 
and docility of its labour force, and that the Egyptian worker was different from his European 
counterpart, having more limited needs and a more restricted social horizon” (Tignor 1982: 26). As 
a result of such pressures, new labour laws enacted in the 1930s lacked rules on social insurance for 
sickness, old-age, and unemployment (Tignor 1982: 26-27). 
Social legislation was also superficial during this period although the Wafdist government 
enacted some minor social laws. In 1932 the government invited the International Labour Office to 
send a mission, which was expected to provide policy recommendations on social reforms. It 
accepted the government’s claim that “Egypt was too underdeveloped to consider anything beyond 
minimal protective legislation for women and children and accident compensation” (Solidarity 
Center 2010: 7). As a consequence, the government enacted restricted social laws on the 
protections of minors and women in 1932 and on workers’ compensation in 1936 (Solidarity Center 
2010: 7-8). Although the workers’ compensation scheme covered not only industrial workers but 
also agricultural workers operating machinery, the provision was small.1 In 1942, furthermore, a 
law to recognise trade unions was passed for the first time. This was a strategy used by the 
government to compete with the Palace for workers’ political support (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 114). 
The end of the Second World War saw citizens paying more attention to social problems in the 
country. In 1950 the government introduced a social assistance programme. This programme 
consisted of two programmes: ‘pensions’ and ‘social aid’. One distinction between the two “was 
that pensions were given for an indefinite period of time, while aids could be given for only twelve 
months” (Garrison 1976: 181).  Another distinction was “the concept of right; a pensioner was 
entitled to the pension whereas applicants for social aids had no right to the money but were 
granted assistance only at the discretion of the Ministry and within the limits of money 
                                                     
1  The 1936 Law was complemented by the Compulsory Insurance Law and the Law for Work 
Hazard Compensation in 1942 (El-Meehy 2009: 77-78). 
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appropriated for this purpose” (Garrison 1978: 282).2 The quality of the programme however 
remained poor. The government expended only 6 million Egyptian pounds (£E) per annum, or 
0.5% of the national income, on this programme (El-Meehy 2009: 81). Some of the ruling elites 
considered this programme to be a waste of money and argued that it would be more appropriate to 
subsidise industrialisation instead. 
The government admitted that the benefit levels were very low, below the real needs 
of human life, but insisted that benefits must be below the minimum wage. The 
explanation attached to the law offers a further justification for the low benefits; It is 
also to be remembered that beneficiaries under this scheme have hitherto been living 
somehow and that they are not entirely without any resources of any kind-in other 
words, they are not absolutely destitute. Thus, although an applicant had to prove 
destitution before receiving assistance and although most income was deducted from 
pensions, the Ministry analyst stated that other resources would (of necessity?) be 
added to the income of the pensioners. Finally, it appeared that the poor could do 
magic with their small grants. One official of the Ministry of Social Affairs responded 
to criticism of low benefit levels with a proverb: ‘Cake in the hands of the poor is a 
wonder,’ i.e., even though the benefits are low the poor can do much with what little 
they get (Garrison 1978: 282-283). 
The opposition to this scheme led to further expenditure cuts and reduced provision. The 
government still asserted that social assistance would be a right, but an amended law stated that the 
right would be restricted within the limits of the money which was distributed to this scheme 
(Garrison 1978: 284). 
The low quality was related to an administrative process determining who was eligible for the 
pensions. Local committees, which were entitled to approve applications for assistance, consisted 
of the mayor (in rural areas), all the local notables (shaykh al-balad), and the tax collector. 
The influence of the local landlords on these committees was undeniable. The law thus 
gave additional power to those who were already powerful, who constituted the 
authority structure of the village, thereby reinforcing the semi-‘feudal’ paternalistic 
relationships of the village. Ahmad Husayn [architect of the bill] even wrote that the 
law should help each citizen feel ‘that society is his helpful father’ and that when this 
happens ‘each person will carry out his duty honestly and effectively’ (Garrison 1978: 
                                                     
2  “This time period could be extended by the Department for up to two years, or for those also 
eligible for pensions or suffering from tuberculosis, leprosy, or mental disease, for up to four 
year” (Garrison 1976: 181). 
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283). 
 
 
2-2.  State-Led Industrialisation and the Expansion of the Social Welfare System 
in the Nasser Era 
 
Whilst the social welfare system had been restricted in the era of the British Protectorate, the 
1952 Revolution, which was led by the Free Officers, was a turning point for the development of 
the social welfare system. As discussed in Chapter 1, a critical juncture becomes truly ‘critical’ by 
working both permissive conditions and productive conditions. Permissive conditions are necessary 
conditions which loosen constraints on agency or contingency. They could be likened to “a window 
of opportunity in which divergence may occur, and that divergence may have long-term 
consequences” (Soifer 2012: 1575). Productive conditions follow permissive conditions and create 
outcomes that are reproduced even after the permissive conditions disappear (Soifer 2012: 
1572-1573). In this context, the 1952 Revolution was a permissive condition for two reasons. First, 
new political leadership – the Free Officers excluded the British Authority from the political arena 
and ended the British Protectorate. Second, they implemented agrarian reform, eliminating the 
political power of the landlord class, which had been a powerful supporter of the Wafd Party. At the 
time, the government did not adopt the etatist economic system and attempted industrialisation 
dependent on the private sector. These political and economic features had a significant impact on 
the design of the new social welfare system. After the 1952 Revolution, the government recognised 
the importance of social welfare programmes as tools for industrialisation. It paid more attention to 
economic growth than generous income redistribution. The size of the social welfare system was 
therefore restricted. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a productive condition. As the 
government needed to justify the Canal’s nationalisation, it actively adopted the etatist economic 
system. In 1962 the government declared the introduction of Arab socialism. The nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal and ensuing Arab socialist policies (the productive conditions) encouraged the 
government to treat the social welfare system as an ideologically justified mechanism for Arab 
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socialism. 
Consequently, the social welfare system in the Nasser era had ‘dualist’ features, consisting of 
two programmes: industrial programmes and residualist programmes. The industrial programmes 
were pro-labour and designed to contribute to Nasser’s industrialisation project, represented by (1) 
the social insurance programme, (2) the food subsidy programme (see also Chapter 4) and (3) the 
public employment programme (see also Chapter 5). Although these programmes benefited urban 
workers’ organised labour, they had few impacts on the rest of the population. The corporatist 
connection with organised labour provided organised labour with a channel to influence public 
policies, including social welfare policy, especially after the consolidation of socialist ideas. The 
government needed to implement programmes (such as the social insurance programme) along 
with the idea of Arab socialism – fair income distribution to urban workers. At the same time, these 
industrial programmes were linked with industrialisation projects. The social insurance programme, 
for example, distributed its profits to investment in government’s industrialisation projects. In 
contrast to them, the residualist programmes were not necessarily connected with industrialisation 
projects. The development of the residualist programme was mainly motivated by Arab socialism. 
To obtain popular support, especially from the vulnerable, the government expended populist 
programmes that benefited them. It should be noted that, although the introduction of Arab 
socialism fuelled the residualist programmes, the level of the expansion was restricted because it 
was motivated by an ideology rather than practical reasons. Despite the dualist characteristics of 
the social welfare system, social welfare programmes had entirely populist features, aiming at 
distributive justice. This feature led to path-dependent change in the social welfare system 
thereafter. 
The structure of this section is as follows: (1) explaining political and economic features in the 
Nasser era, focusing on the permissive condition (the 1952 Revolution) and the productive 
conditions (the Suez Crisis and following Arab socialist policies); and (2) focusing on the dualist 
social welfare system and analysing the development of the industrial, core social welfare 
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programme (i.e., the social insurance programme), the residualist programmes (i.e., universal 
healthcare and the social assistance programme), and am ambiguous case – the housing 
programme. 
 
 
2-2-1.  The 1952 Revolution and the State-Led Industrialisation: A Critical Juncture 
for the Development of the Social Welfare System 
 
A.  The Permissive Condition: The 1952 Revolution 
In 1952 Gamal Abdul Nasser organised the Free Officers, who consisted of anti-regime 
officers in the Egyptian military, and staged a coup d’état. This conspiracy successfully overthrew 
the old regime with the support of the military, which could be the launching organisation for the 
new regime according to the definition discussed in Chapter 1. At the time of the coup (the 1952 
Revolution), the direction of the country’s development was not determined because the Free 
Officers came from various ideological backgrounds, ranging from the right (such as Islamism) to 
the left (such as Communism). Such political circumstances were reflected by the first constitution 
in 1953.3 “In order to maintain overall unity between the Free Officers during their first years in 
power, the 1953 provisional constitution empowered the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council] 
with the responsibility of formulating national policy” (Kassem 2004: 17). 
Among the Free Officers there was a consensus that the political actors who had been 
dominant in the pre-revolutionary era should be removed from the political arena. Although the 
Palace immediately lost its political influence, the King maintained his position until the 
declaration of the republic in 1953. The British Authority had already reduced its political influence 
after the Second World War. Although British troops withdrew to the Suez Canal zone in 1947, they 
still controlled the Suez Canal, which stimulated anti-British nationalist movements. In response to 
the rise of nationalism, the new government began to negotiate with the United Kingdom to 
                                                     
3  This constitution was amended four times, in 1956, 1958, 1962, and 1964, during Nasser’s 
presidency. Each constitution reflected the political situation. Whereas the 1953 provisional 
constitution aimed at collective rule by members of the Free Officer, four amended constitutions 
were justified Nasser’s individual rule (Kassem 2004). 
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evacuate British troops from the Suez Canal zone in April 1953. Britain and Egypt reached an 
agreement in October 1954. The agreement concluded that British troops should withdraw from the 
Egyptian territory within twenty months and declared the supersession of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, which had provided British troops with various privileges and exemptions. Although the 
agreement stipulated that Egypt should maintain the Canal Base and offer it to British troops in the 
case of a future war, the influence of the British Authority on domestic politics drastically 
decreased (Vatikiotis 1991: 388-390). The landlord class also lost its political and economic 
influence as a result of agrarian reforms. The Agrarian Land Reform Law in 1952 restricted the 
amount of land owned by one person to 200 feddans, although there were several exceptions. This 
measure aimed to reduce the political and economic influence of the landlord class and Greek 
moneylenders, who played the major role in providing rural credit (Sadowski 1991: 59). 
A dominant player in the pre-revolutionary era, the Wafd Party was also dissolved by the Free 
Officers. They had no intention of returning to the old, pre-revolutionary style of party politics. 
Instead, they founded a new political front, the Liberation Rally in January 1953. It aimed to block 
politicians in the pre-revolutionary era from their effective participation in decision making. 
There has never been any intention of granting an effective voice to the members of 
the mass party. The purpose of the mass party has been exploitative, since [it was] 
means of mobilizing sentiment for the regime and … means of rendering the masses 
unavailable to alternative leaders (Binder 1966: 227). 
At the same time, the Liberation Rally successfully mobilised students in demonstrations in the 
favour of the new revolutionary government (Blaydes 2011: 30). Consequently, the 
previously-dominant political actors in the pre-revolutionary era were all excluded from the 
political arena, which meant that obstacles to the development of the social welfare system were 
removed. 
Instead of political elites in existing political parties, the new government considered 
organised labour to be a potential supporter of the new regime. The Liberation Rally created the 
Labour Bureau in its organisation, which was expected to function as a channel to trade unionists.  
Its Labor Bureau, which was charged with building ties with the labor movement. … 
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Over time the Labor Bureau supplanted the Labor Department in the MSA [Ministry 
of Social Affairs] as the agency for dealing with workplace and union issues, and 
unionists were expected to always show their loyalty to the regime by frequenting the 
Liberation Rally office (Posusney 1997: 52). 
This relationship was reinforced by a power struggle among the Free Officers, especially between 
General Mohammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. To compete with General Naguib, 
Colonel Nasser mobilised trade unions. In March 1954, he mobilised a trade union – the Cairo 
Transport Workers’ Union, which subsequently played an important role in his political struggle 
with Naguib. To support Nasser’s ‘continuation of the revolution’, workers in the transportation 
sector embarked on a strike in Cairo. This strike paralysed the city for two days. It did not merely 
help reinforce Nasser’s rule but had an important consequence for the relationship between the 
government and organised labour (Kassem 2004: 91). “By November 1954, Naguib had lost his 
political influence to Nasser. Under the pretext that the president had been collaborating with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Naguib was tried and placed under house arrest, which cleared the way for 
Nasser to become president” (Kassem 2004: 13). The power struggle determined the relationship 
between the government and organised labour, which had a significant impact on the development 
of the social welfare system in the Nasser era. 
Simultaneously, the power struggle transferred the character of rule, from collective rule by 
the Free Officers to Nasser’s individual rule. When the RCC was dissolved and Nasser was elected 
President in 1956, Nasser’s rule was formalised by the constitution. The 1956 constitution entitled 
the president to appoint and dismiss ministers, shifting from the parliamentary to the presidential 
government system. Through this system, Nasser replaced some of the Free Officers with civilians 
loyal to him (Kassem 2004: 17).4 Indeed, “whereas in 1954 Nasser used his closest associates to 
strengthen his position against Naguib and civilian opposition groups, now with consolidation of 
his position in 1956 after the elimination of his opponents he brought more civilians into the 
government to head new departments concerned with economic, agrarian and social problems. 
Such alternation of personnel for his retention of power … was a trademark of Nasser’s rule and 
                                                     
4  At that time, for instance, Gamal Salim, Anwar al-Sadat, and Hasan Ibrahim were expelled. 
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political style throughout his Presidency” (Vatikiotis 1991: 388). 
Although the Free Officers initially had no intention of entirely controlling the economy, they 
recognised the importance of an active role for the state in industrialisation projects. In the 1950s, 
Egyptian industrialisation began to shift from the initial stage of industrialisation (mainly based on 
light industries) to the next stage. For further economic growth, therefore, active intervention by 
the state was needed because of the absence of a domestic industrial bourgeoisie in Egypt. Thus, 
the new government embarked on industrialisation projects in chemicals and engineering products. 
Although it encouraged private companies to participate in these projects, it was directly involved 
in their finance and management (O’Brien 1966: 84). 
The 1952 Revolution removed obstacles for the social welfare development, such as 
conservative political actors who had been dominant in the pre-revolutionary era. Also, the 
subsequent power struggle between Nasser and Naguib revealed that organised labour played an 
important role in the new political arena. However, the Revolution did not provide the new 
government with a strong driving force for the consolidation of the social welfare system. In other 
words, the 1952 Revolution was a permissive condition, not a productive condition, for a critical 
juncture of the social welfare development in Egypt for two reasons. First, government 
commitment to industrialisation projects was limited, although it actively intervened in several 
industrialisation projects. The industrialisation projects depended heavily on investment from the 
private sector. The new government also had no intention of playing a pivotal role in the economy 
and wanted to restrict its role to financial support and planning in industrialisation projects. 
Therefore, the size of the public sector remained small and welfare provision by the state were 
restricted to those of the pre-revolutionary era. Second, the new regime did not successfully 
institutionalise the relationship with organised labour even though Colonel Nasser mobilised trade 
unions during the political struggle against General Naguib. The government found the Liberation 
Rally to be a failed organisation and replaced it with the National Union in 1956. These political 
and economic features changed after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, which was one 
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of the productive conditions for the development of the social welfare system. 
 
B.  The Productive Conditions: The Nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the introduction of 
Arab Socialism 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is no logical connection between permissive conditions and 
productive conditions. After the appearance of a permissive condition (the 1952 Revolution in this 
case), political or economic events happen and become productive conditions for a critical juncture. 
In this case, there were two political events which may be regarded as productive conditions: (1) 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and (2) the introduction of Arab socialism. Both of the events 
were accidentally triggered by international or regional turmoil. These two productive conditions 
consolidated the political and economic structures in Egypt and had a significant impact on the 
development of the social welfare system. 
The first productive condition, the Suez Crisis in 1956, led to further changes in the political 
and economic structures in Egypt. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal was caused by the US 
refusal to provide financial aid to Aswan High Dam and triggered a war with the United Kingdom, 
France and Israel. The most important point for the development of the Egyptian social welfare 
system was that this war led to change in the economic structure. The new government confiscated 
French and British companies and expanded the public sector as a result of the Suez War.5 In 
November 1956, it decided to take over all British and French banks and companies, a total of 
15,000 establishments. These enterprises were supervised by a semi-public company, the Economic 
Organization, which was newly founded in January 1957. At the same time, all banks, insurance 
companies, commercial houses and agencies were confiscated by the government (Vatikiotis 1991: 
396). After this war the government played a more active role in the economic planning. 
The government recognised the inefficiency of relying on the private sector as a driving force 
of drastic economic growth before the war, and decided that further intervention by the state was 
needed for rapid industrialisation. It paid more attention to the incompatible gap between the 
                                                     
5  Even before the Suez War, the government nationalised some companies, whose owners were 
antagonistic to the ruling group in junta. In 1955, for instance, a sugar company owned by 
Ahmed Aboud was nationalised (Hansen 1991: 126-127). 
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government’s ambitious targets and the means for economic growth that were controlled by the 
private sector. 
Exhortations, incentives, and indirect controls would not and could not ensure that the 
private sector complied with the patterns of production and investment established for 
it by the planners. In every case which entailed an incompatibility between ends and 
means the government almost invariably reacted by increasing the power of the state 
rather than adopting the alternative path of negotiation and compromise. Hardly ever 
was the Military Junta diverted from its chosen aims by the presence of traditional 
patterns of ownership and control over productive resources. As soon as contradictions 
emerged, the Junta simply altered the institutional and legal framework in order to 
make the economy amenable to control from the centre (O’Brien 1966: 240). 
Such dissatisfaction with the private sector encouraged the state to play an active role in 
industrialisation. 
Following the confiscation of British and French companies during the Suez War, the Nasser 
government embarked on the nationalisation of several domestic banks, represented by the Misr 
Bank, in 1960. At the time, the bank had £E 100 million in deposit. More importantly, it worked as 
a holding company for various industrial and commercial companies: 
The Misr Group owned the largest textile center in the Middle East at Mahalla 
al-Kubra and its various affiliates accounted for 60 percent of all textile production 
and 53 percent of employment in the textile sector. … Nationalization was justified on 
the grounds of breaking up an effective monopoly that could use its weight to thwart 
public development policy [italics in original] (Waterbury 1983: 72). 
Moreover, the Nasser government attempted to control the economy through economic planning. 
Since the mid-1950s, the government actively framed serious plans for economic development. In 
1957 it began formal agricultural and industrial planning. A comprehensive five-year plan (for 
budget years from 1960/61 until 1964/65) was introduced in 1959 (Hansen 1991: 128-129). The 
plan “set out detailed investment, saving, production, and consumption targets for every part of the 
economy. Its ambitious aim, to double real national income over decade, received great publicity 
throughout the Arab world, and Egyptian leaders became deeply committed to its success” 
(O’Brien 1966: 310). 
This expansion of the public sector was justified by the concept of ‘socialism’. Colonel Nasser 
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had frequently used the term of ‘socialism’ since the Bandung Conference in April 1955. 
On December, 1957, Nasser announced the idea of “socialist, democratic and 
cooperative society.” He defined his ideal society in a variety of ways, such as a 
society without exploitation, a society of owners, a controlled economy, and a 
controlled capitalist economy (Dessouki 1982: 59) 
President Nasser flexibly used the term ‘socialism’ with various meanings to justify his political 
choice in specific policy areas. His choice was not based on a specific dogma, such as Marxism in 
the Soviet Union, but determined by trial and error. This style of decision-making was named 
‘pragmatic socialism’ by The Economist (Anon. 1964). 
Nasser’s socialism was gradually incorporated into various political organisations, 
encouraging President Nasser to adopt an organisational proliferation strategy. As he had already 
found the Liberation Rally insufficient as a political front before the war, he replaced it with the 
National Union. The National Union established a denser network in the whole nation and created a 
basic unit in each village (in rural areas) or each city quarter (in urban areas) (Binder 1966: 230). 
The organisation had a hierarchical structure based on villages, quarters, governorate capitals, and 
at the top, a National Congress and executive committee. Every citizen was obliged to participate 
in the National Union. Although this organisation was ideologically based on a vague socialism, his 
approach was a blend of the approaches of Peron (Argentina), Salazar (Portuguese), Tito 
(Yugoslavia) and Ataturk (Turkey). The National Union claimed that it was not a political party 
because political parties in general implied partisanship, class conflict and division. Rather it was 
an assemblage or a political front to serve national unity beyond the interests of specific social 
strata or classes (Waterbury 1983: 313). This was Nasser’s strategy of expanding a basis of political 
support not only to the launching organisation (i.e., the military) but to the populace through the 
establishment of a more institutionalised political party. 
Nasser’s ‘socialism’ stimulated the organisational proliferation strategy and encouraged the 
new political organisation – the National Union to co-opt organised labour into itself. According to 
Marsha Posusney (1997: 60-61) the corporatisation of organised labour in Egypt began after the 
Bandung Conference (April 1955) and imitated that of Yugoslavia: 
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With the working class and workers’ organizations given a high status in Yugoslavia’s 
formal ideology, at least, if not in practice, Nasir became embarrassed at the 
underdevelopment of labor policies in Egypt. The Labor Bureau [in the National 
Union] took the initiative to convene a large meeting of trade union leaders where the 
establishment of an informal organization to function unofficially as a confederation 
was proposed. 
In response to the government move towards the corporatisation of organised labour, union 
activists also attempted to create a single, hierarchically-ordered union confederation. Some ruling 
elites especially in the Ministry of Interior and the security forces were opposed to the 
corporatisation, because the political influence of organised labour would penetrate into the 
government. However, in 1957 President Nasser finally admitted the formation of a singular 
confederation of trade unions – the Egyptian Workers’ Federation (EWF),6 in exchange for the 
government’s right to select the confederation’s leaders (Posusney 1997: 61-63). 
It should be noted, however, that the relationship between the state and organised labour was 
not consistent. Even though the labour movement played an important role in society, trade unions 
were always faced with risks of suppression by the state. In the two years prior to the EWF’s 
foundation, individual unions became larger. The EWF attempted to expand its membership base 
by incorporating independent trade unions and restructuring subsidiary unions along industrial lines. 
Such expansion made conservatives suspicious about the labour movement. At the end of 1958, the 
labour movement was temporarily suppressed until 1959 as a result of the government’s 
anti-communist campaign. During this campaign, almost all union activists were arrested. Although 
the unified labour code allowed trade unions to establish a single, centralised confederation, this 
attempt was deliberately delayed by its opponents. The Ministry of Interior reported that trade 
unions contributed to political destabilisation and the establishment of a single confederation would 
increase the danger (Posusney 1997: 64-67). 
A regional factor pushed President Nasser further along a more radical path. In 1958 Egypt 
unified with Syria and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR). Nasser was elected to be President 
                                                     
6  Although the EWF was reorganised and became the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), 
it remained essentially the same organization (Solidarity Center 2010: 11). 
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of the UAR. Although the unification continued for eight years, Syrian politicians, especially the 
rightists, were dissatisfied with Nasser’s political dominance. In 1961 the Syrian rightist military 
planed a coup and successfully declared their withdrawal from the UAR. The Syrian withdrawal 
from the Republic made President Nasser fear reaction within Egypt, especially from reactionary 
politicians. President Nasser decided to take further socialist measures to pre-empt reactionary 
actions. At the same time, he feared that the National Union might serve as a platform for 
reactionary activists rather than remaining a bastion against the right. Consequently, the National 
Union did not function as a channel to reflect interests of the members to government decisions 
(Waterbury 1983: 313-314). 
Neither the Liberation Rally nor the National Union debated or had any discernible 
influence over the regime’s most significant decisions: nationalization of the Suez 
Canal, [and] unity with Syria (Waterbury 1983: 314). 
In the beginning of the 1960s, the Nasser government recognised that the National Union, which 
was replaced by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) after the introduction of Arab socialism, had been 
useless as a political front. 
In 1962 the government revealed that the country would adopt a unique style of socialism – 
Arab socialism (the second productive condition for the development of the Egyptian social 
welfare system), making the Charter (al-mithaq) public. The Charter justified Nasser’s strategy of 
introducing socialism, asserting that the choice was inevitable for the achievement of social 
freedom: 
The socialist resolution to the problems of economic and social underdevelopment in 
Egypt – with a view to achieving progress in a revolutionary way – was never a 
question of free choice. The socialist solution was a historical inevitability imposed by 
reality, the broad aspirations of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the 
second part of the 20th century (Information Department 1962: 49). 
In his speech in Cairo, Nasser stated that the Arab socialism would be explicitly different from 
Western-style socialism, such as Marxism, because the latter does not recognise the existence of 
religions and asserts the proletariat’s dictatorship. At the same time, he emphasised that a goal of 
‘Arab socialism’ was the construction of a secular, classless society with a mixed economy (Hansen 
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1991: 115). 
Prior to the declaration of Arab socialism in 1962, the government issued several 
nationalisation laws. Law 117/1961 stipulated that the government would nationalise all remaining 
private banks and insurance companies, and companies in heavy or basic industries and shipping. 
In nationalising these companies, the government converted their shares to fifteen-year government 
bonds. Law 118/1961 forced another 83 private companies to sell more than 50% of their shares to 
public institutions. Law 119/1961 provided for the nationalisation of companies whose value of 
shares per shareholder exceeded £E 10,000. This law affected 147 medium-sized companies 
(Waterbury 1983: 73-74). 
The market value of the shares of the companies affected by Laws 117-119 has been 
estimated at £E 258 million, of which the state acquired £E 124 million. In 1963 and 
1964 most of the shares that remained in private hands were transferred to the state 
(Waterbury 1983: 74). 
In 1961 and 1963, nationalised industrial sectors were reorganised into 160 joint stock companies 
(muassasat amma), which were controlled by eleven semi-public organisations. As a result, most of 
the main enterprises in manufacturing and trade came under the government’s ownership and led to 
the downfall of wealthy families and entrepreneurial class (Hansen 1991: 126-127). This new 
economic system stimulated rapid industrialisation in the country. The importance of industry 
increased after the coup, from only 10% in 1952 to more than 20% of GDP in 1962 (Vatikiotis 
1991: 399). Moreover, “the control of industry, transport, finance and trade was transferred to the 
State. The government budget came to account for over 65 per cent of GNP” by the 1960s 
(Vatikiotis 1991: 396). 
The introduction of Arab socialist ideas gradually created a consensus that organised labour 
was a powerful government supporter and contributed to the consolidation of the relationship 
between the regime and organised labour. According to Bianchi (1989: 132), trade unions for 
government employees had been prohibited to prevent these employees from becoming infected 
with labour radicalism before 1959. As trade unions became a semi-official partner, unions of 
government workers were regarded as key players to prevent the radicalisation of the labour 
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movement. Some ruling elites supported the labour movement. In January 1961, Husayn al-Shafi’i 
“convinced Nasser that one hierarchical union structure is less of a threat than many small ones, 
since it is easier for the government to keep undesirable elements out of the leadership of a single 
confederation, and since a handful of leaders are easier to manipulate than many. The confederation 
leaders were then able to proceed with the reorganization of the union movement. By January 1961, 
59 of 65 federations designated by Law 91 had been formed” (Posusney 1997: 67). 
The political structure was now characterised by the pro-labour single-party and a corporatist 
system. Nasser had repeated his attempts to unite many political parties in a single party to control 
the society. His attempts shaped the ASU in 1962. Whereas its predecessor, the National Union, did 
not establish its organisation along occupational or functional lines, the ASU established the 
corporatist structure based on occupational or functional lines (Waterbury 1983: 313). It is 
undeniable that the ASU could not take an initiative in the political decision-making process and 
never worked as a totalitarian party (such as the Communist Party in the Soviet). It was a mere 
vehicle for Nasser. Whereas only ASU members were allowed to participate as candidates in 
legislative elections, the ASU screened potential candidates. This means that, through the screening, 
Nasser was able to choose candidates with loyalty to him personally (Kassem 2004: 18). Indeed, 
the following two cases show its effectiveness as his political vehicle: 
The first role was the role of the ‘political vanguard’ in uncovering the Ikhwan 
[Muslim Brotherhood] conspiracy of mid-1965, as revealed by Nasser himself. The 
second instance of effective performance came on the night of 9 June 1967, and during 
subsequent months when the ASU helped rally the pro-Nasir masses against various 
conspiracies emanating from the military and to a lesser extent from the secret police 
(Dekmejian 1972: 154). 
Despite the fact that the ASU functioned as Nasser’s instrument for maintaining power, this 
organisation symbolically represented the interests of workers and peasants. In all elected bodies, 
half of the representatives were elected from workers and peasants (Waterbury 1983: 325). 
In summary, the Nasser government demonstrated a new survival strategy that was completely 
different from that in the pre-revolutionary era. It removed, by a coup d’état – the 1952 Revolution, 
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several political actors who had been dominant in the pre-revolutionary era: the Palace, the British 
Authority and the landlord class. Although the revolution removed obstacles for the expansion of 
the social welfare system, the government did not have an ‘engine’ for the expansion. Therefore, 
the 1952 Revolution was the permissive condition for the development of the social welfare system. 
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal was the first engine, triggering the confiscation of British and 
French companies and expanding the public sector. Following the war, the Nasser government 
introduced Arab socialism to legitimise his rule. This ideology also fuelled the social welfare 
expansion. In this process, the Nasser government adopted an organisational proliferation strategy, 
co-opting organised labour into the regime and granting to it social security and symbolic 
representation in exchange for control over organised labour. As this pro-labour tendency had 
significant impact on the development of the social welfare system in the Nasser era, these events 
were the productive conditions for the development of the social welfare system. 
 
 
2-2-2.  Nasser’s Survival Strategy and the Development of the Social Welfare 
System 
 
Following the 1952 Revolution (the permissive condition), the Free Officers often mentioned 
the achievement of social justice through fair income distribution. General Naguib noted in his 
book that the Liberation Rally promised to establish a fair system for its members: 
A social system designed in which all citizens shall be entitled to protection against 
the ravages of unemployment, illness, and old age – i.e., a “welfare state.” 
An economic system designed to encourage a fair distribution of wealth, full 
exploitation of natural and human resources, and the maximum investment of new 
capital (Naguib 1955: 184-185). 
In a speech on 30 April 1954, Colonel Nasser also addressed the importance of social policies, 
remarking as follows: “I can’t understand how there can be freedom if I am not free to find my 
bread and make a living, free to find employment” (Dessouki 1982: 58). However, despite repeated 
references to social justice and social welfare, the new government did not implement significant 
social reform (except the agrarian reform) in practice (Dessouki 1982: 58-59). 
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After Colonel Nasser won the power struggle against General Naguib, the new leader Nasser 
published the new Constitution of 1956, which expected the state to play a pivotal role in 
alleviating economic inequality through income redistribution. 
The constitution established a number of social obligations on the part of the 
government. Every citizen had the right to social security, medical care, housing, and 
education (Part II, Article 21). The state was responsible for the ensuring of a decent 
standard of living for all citizens and the provision of social, cultural, and health 
services. Egyptians had the right to education (Part III, Article 49). … It was a 
government responsibility to establish hospitals and ensure medical care (Dessouki 
1982: 60). 
The government was ready to prepare an ideological base for the development of the social welfare 
system in the mid-1950s, but the size of the social welfare system was restricted, as will be 
discussed later. 
However, after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the political and economic 
climate significantly changed and led to the expansion of the social welfare system. There were 
three significant features that determined the design of the social welfare system: (1) the 
state-dominant economy (etatism), (2) the alliance with organised labour and (3) Arab socialism. 
The first feature was the state-dominant economy. Although the Nasser government aimed to 
construct an economy that was directed by the state, it initially expected the private sector to play a 
pivotal role in industrialisation. Nasser gradually changed his attitude to desirable economic 
structures and aimed to control measures of production in the private sector. The Suez War enabled 
the Nasser government to nationalise the main companies in the country. Accordingly, the state 
became not only a commander of the economy, but the most dominant economic player. Under this 
condition, the social welfare system was also expected to work to maximise successful 
industrialisation. The second feature was the ruling coalition – the alliance with organised labour. 
Whereas the Nasser government maintained a strong tie with his launching organisation – the 
military, it also adopted an organisational proliferation strategy by co-opting organised labour to his 
regime. It should be noted that organised labour was not an independent actor in politics in Egypt, 
unlike in democracies. For the Nasser government, the labour movement was a mere tool to 
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strengthen his authoritarian rule. This organisational proliferation strategy encouraged the 
government to address distributive justice: 
The official line was that Egyptian workers did enjoy many rights, many more than the 
labor movement had asked for at the time. The government provided social and 
economic security and symbolic representation … in exchange for its control over the 
labor movement (Dessouki 1982: 73). 
Although social rights were superficial, the Nasser government established a social welfare system 
that favoured urban workers (and organised labour) to achieve social rights. The third feature was 
Arab socialism, which was the most important feature for path-dependent change in the social 
welfare system. Although Arab socialism was quite different from ‘true’ socialism (such as 
Marxism), it provided the social welfare system with a secondary (but important) role. The 
introduction of Arab socialism allowed the Nasser government to justify its rule by achieving social 
justice via generous welfare provision. 
These three features led to the ‘dualist’ social welfare system, which consisted of two layers: 
(1) industrial programmes and (2) residualist programmes. The first layer, the industrial 
programmes were designed to contribute to Nasser’s industrialisation project and were in favour of 
organised labour. They were represented by (1) the social insurance programme, (2) the food 
subsidy programme and (3) the public employment programme. The social insurance programme 
exploited the profits, which were collected from the insured, to invest in government projects for 
industrialisation. In addition, the food subsidy programme functioned as a mechanism for 
transferring resources in the agriculture sector to the industrial sector by providing inexpensive 
foodstuffs to urban workers (see Chapter 4). The public employment programme played an 
important role in supplying human resources (i.e., university graduates) to the growing public 
sector (see Chapter 5). The second layer, the residualist programmes were not directly connected 
with industrialisation and targeted the vulnerable, represented by (1) the healthcare programme and 
(2) the social assistance programme. Although these programmes were not expected to contribute 
to industrialisation, the introduction of Arab socialism enhanced their importance as mechanisms to 
deliver welfare benefits to the vulnerable. Although the government made a gesture to expand these 
89 
programmes after the introduction of Arab socialism, the expansion was restricted because of 
financial constraints. Whereas the main resource of social insurance was contributions collected 
from employees and employers (not from the exchequer), these residualist programmes were 
entirely dependent on the government support. An ambiguous case between the first and second 
layers was the housing programme. Although it originally aimed to supply cheap accommodations 
to the vulnerable, its benefits were spilled over the middle class. The government actively provided 
housing units to civil servants and urban workers in the formal sector, who were categorised as the 
middle class in Egypt. As a result, the housing programme was strongly connected to urbanisation 
and industrialisation. 
 
A.  Case (1): The Social Insurance Programme – An Industrial Programme 
The social insurance programme was developed after the 1952 Revolution. Although the 
pension programme had already been introduced in the pre-revolutionary era, it only targeted civil 
servants and military personnel and was not based on their contributions but on tax. The 
programme consisted of the following five schemes: (1) work injury, (2) old-age, (3) disability and 
death, (4) unemployment and (5) health insurance. 
The targets were categorised into two groups: government employees and workers in the 
private sector and public enterprises. As for government employees, Law 316/1952 provided that 
an insurance and provident fund should insure them against death during their work (Garrison 
1976: 133). In 1956 social insurance funds for them were established and began old-age pensions. 
Income was raised from both employees and the government. While the employees paid 10% of 
their salaries as contributions, the government also paid the same amount and then increased it to 
12.5% (Hansen & Marzouk 1965: 217). Social insurance for workers in the private sector and 
public enterprises was created according to Law 419/1955. To implement the insurance scheme for 
them, the Insurance and Provident Fund was established in 1956. The workers paid 5% of their 
salaries and their employers had to pay the same amount (Hansen & Marzouk 1965: 218-219). Law 
202/1958 was furthermore enacted to improve a scheme to compensate for employment injuries, 
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which had been first established in 1936. The insurance scheme for workers in the private and 
public sectors was integrated in 1959. This new scheme dealt with three types of social risks: (1) 
work-related injuries (including occupational diseases), (2) old-age and (3) disability and death. 
Also, the 1959 law provided that a health insurance scheme should be set up within 12 months 
from 1 August 1959 and an unemployment insurance scheme should be established within three 
years of that date (ILO 1960: 1). 
The main beneficiaries of the social insurance programme were urban workers, especially 
employees in the government sector and public enterprises. In principle, this law was supposed to 
apply to all wage earners and apprentices except agricultural workers, casual workers, members of 
employers’ families and domestic servants. As for work injury insurance, the following workers 
were also included in this scheme: “(1) agricultural workers working with machinery or exposed to 
the risk of certain occupational diseases mentioned in the Act, (2) temporary and casual workers, 
(3) seasonal workers, (4) workers who are liable to be transferred frequently or who are engaged in 
loading and unloading work” (ILO 1960: 2).7 Therefore, more than half of the workers covered by 
social insurance lived in Cairo and Alexandria Governorates at the time of 1970/71. Since pensions 
were based on wages and many white-collar workers eligible for high pensions were likely to live 
in Cairo, the average pensions in Cairo (£E 9.8 per month) were accordingly higher than those in 
other governorates (£E 7.5 per month). The exception was the Suez Governorate, where employees 
in the Suez Canal, fertiliser, and petroleum sectors gained relatively high wages (Garrison 1976: 
223). 
Among urban workers, workers in the public sector (including government institutions and 
public enterprises) were the core beneficiaries of the social insurance programme. Most wage 
earners in the private sector were not covered by the social insurance programme because their 
employers did not take part in this scheme in order to reduce their costs (Loewe 2000: 14). Some 
                                                     
7  In the beginning, however, the government admitted several exceptions. Employers and workers 
who were already covered by private insurance, such as provident funds, pension schemes, and 
collective insurance schemes, were temporarily discharged from this compulsory insurance 
programme and were supposed to be gradually included into the scheme. The number of 
workers participating in such private schemes was estimated at 70,000-80,000 (ILO 1960: 2). 
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employers in the private sector prevented the government from collecting contributions. The 
example was “the formation of fictitious companies in which the workers were ‘partners.’ Since 
they were no longer ‘workers’ they fell outside the scope of the law and hence the employer was 
not legally required to pay social insurance taxes on them” (Garrison 1976: 242).8 In another 
example, employers “hired workers on a temporary basis and then rehired them, thus avoiding the 
obligation to pay social insurance since only ‘permanent’ workers were covered under the law” 
(Garrison 1976: 242). 
 
Figure 2.1: Social Insurance – The Number of Pensioners and Insured Workers (1956-1971) 
 
Source: Garrison (1976: 220), Table 21. 
 
Therefore, the number of workers covered by the social insurance programme had almost 
doubled with the large-scale nationalisation in 1961, from approximately 300,000 in 1960 to 
555,000 in 1961(Garrison 1976: 221). Workers in industry, construction, transportation, the Suez 
                                                     
8  Such evasive method was prohibited in 1971. 
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Canal, trade and finance, communications were gradually included into this scheme. The number of 
insured workers in 1971 became almost twenty times as large as those in 1956, from 75,412 (1956) 
to 1,561,344 (1971) (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, as the number of insured workers increased, the 
number of pensioners also rose. According to Jean Garrison (1976: 222), the number of pensioners 
rose seven-fold, from 10,284 in 1964 to 76,743 in 1971 (Figure 2.1). The average monthly pension 
simultaneously doubled, from £E 4.565 to £E 8.266, while wholesale food prices increased by 
approximately 31% during this period. According to the government’s statistics, expenditure on 
old-age pensions accounted for more than 50% of total expenditure on the social insurance 
programme in 1971. The second largest expenditure was on pensions for survivors (32.8% of the 
total expenditure). Expenditure on the two schemes exceeded 80% of the total expenditure on the 
social insurance programme (Garrison 1976: 226). 
The number of types of insurance also increased besides the existing three types: (1) work 
injury, (2) old-age, and (3) disability and death. The first case was unemployment insurance. 
Whereas the government began to collect contributions for unemployment insurance from 
employees, it also started payments to unemployed people in 1965. Unemployment insurance was 
influenced not only by economic fluctuations but by political conditions. 
‘Abd-al-Halim al-Qadi of the social insurance organization attributes the relatively 
large number of cases during 1967-70 to economic dislocations caused by the June 
1967 war. The large size of the average benefit for 1967/68 was also a result of the 
war: workers in the Canal Zone governorates who lost their jobs as a result of the war 
received unemployment compensation, and as these workers were considerably better 
paid than other workers their unemployment checks were larger (Garrison 1976: 231). 
The second case was health insurance. Although the Nasser government attempted the expansion of 
health insurance, the expansion was faced with strong opposition in comparison to the expansion of 
other schemes. There were two functions in this insurance programme: curative services and 
compensatory payments to lost wages of injury or ill workers. Whereas the former programme 
covered both private and public sector workers, the latter was only for government workers. The 
curative service was unpopular with both doctors and workers, especially those working in big 
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companies. Even before the introduction of the health insurance initiative, large companies were 
required to provide medical services to their employees under the labour laws. For doctors, this had 
generated higher earnings than those paid through the health insurance scheme, and the 
introduction of health insurance meant that they would lose such earnings. Organised workers were 
also opposed to this programme. As mentioned above, workers in large companies already enjoyed 
medical services offered by their employers. The new health insurance scheme forced workers to 
pay contributions (1% of their pay), but they saw no improvement to benefits. Also, workers were 
against the health insurance scheme because it made it more difficult to obtain sick leave. Under 
the health insurance scheme, workers needed a doctor in the social insurance organisation to certify 
their illness before they could take sick leave. Doctors were likely to examine the reasons for sick 
leave and, accordingly, the average days of sick leave in companies covered by health insurance 
decreased, from 8 days to 2.1 days (Garrison 1976: 244-246). 
The social insurance programme in the Nasser era had several pro-labour features even if the 
expansion was implemented despite worker opposition. The most significant feature was that trade 
unions were able to shape the social insurance programme. As well as implementing changes to 
social insurance laws, they also played administrative roles and attended Social Insurance 
Organisation (SIO) board meetings. By January 1975, the number of the workers’ representatives 
was two out of six board members in total. The trade union federation in Egypt was able to 
influence these issues through weekly meetings with the administrators of the social insurance 
programme. At these meetings, workers’ interests were reflected in amendments to the social 
insurance programme. Organised labour was also able to influence decision-making in local 
administration. Each local union committee had to select a union member responsible for the 
implementation of social insurance. He/she had to take a short-term course on social insurance, 
which was offered by the Social Insurance Institute (founded in 1965). After the training course, 
he/she worked full-time on the payment of old-age pensions and was temporarily discharged from 
his/her job in the company. The implementation of the social insurance programme in the country 
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was sustained by workers and organised labour (Garrison 1976: 168-172). 
It is worth pointing out that the social insurance programme functioned as a resource for 
Nasser’s industrialisation project. This was clear from the fact that the government made little 
commitment to social insurance for workers in the private and public sectors in general. Along with 
the increasing influence of Arab socialism in politics, “social insurance contributions were raised to 
7 per cent from the employee and 17 per cent from the employer [in 1961]. In March 1964, these 
contributions were further increased to 33 per cent of the salary; 10 per cent was paid by the 
employee and 23 per cent by the employer” (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 31). Whilst the government 
expended the money equal to 15.5% of salaries of government workers on their insurance, it paid 
only 1% of salaries of workers in the private and public sectors. This means that the main resources 
in this scheme did not come from tax but from contributions paid by workers and employers 
(Garrison 1976: 236-238). This motivation encouraged the Nasser government to expand the health 
insurance scheme despite the strong opposition by workers and doctors, as discussed above. 
Indeed, social insurance for workers in the private and public sectors worked as a mechanism 
to absorb contributions from workers and private companies to the government and enabled it to 
invest in long-term industrial projects. In 1961 this social insurance scheme brought a surplus of £E 
9.2 million, most of which was invested in long-term projects and government undertakings (see 
Table 2.1). Social insurance for government employees also brought a surplus although the 
resources were originally from the national revenue. In this case, the surplus was invested in 
various projects and the insurance scheme received a return from the investments (£E 4.7 million in 
1961/62) (Hansen & Marzouk 1965: 217-219) (see also Table 2.2). Muhammad Badran, director 
general of the Social Insurance Organisation, stated that “there were three goals of social insurance: 
limiting inflation, contributing towards financing the development plan, and forming reserves 
capable of meeting all social insurance requirements” (Garrison 1978: 290). His remark 
represented the government’s motivation to utilise insurance contributions for long-term 
investments. 
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Table 2.1: Social Insurance Surplus, 1956-1963 (£E million) 
 Total receipts Total expenditure Surplus 
1956 1.1  0.2  0.9  
1957 2.3  0.7  1.5  
1958 3.1  0.7  2.4  
1959 4.1  1.0  3.1  
1960 7.5  1.8  5.7  
1961 12.7  3.6  9.2  
1962 n/a  n/a  20.9  
Source: Hansen & Marzouk (1965: 219), Table 8.3. 
 
Table 2.2: The Social Insurance Fund for Government Employees (1956-1962) 
Year Number of 
beneficiaries 
(thousands) 
Excess of receipts 
over payments 
(£E million) 
General reserve 
(£E million) 
Return from 
investments 
(£E million) 
1956/57 204   7.3   24.4   0.7   
1957/58 221   12.5   36.9   1.1   
1958/59 228   12.3   49.2   1.3   
1959/60 582   15.7   64.9   2.0   
1960/61 600   20.8   85.8   2.5   
1961/62 625   24.9   142.2   4.7   
Source: Hansen & Marzouk (1965: 217), Table .8.2. 
 
B.  Case (2): Healthcare – A Residualist Programme (1) 
Since the 1952 Revolution, the government promoted the popularisation of social welfare 
programmes that had been restricted to privileged classes in the pre-revolutionary era.9 Healthcare 
was a typical case. The Nasser government also publicised its commitment to social justice through 
the expansion of the healthcare programme in leaflets distributed to foreign countries.10 According 
                                                     
9  In a broader meaning of social welfare programmes, this trend could be found in the expansion 
of the universal education programme. In the first decade after the coup, 350 primary schools 
were built in average. This change let illiteracy rate decline, from 77% of the population in 1947 
to 56% in 1976. Enrolment rate in primary schools also rose, from 40% in 1953 to 77% in 1970 
(Bayat 2006: 137). Whereas the popularisation of education contributed to social development 
in total, it should be noted that this strategy was biased to the middle class rather than the lower 
class and that, as explained below, it was strongly connected to Nasser’s industrialisation and 
political mobilisation strategies. 
10  In the First Five-Year Plan, the government was supposed to spend £E5.6 million. Although the 
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to the government’s report (Information Department 1964: 105-108), expenditure on healthcare 
increased by 34% in thirteen years after the 1952 Revolution. Government efforts increased the 
number of public hospitals in urban areas, from 90 (in 1952) to 116 (in 1964). 
The number of health facilities administered by the government dramatically increased 
after the revolution. The number of beds in hospitals operated by the Ministry of 
Health more than doubled between 1952 and 1973, increasing from 25,710 to 56,223. 
… In 1971, for every 10,000 persons there were 16 hospital beds under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Public Health and 6 under other auspices, making a total of 22 beds per 
10,000 population (Garrison 1976: 74). 
Comprehensive free healthcare theoretically became available in urban areas by 1975 (Garrison 
1976: 173-175). At the same time, the government attempted to expand healthcare in the rural areas. 
“A project to generalise rural health units was instituted so that every unit would serve 5,000 
inhabitants in a village or a group of villages not more than 3 kilometres apart. Units upon the 
completion of the project will number 2,500, of which 505 units were established and operated” 
(Information Department 1964: 105). Thanks to universal healthcare, any citizen in the country 
could enjoy medical services in public clinics without cost to the patient.11 
Although this healthcare programme was apparently a great accomplishment of the 1952 
Revolution and Arab socialism, the government could not keep up with popular demands for 
healthcare because of budgetary constraints. Overcrowded facilities encouraged the rich to use 
private hospitals, not the free public hospitals, even though the public services were free of charge. 
The healthcare programme could not resolve this problem and eventually restricted free access to 
the vulnerable. Urban workers (especially workers in the formal sector) used the health insurance 
scheme provided by the social insurance programme instead. 
The disparity in standards between public health care and private care was implicitly 
apparent in the state goal to increase the scope of state health insurance: if adequate 
                                                                                                                                                                
government spent 5% of the total budget for the Ministry of Health in 1965, this goal could not 
be achieved because of the financial constraints of repeated wars. The percentage fell down to 
1.6% in 1970 and 1.1% in 1975 (Bayat 2006: 136-137). 
11  The government also struggled with the cost of the popularisation of medicine: “Medicines are 
available in qualities meeting the local consumers’ needs and at moderate, prices within the 
reach of all. The State nationalized the import and distribution of medicine in 1960, allotted to 
its production investments estimated at 1,500% over the amount in 1952-53, and reduced 
customs duties by 25% of its price before 1960” (Information Department 1964: 108). 
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free health care were already available, health insurance would be redundant. However, 
the fact that the quality of health care under health insurance was akin to that of 
private care led to the development of health insurance and to efforts to expand the 
system (Garrison 1976: 174) 
Consequently, the healthcare programme was categorised as residualist while health insurance 
provided by the social insurance programme was a core programme in the social welfare system. 
 
C.  Case (3): The Social Assistance Programme – A Residualist Programme (2) 
At the beginning of revolutionary rule, the government was not interested in the expansion of 
social assistance and maintained the existing social assistance programme that the old regime had 
established. The government paid more attention to the social insurance programme than this 
programme and, therefore, did not drastically change this programme until the 1960s.12 The ruling 
elite had thought of this programme as merely complementary to the main social insurance 
programme. 
Adopting Arab socialist policies reaffirmed the importance of poverty alleviation programmes 
and the social rights of the vulnerable. The Nasser government adopted a strategy of utilising the 
social assistance programme as a tool to justify Arab socialist rule. In 1964 a new social assistance 
law (Law 133/1964) was enacted. In a preamble to this law, the government declares: 
Because the Social [Assistance] Law was passed in 1950 under a regime that has since 
been abolished and because the law had many inadequacies, the government found it 
necessary to pass a new law to correct these inadequacies and to provide better 
benefits in accordance with the aims of the new regime (Garrison 1976: 176). 
The new law expanded the programme. First, the new law expanded the targets. The 1950 law 
established that there were four groups entitled to receive social assistance pensions: orphans, 
widows with children, the disabled and senior citizens (over age 65). In contrast, the new law 
                                                     
12  An exception was the institutional expansion to retired bureaucrats in 1954. The cabinet issued a 
decree that the Ministry of Social Affairs was responsible for establishing a programme for 
retired bureaucrats in such conditions as: “(1) emergencies that might threaten the family, such 
as illness or the sudden loss of a part of the family's income; (2) the schooling of children; (3) 
the marriage of daughters; (4) the divorce of daughters within five years of their marriage, and 
(5) accidents while on duty if the employee or worker was not entitled to a pension” (Garrison 
1978: 284). This is because the revolutionary government needed bureaucrats’ supports and 
loyalty at that time. 
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expanded its target to include divorcees with children. Also, this new law loosened several 
conditions in a means test. Both laws allowed a pensioner to receive income from paid labour or 
handicrafts. The new law provided that, if his/her income exceeded 50% of the value of the pension, 
his/her pensions were reduced (in comparison with 40% in the 1950 laws) (Garrison 1976: 
176-179). Second, the new law loosened eligibility conditions and confirmed that any citizen 
would have the right to receive social assistance. “Under the 1950 law, pensions were available 
only if there were sufficient funds in the budget. The new law, however, amended this provision, 
stipulating that all eligible persons should receive pensions as a right and that consequently within 
a five-year period all necessary funds would be allotted to ensure that eligible persons received 
their pensions” (Garrison 1976: 182). 
In response to the enactment of the new law, expenditure on the programme dramatically 
increased in 1964. Although the food price index increased approximately 50% between 1963 and 
71, expenditure on the programme doubled during the same period, from £E 1.27 million in 1963 
to £E 3.03 million in 1971 (Figure 2.2). Jean Garrison (1978: 287-288) analysed the increase as 
follows: 
It is evident that the “socialist revolution” proclaimed in 1961 was the major reason 
for the increased expenditures. The “socialist revolution” consisted primarily of the 
nationalization of most large scale industries, increased coverage of workers under 
social insurance, and a new rhetoric, including a reaffirmation of the rights of the poor 
and of the commitments of the state to securing a decent income for all. 
Whereas the social insurance programme was a core of the social welfare system, the social 
assistance programme was a complement to the social insurance programme and targeted citizens 
who were excluded from social insurance. The social assistance programme was therefore 
categorised as residualist. 
As the expansion of the social assistance programme was motivated by ideology, the 
programme was not fully satisfied with the goal of poverty alleviation. Although the 1960 law had 
intended to allocate decent pensions to eligible people, the government was not able to achieve this 
goal because of financial restrictions. Consequently, the average social assistance payment was low 
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in all of the three categories: pensions, social aids and benefits to retired bureaucrats (Garrison 
1976: 212). The achievement of Arab socialism was limited by budgetary constraints, unlike the 
social insurance programme that was financed mainly by insurance contributions. 
 
Figure 2.2: Social Assistance – The Total Expenditures and Total Number Families Benefiting, 
1951/52 to 1971/72 
 
Source: Garrison (1976: 205). 
 
D.  Case (4): The Housing Programme – An Ambiguous Case? 
The housing programme was an ambiguous case lying somewhere between industrial and 
residualist programmes. The main purpose of the programme was to supply cheap public housing 
to citizens, especially vulnerable immigrants from rural areas. Even before the 1952 Revolution, 
the country had experienced a housing crisis because demand in cities exceeded supply as a result 
of rapid urbanisation. More and more people living in rural areas moved to cities, seeking better 
earnings. After the 1952 Revolution, the government dealt with this issue through rent controls. 
The importance of rents control as a part of the social welfare system had been recognised. The 
100 
government introduced a 15% rent reduction in 1952. This regulation was gradually applied even to 
new buildings constructed after the revolution (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 123). 
The introduction of Arab socialism encouraged the Nasser government to intervene in the 
housing market not only indirectly as the regulator but directly as an agent. Approximately £E 6 
million was distributed annually as investment in urban housing in 1960s. This programme aimed 
to provide inexpensive housing to those on lower-incomes. This investment enabled the 
government to construct nearly 10,000 units per year. Accordingly, it also recognised the 
importance of the housing programme as a part of social welfare programmes for lower-income 
citizens: 
Construction of ‘popular dwellings’ (masakin) has become an essential element of the 
government housing policy in the 1960s, in which the Ministry of Housing and the 
Ministry of Wakf have been deeply involved. Such schemes of ‘popular dwellings,’ in 
poor areas of Cairo, were designed to raise the housing standards of Cairo’s 
low-income families (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 130-131). 
In addition to the construction of public housing, rent control was reinforced. In 1962 the Rent 
Assessment Committee was established to enforce ‘fair rents.’ Law 46/1962 defined ‘fair rents’ as 
“not exceeding 5% of the value of the land on which the building is raised plus 8% of the cost of 
construction” (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 123). 
It should be noted however that the housing programme was not necessarily categorised as a 
residualist programme but rather an industrial programme. The housing programme benefitted not 
merely those on lower-incomes but also wealthier citizens. The government offered various types 
of public housing and constructed residences for civil servants, army officers and formal-sector 
workers as well. The civil servants preferred public housing because it enabled them to reduce their 
housing costs and to supplement their low incomes. Moreover, as rent controls discouraged the 
private sector from investing in housing construction, wealthier urban workers tended to dwell in 
public housing. Since scarce resources were distributed not only to the lower classes but also to the 
wealthier classes, the effectiveness of this housing policy as a programme for the lower classes 
declined. Consequently, the housing programme became a social welfare programme for urban 
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workers (Feiler 1992: 299). 
 
E.  A Summary: The Social Welfare System during the Nasser Era 
Whilst the social welfare system had been restricted in the era of the British Protectorate, it 
was dramatically expanded by the Nasser government. Although the 1952 Revolution removed 
obstacles to social welfare expansion (the permissive condition), the social welfare system initially 
lacked an ‘engine’ for the expansion. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company became such 
an ‘engine’. As the government needed to justify the nationalisation, it more actively adopted the 
etatist economic system. In 1962 the government declared the introduction of Arab socialism. The 
primary role of the social welfare system was to financially support industrialisation. The 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal and Arab socialist policies (the productive conditions) gave the 
social welfare system another significant role – ideological justification through generous income 
distribution. 
Consequently, the social welfare system in the Nasser era had ‘dualist’ features, consisting of 
two programmes: industrial programmes and residualist programmes. The industrial, core 
programmes were pro-labour and designed to contribute to Nasser’s industrialisation projects. This 
research focused on the social insurance programme. The food subsidy programme (see Chapter 
4) and the public employment programme (see Chapter 5) were also categorised as industrial 
programmes. Although these programmes benefited urban workers’ organised labour, they had little 
impact on the rest of the population. The corporatist connection with organised labour provided 
organised labour with a channel for influencing public policies, including social welfare policy 
especially after the consolidation of socialist ideas. The government regarded industrial 
programmes as tools to achieve social justice through fair income distribution, which was the core 
idea of Arab socialism, especially to urban workers. At the same time, they were linked to 
industrialisation projects, for example by re-investing social insurance contributions in government 
projects. In contrast to the industrial programmes, the residualist programmes were not necessarily 
connected with industrialisation. Their development was motivated by an ideology – Arab 
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socialism. To obtain popular support especially from the vulnerable, the government expanded 
these programmes. Although the introduction of Arab socialism fuelled the expansion of these 
programmes, the scale of the expansion was limited because of the financial restrictions. Indeed, 
the amount of social assistance benefits slightly increased even after the introduction of Arab 
socialism, whereas social insurance benefits exceed social assistance benefits in 1960 and 
dramatically increased thereafter. This was because the size of social insurance enlarged as the 
public sector increased (see Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3: A Comparison of Social Assistance and Social Insurance Benefits, 1956 to 1970 
(£E million) 
 
Source: Garrison (1978: 289), Table 1. 
 
It should be noted, however, that although social welfare programmes were divided into two – 
industrial and residualist programmes, the social welfare system was generally populist as Arab 
socialism allowed the government to legitimise its rule through generous welfare provision. For 
example, the social insurance programme attempted to cover more and more social risks by 
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expanding the categories covered, although its beneficiaries were generally restricted to urban 
formal-sector workers. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the public employment programme 
socially protected the new middle class youth by guaranteeing public sector jobs to all university 
graduates. Moreover, the residualist programmes also attempted to deliver welfare benefits to the 
vulnerable, although their expansion was restricted because of the financial constraints. The 
populist feature had a significant impact on path-dependent change in the social welfare system 
after the Nasser era and stimulated the Sadat government to drastically expand the system. 
 
 
2-3.  The Legacy of the Arab Socialism and Positive Feedback Effects in the 
Sadat Era 
 
In 1970 Anwar al-Sadat took office after the death of President Nasser. In the late 1960s, 
Egypt had experienced economic difficulties. To boost the economy, the Sadat government adopted 
a partial economic liberalisation policy (infitah), aiming to promote foreign investment in 
industrialisation. Whereas the Sadat government expected the huge public sector to play a critical 
role in economic production, it opened the market to foreign investors, from Western Europe and 
the Gulf countries in particular. According to conventional understanding, the infitah encouraged 
the country to shift from ‘distributive justice’ to ‘economic growth’ or ‘efficiency’. As Asef Bayat 
(2006: 138) remarks, “faced with a choice between ‘egalitarian / populist measures’ and ‘economic 
growth / productivity’, the [Sadat] regime eventually chose the latter”. This research, however, 
demonstrates that during the Sadat era the choice of ‘economic growth / productivity’ – the infitah, 
eventually addressed the importance of ‘distributive justice’, expanding the social welfare system. 
To explain path-dependent change in the social welfare system during the Sadat era, first, this 
section explains that failures in Nasser’s project and Sadat’s choice – the infitah and political 
liberalisation (i.e., the introduction of multiparty elections) in the 1970s. Although the infitah was 
introduced to boost economic growth, it only benefited the business elites, providing them various 
opportunities to increase their wealth and make strong connections with the regime. It created 
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various economic difficulties for many citizens, such as unemployment and inflation and several 
social welfare programmes became dysfunctional. Accordingly, the income gap between the ‘haves’ 
and the ‘have-nots’ increased and damaged distributive justice. In addition, the introduction of 
multiparty elections did not benefit the populace because the government did not change its 
authoritarian characteristics. Instead it favoured the business elites because multiparty elections 
increased the costs. Theoretically speaking, the Sadat government abandoned the organisational 
proliferation strategy that Nasser had adopted, and reinforced patronage relationships between the 
government and the business class. As a result, political liberalisation in Egypt did not resolve the 
deficit of distributive justice, which encouraged the Sadat government to find another source of 
enhancing its legitimacy. 
Second, this research demonstrates that the Sadat government regarded populist welfare 
provision, which stemmed from Arab socialism, as an alternative way of enhancing the legitimacy 
of Sadat’s rule. Although the government exploited the concept of ‘socialism’ to legitimise welfare 
provision, it conceptualised welfare different from Arab socialism and used it as a manifesto that 
the government would continue populist welfare provision. This approach was strengthened after 
the food riots in 1977, when the government was forced to cut subsidies but to continue populist 
welfare provision. As a result, the social welfare system strengthened its populist feature (path 
dependence), which had a significant impact on its development during the Mubarak era. 
 
 
2-3-1.  The Political Economy of Sadat’s Rule: The Economic Open-Door Policy 
(Infitah) and the Introduction of Multiparty Elections 
 
A.  The Twilight of Nasser’s Rule: Economic Failures and Defeat in the 1967 War 
President Sadat was faced with serious economic difficulties when he succeeded Nasser in 
1970. The causes could be traced to the mid-1960s and were divided into two: international and 
domestic factors. First, domestic factors led to a deteriorating economic performance in Egypt from 
the beginning of the 1960s onwards. Nasser’s nationalisation strategy needed a huge amount of 
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foreign currency for compensation, such as payments to the United Kingdom for companies 
nationalised in 1956 (£E 25 million), compensation to shareholders of the Suez Canal Company 
(£E 27.5 million) and compensation to the Sudan for the construction of the Aswan High Dam (£E 
15 million). Poor export performance also led to a trade imbalance, which reached £E 174 million 
in 1963. 
In order to cover these deficits Egypt had constantly eroded its total net foreign 
exchange reserves which stood at £E 109 million on the eve of the first industrial plan 
and at £E 7 million in December 1962. In May 1962 Egypt reached a standby 
agreement with the IMF and immediately drew credits of £E 20 million (Waterbury 
1983: 95). 
Although the Nasser government devalued the Egyptian pound, this was not sufficient to boost 
exports. The government therefore needed to implement further retrenchment. President Nasser 
appointed the mildly rightist Zakaria Muhi al-Din to the post of Prime Minister. Prime Minister 
Muhi al-Din began negotiations with the IMF and worked out a ‘background stabilisation plan’. It 
was supposed to include economic reform measures, such as further devaluation of the Egyptian 
pound, tax raises and the loosening of price controls. Although the plan was not executed, it was 
obvious that, even before the 1967 War, the country did not have sufficient resources to undertake 
further socialist measures (Waterbury 1983: 94-97). 
Second, international factors also damaged the economy. Egypt intervened in a civil war in 
North Yemen between 1962 and 1967, triggering the payment crisis of 1962. The Yemeni civil war 
led to a deteriorating relationship with the United States and resulted in the suspension of American 
wheat shipments. Defeat against Israel in the 1967 War was a final blow to Nasser’s rule. The 
defeat meant that Egypt lost two main engines of economic growth: the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Suez Canal. The former was occupied by Israel, having till then produced half of all Egyptian oil. 
The latter was closed during the war, which meant that the country completely stopped receiving 
related foreign currency revenue (Vatikiotis 1991: 412). As the country had lost several important 
resources of foreign currency (such as the Suez Canal, the Sinai oil fields and tourism), the 
industrial sector suffered from currency shortages and could not afford to invest in new projects, 
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which resulted in economic stagnation. Consequently, the perception spread that Nasser’s 
industrialisation strategy had failed (Hinnebusch 1985: 36-37). 
Defeat in the 1967 War had a serious impact on Egypt’s political and economic structures. 
After the defeat, Nasser made modest concessions to the right and his political assertion of Arab 
socialism was toned down. Whereas the leftists claimed that the government should continue the 
revolution against the privileged classes and mobilised the masses, the rightists endorsed a 
prescription for the political crisis that Egypt should implement political and economic 
liberalisation to attract economic investment from the West. In response to the rightist claims, the 
Nasser government abandoned the radical mobilisation effort of the 1960s: the ‘Socialist Youth 
Organisation’ was dissolved, efforts to organize the lower-income class in rural areas ended, and 
peasant cooperatives were gradually neglected (Hinnebusch 1985: 37). As for economic policy, 
President Nasser initiated several plans to overcome Egypt’s economic difficulties after the defeat 
in 1967. A result of his consideration was conveyed in the ‘30 May 1968 Paper,’ which outlined the 
principles of his revised economic strategy. “This strategy rested on three pillars: (a) resource 
allocation would give priority to defense; (b) development would be maintained at a reasonable 
rate; and (c) subsidies and the policy of guaranteeing government employment to graduates would 
continue” (Ikram 2006: 19). 
 
B.  The Exclusion of the Left and the Economic Open-Door Policy (Infitah) 
When Anwar Sadat took office, it was obvious that Nasser’s industrialisation strategy had 
failed. However, significant reforms were not implemented until the end of the October War in 
1973. This was because the leftists who supported Nasser’s socialist measures were still dominant 
and President Sadat had to deal with them. The leftists were represented by Ali Sabri, a Free Officer, 
senior party chairman of the ASU and Vice President. Although the group was small, it was well 
organised and had influenced the political arena in the 1960s. The faction was the majority on the 
ASU’s executive committee. Also, this faction had strong networks in the Ministries of Interior and 
Information, or the security and police apparatuses. President Sadat represented the other rightist 
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faction. Although he had not been close to the centre of the power in the Nasser era, his rivals 
agreed to the appointment of Sadat as President because his rivals did not regard him as a powerful 
challenger against them. Contrary to their expectation, President Sadat successfully expelled Ali 
Sabri and his supporters from the political arena and re-distributed their positions to his own 
supporters (Hinnebusch 1985: 40-44). 
Before the mass public, he [President Sadat] donned the mantle of Nasirism, for 
identification with Nasir and the Revolution was a legitimacy asset for which he had 
as yet no substitute. Those loyal to the Nasirite heritage were assured that its principles 
still governed Egypt’s policy. In spite of Egypt’s crunch, he tried to appease 
government employees with increases in wages and pensions (Hinnebusch 1985: 50). 
 
However, President Sadat gradually attempted to embark on economic reform, removing 
leftists from the political arena. First of all, he encouraged rightists to criticise Nasser’s policies. 
Sadat portrayed himself as standing above this debate as a neutral arbiter, unwilling to 
see the ideals of the Egyptian revolution disparaged, but prepared to listen to those 
advocating changes in the methods of realizing them. In fact, Sadat was giving the 
‘green light’ to the right wing to launch an open attack on Nasirism, as a way of 
broadening support for a new course (Hinnebusch 1985: 61). 
The major attack concentrated on the fact that President Nasser was a dictator, focusing on the lack 
of political freedom, political suppression of his opponents and abuses of human rights. At the 
same time, President Sadat accused Sabri and his supporters of comprising the ‘power centre’ in 
May 1971 (the Corrective Revolution). On 2 May, Sabri was dismissed from his position (Vice 
President) and from the ASU. Within the following weeks, Sabri’s supporters resigned their 
positions in the cabinet or the ASU: 
Perhaps the conspirators had deluded themselves into thinking that they personally and 
the ASU as a whole had popular roots, that having gone public some segments of the 
masses (students, workers, the Vanguard?) would go into the streets to shout their 
names, and that with control of the police, [the Ministry of] Interior, and the armed 
forces they could restore order and their own power (Waterbury 1983: 351). 
However, their attempt resulted in a failure and they were arrested by the Republican Guard. 
Thereafter, President Sadat ostentatiously dismantled the ‘power centre’, asserting the end of 
autocratic measures represented by police harassment, mail surveillance and wiretapping 
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(Waterbury 1983: 349-353). 
The power struggle accelerated economic reform. In 1974, the Sadat government issued the 
October Paper, which outlined the new policy of infitah. This term, ‘infitah,’ first used in the late 
1960s, implies a positive meaning of opening not only to foreign investment but to profit. “It was 
thus difficult to reject a policy with such a name, the more so as the policy was emphatically 
praised by the state” (Wahba 1994: 179). Law 43/1974 legalised foreign investment in all fields, 
some of which had been restricted by the National Charter of 1962, and this law was brought into 
effect in 1975. At the same time, the government approved various projects such as “free zones, 
chemical industries, spinning and weaving, mining, banking, housing, tourism, livestock, and 
others. … A large assortment of guarantees and privileges was given to the projects, including 
exemption from nationalisation, confiscation and sequestration; nor were they subject to the 
legislations and regulations that applied to the public sector, even in areas concerning personnel 
regulations, representation of workers on boards of directors, or distribution of profits” (Ayubi 
1991: 20).13 Simultaneously, the government enacted Law 86/1974 to protect Egyptian investors. It 
“allowed Egyptian entrepreneurs who invested their funds in local currency the same privileges as 
those given to foreign investors. In practice, however, no local projects benefited from this law for 
a number of years and there were calls for the Egyptian investors to be given the same rights as 
were accorded to foreign capital” (Ayubi 1991: 21). 
It should be noted that the infitah was not a blueprint for a free economy but rather an 
‘investment promotion programme.’ An official publication, which was published by the Ministry 
of Planning in 1977, reveals the thought of the ruling elites during the Sadat government. 
It was thought in early 1975 that the crisis of the Egyptian economy was temporary, 
                                                     
13  Several shortcomings in Law 43/1974 were pointed out by foreign investors. An important 
problem was the exchange rate for the repatriation of profits and capitals. “In the original law, 
the exchange rate was fixed at the original level, i.e. at Piastres 39.36 per US dollar. Another 
problem related to the foreign exchange accounts of infitah companies which had to be kept in 
banks registered with the Central Bank of Egypt, rather than the offshore branches of 
international banks which had been set up in Egypt for example.” These problems were solved 
by Law 43/1974, in which “the repatriation of profits and capitals was allowed at the ‘highest 
obtainable price,’ and projects were allowed to open accounts in any banks they liked” (Wahba 
1994: 190-191). 
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resulting from insufficient liquidity and a temporary deficit in the balance of 
payments… From this point of view it was logical that efforts should be concentrated 
on seeking liquid resources from abroad without changes in domestic economic 
structure and general policy (MoP 1977: 5). 
Economic advisors in the government did not regard the economic difficulties as structural. This 
attitude explains the fact that they recognised the importance of Arab funds for Egypt’s economic 
recovery. “Such funds were likely to be mobilized more quickly than those from other sources, and 
were less likely to require institutional and other changes by Egypt” (Ikram 2006: 21). 
The government attempted to rationalise the management of public enterprises by excluding 
employees from their decision-making process. While the government abolished public holding 
organisations (muassasat amma), it created twenty five Higher Sectoral Councils instead. These 
new councils were responsible for developing a particular sector and supervising their subsidiary 
companies. At the same time, the government attempted to make the public sector management 
more efficient by eliminating workers’ representation. Law 111/1975 “stipulated that the board of 
the Higher Sectoral Councils was to consist of the directors of the individual companies, three 
independent experts, and representation from the Ministries of Finance, Planning and the Economy 
and Economic Cooperation chaired by a supervising minister” (Wahba 1994: 193). Although the 
government maintained control of public sector companies through control of appointments to the 
boards of governing councils, these organisations were supposed to function in an advisory rather 
than a supervisory capacity and, accordingly, the subsidiary companies obtained a large degree of 
freedom. Also, this law provided for the creation of a general assembly in each public enterprise. 
“The general assembly was empowered to dismiss all or part of the board of directors, and vote on 
mergers and changes in the form of the company. Interestingly, the general assembly, whether in 
wholly state-owned or mixed ownership companies, was composed of the relevant minister, 
representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Planning, five members of the Higher Sectoral 
Council, three experts and four company employees appointed by the board of directors” (Wahba 
1994: 193). The government intended to reduce the role of workers’ representation in the 
management of the public sector by making representatives of employees a minority on the boards. 
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Although the workers’ representatives did not have a substantial impact on the management of 
public enterprises, they were a symbol of ‘bottom-up’ management in Nasser’s Arab socialism 
(Wahba 1994: 192-194). 
The infitah did not lead to serious changes in Egypt’s economic structure. “What it seems to 
have done was to establish and expand a parallel market for foreign exchange, reduce exchange 
restrictions, reform banking laws, and to some extent decentralize the making of economic 
decisions. More importantly, perhaps, it increased the participation of the private sector in the 
economy and thus introduced an element of greater competition for the public sector” (Vatikiotis 
1991: 429-430). However, the ruling elite did not intend to diminish the role of the public sector in 
the economy through the infitah. Prime Minister Mamduh Salim remarked: “This policy does not 
deviate from the general philosophy of the system nor from the principles of equal distribution; it 
does not weaken the public sector nor the importance of comprehensive national planning, nor does 
it mean chaos, clashes and contradictions” (Ayubi 1991: 21-22). 
Therefore, the infitah could not overcome the shortcomings in the Egyptian economy created 
during the Nasser era. According to Ikram (2006: 44-54), there were eight problems in the Egyptian 
economy after the infitah: (1) serious distortions in prices and incentives led to many uneconomic 
allocations of investment and waste of resources. (2) Exchange rate and trade protection benefited 
imports rather than exports, which distorted allocations of investment. (3) The regimes of exchange 
rate and trade were highly fragmented and complex. There were three channels of exchange 
transaction: the Central Bank, the commercial banks and the ‘own exchange’ market. The exchange 
rates changed, depending on the channels and types of transactions. (4) The budget contained 
several structural weak points. Whereas there was an increase in total government’s expenditure as 
a proportion of GDP, the increase highly depended on fiscal deficit. The budget was furthermore 
vulnerable to external forces. (5) The economy was sustained by the public sector, including 
government activities and public enterprises, whose activities were protected by the government 
from competition. (6) Pressure to enhance the productivity of capital was weak especially in the 
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public sector. (7) Economic management by the government did not effectively respond to changes 
in circumstances. In order to control inflation, for example, the government utilised price control 
through subsidies and price regulations. Fiscal policy was not effectively utilised as a tool for 
economic stabilisation. (8) Government institutions for economic management were not effective 
enough to construct the new economic system. Despite the shortcomings, the infitah gradually 
enabled the business elite to increase their economic power, although the public sector was still 
dominant in the economy. 
However, it should be noted that the business class was not independent from the state, unlike 
the bourgeoisie in Western European countries. Businessmen were dependent on the state and the 
public sector in Egypt. 
Changing patterns of allocation rather than ownership may produce the kind of 
political economies that will give an exhausted statist regime a new lease of life. 
Instead of managing economic exchanges directly, such a regime may manage them 
indirectly, while still continuing in principle to own the means of production. 
Supporting client groups then becomes less expensive because some of the costs are 
farmed out to the state oligopolists … in much the same way as indirect rule was 
usually less costly to colonial powers than direct rule (Moore 1986: 637). 
In the process of privatisation, the government provided benefits to businessmen in return for their 
support. It erected a personalistic network of patronage along with the state bureaucracy. 
The distinction between the public treasury and the ruler’s private purse became 
increasingly blurred as Sadat and his immediate family became principal beneficiaries 
of the infitah. Sadat … did not openly pursue business interests or acquire assets in his 
own name; but his wife, siblings, and others … ensured that the President’s family 
secured a substantial piece of the action (Springborg 1989: 34). 
Whereas the government allowed them to benefit from their activities under the auspices of the 
government, it still maintained political control over these activities through membership of its 
inner circle. As a result, President Sadat successfully reinforced his power by politically controlling 
their activities. 
Moreover, the infitah apparently led to improved prosperity. The growth ratio of national 
income reached 8% per annum between 1975 and 1985. Simultaneously, per capita income 
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increased by more than 5%. Although Sadat and his supporters thought of the economic growth as 
an outcome of the economic reforms, the reality was that productive activities actually stagnated. In 
major industries such as textiles, for example, only a slight increase in their product was recorded. 
The Egyptian economy failed to promote the export of manufactured goods. Although exports 
increased from 12.9% of GDP in 1970 to 16.9% in 1974, they dropped to 11.5% in 1976. This 
record also depended on petroleum exports. Investments were directed to six sectors (petroleum, 
construction, electricity, trade and finance, transportation, and storage and communication) and did 
not necessarily contribute to improving productivity in manufacturing (Cooper 1982: 108-113). 
 
C.  The Introduction of Multiparty Elections 
In the Sadat era, the country experienced gradual change in the political structure with the 
introduction of multiparty, quasi-competitive elections. After issuing the October Paper in 1974, the 
Sadat government actively attempted to take political liberalisation measures as a means to control 
opponents within the ASU and its affiliated organisations. After the 1975 ASU election, the 
National Congress decided to organise platforms (manabil) that were to function within the ASU. 
Although forty platforms were proposed, the National Congress approved three: a ‘liberal right’ 
platform, a ‘centre’ platform and a ‘left’ platform. Although Sadat had represented the right during 
the power struggle between Sadat and Sabri, he now pretended to be ideologically neutral to all of 
the platforms. In fact, he located himself within the centre platform, which in turn supported him. 
The liberal right platform stressed the necessity to activate investment in the private sector through 
the promotion of the infitah. The left platform was originally divided into two – Marxists and 
Nasserists, because Nasserists were suspicious about the subordination of Egyptian Marxists to the 
Soviet Union and apprehensive of their ideology of class struggle. Although the two made a unified 
platform in 1975, the platform was fragile. What they shared was a concern for social and 
economic equity, hostility to the bourgeoisie and suspicion of the United States (Waterbury 1983: 
364-366). 
Although only the three platforms within the ASU could participate in the 1976 parliamentary 
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election as political organisations (except independent candidates), it was the first openly contested 
election, at least in appearance, in nearly 25 years. The election resulted in a triumph of the centre 
platform over other two with a majority of 280 (of 352 seats) in the parliament. The right and left 
platforms obtained only 12 and 2 seats respectively. After this election Sadat decided to transform 
the platforms into independent political parties. The pro-government centre was named the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1978. The right and left platforms were later named the 
Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar) and the National Unionist Progressive Party (Hizb al-Tagammu) 
respectively. Moreover, the Sadat government allowed opponents to found new political parties in 
January 1977. In response to this decision, the liberal right opposition formed the New Wafd Party 
and the centre left opposition organised the Socialist Labour Party (Fahmy 2002: 62-63). 
During the Sadat era, organised labour remained an important partner for the authoritarian 
regime. When President Sadat decided to divide the ASU into three political platforms, he exerted 
pressure on the subsidiary trade unions to affiliate with the centre platform led by himself: 
Sadat promised the unionists that they would receive the government’s support in 
future political elections if they affiliated with his plank. Unionists were added to the 
political bureau of the party and the leadership of Cairo branch …. And where 
enticement failed, intimidation was attempted (Posusney 1997: 110). 
Consequently, the Sadat government obtained the ETUF’s support for his political initiative, even if 
union activists were opposed to it. Confederation leaders co-operated with the government in 
tightening control over local union activists, especially for elections (Posusney 1997: 108-113). 
The introduction of multiparty elections created by-products that would go on to have a 
significant impact on the Egyptian political structure. Whereas the Nasser government selected 
candidates before elections, the Sadat government took indirect measures to control the outcome of 
elections, such as monopolisation of the media and intimidation of opposition candidates. As direct 
government control was loosened, outcomes of elections were determined according to candidates’ 
resources. Candidates needed wealth to distribute such favours as chickens before elections, or to 
contribute to the development of their constituency, for example, by renovating local mosques. 
Although election laws provided that candidates could spend no more than £E 50 on their 
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campaigns, in fact they needed £E 10,000 to win an election. Candidates also needed government 
connections to contract infrastructure or get public sector jobs for their clients in their constituency 
(Hinnebusch 1985: 171). 
As the costs of elections increased, elections proved most favourable to wealthy people, such 
as the business elite. Indeed, parliamentary committees became an arena which reflected their 
interests in government policy. 
From the education committee sprang the proposal for a private university. From the 
planning and budget committee came … proposals to sell shares of public sector 
companies to private investors, opposition to periodic increases in worker salaries on 
the grounds that they raised consumption and inflation, and calls to restrict the public 
sector to fields the private sector could not undertake. From the agricultural committee 
came proposals to change the land tenure law… (Hinnebusch 1985: 176). 
Although not all of the proposals were reflected in government policy, many of them were 
embodied (Hinnebusch 1985: 176-177). 
The wave of political liberalisation loosened control over the media. The press was allowed to 
publish articles freely and the television debates between top policy makers were broadcast. In 
response to the wave of the political liberalisation in the mass media, parliamentary members 
expected a role for parliament in political decision-making. In November 1976, “at the Sidna 
Hussain mosque in Cairo, the Independent MPs met and declared themselves the real opposition in 
the parliament” (Waterbury 1983: 367). 
However, political liberalisation led to a crisis of legitimacy, not to a declining democracy 
deficit. In the de-Nasserisation campaign that President Sadat launched, he criticised Nasser’s rule 
for its autocratic features, such as the lack of political freedom, political suppression of his 
opponents and abuses of human rights (Hinnebusch 1985: 63). However, this political liberalisation 
did not lead to looser authoritarian controls over the populace. In Egypt political liberalisation was 
one of Sadat’s strategies to expand political support. As the government loosened control over 
parliamentary elections, only the business class, which arose as a result of the infitah, benefited 
from this policy. Theoretically speaking, the Sadat government abandoned the organisational 
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proliferation strategy, which Nasser had adopted, and reinforced patronage relationships with the 
business class. In contrast, most of the population did not benefit from this political liberalisation 
because of the authoritarian features of Sadat’s rule. Instead, they were harmed by Sadat’s 
economic policy (infitah), as explained above. Moreover, although organised labour was still an 
official partner of the regime, its political influence declined as the business class gained more 
political power. Thus, the Sadat government needed to find other ways of enhancing its legitimacy 
and exploited the concept of ‘socialism’ to further its own ends. 
 
 
2-3-2.  The Populist Development of the Social Welfare System in the Sadat Era 
 
The infitah led to an increasing income gap between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. The infitah 
provided ‘haves’ with opportunities to expand their fortunes. Most investors were from the upper 
class in the pre-revolutionary era or those who had made fortunes in the Gulf countries in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The monopolised structure of domestic wholesale trade, for example, gave ‘haves’ 
opportunities to make further fortunes: “20 large merchants controlled the meat trade, three the 
seed trade, nine the market in paper, 11 in pipes, 10 in soft drinks and four in automobile parts; in 
consequence of such monopolies, the price paid by the consumer for locally made goods was 
typically more than twice than paid by merchants to the producer” (Hinnebusch 1985: 280). 
In contrast to ‘haves’, ‘have-nots’ suffered from inflation caused by the infitah and were faced 
with a decline in their living standards. 
As far as the issue of income distribution was concerned, the Open Door Policy 
[infitah] increased the opportunities for wealth enhancement for the upper strata while 
raising prices faster than wage increases. … 
The part of society that was especially harmed by the infitah, and which saw its 
standard of living lowered, was the large segment of the middle class that had neither 
migrated nor found the means for increasing their income by working in the new 
infitah activities, such as import/export, brokerage, exchanging currencies or renting 
out furnished apartment, and so on (Amin 2011: 55-56). 
Table 2.3 indicates that income inequality declined from the 1950s until 1972. This was because 
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the Nasser government implemented a variety of egalitarian measures, such as agrarian reform and 
the nationalisation of private enterprises. Thereafter, income inequality grew again because of the 
infitah. The share of the wealthiest 10% in income distribution rose slightly in the 1970s. 
Simultaneously, the share of the middle 30% shrunk slightly. This data indicated that the middle 
class had gradually been eroded as a result of the infitah (El-Issawy 1982: 101-102). Other statistics 
also indicates that the infitah increased the proportion of those who lived below the poverty line. 
Table 2.4 indicates that the percentage of families below the poverty line in urban areas declined in 
the Nasser era, from 30.0% in 1958/59 to 27.8 in 1964/65. However, the tendency reversed in the 
1970s and the percentage increased to 34.5% in 1974/75 (Ibrahim 1982: 384-385). 
 
Table 2.3: The Personal Distribution of Income 
Relative Share of 
Income Groups 
Early 1950s 1972 1975 1976 
Lowest 60% 18.0   29.8 34.9 33.7 
Middle 30% 38.5 37.0 30.2 31.7 
Top 10% 43.5 33.2 34.9 34.6 
Source: El-Issawy (1982: 101), Table 4.9. 
 
Table 2.4: Estimation of Rural and Urban Poverty in Egypt, 1958-1975 
  1958/59 1964/65 1974/75 
Poverty line as measures 
in £E 
Rural 93.0 125.0 270.0 
Urban 121.0 163.0 351.0 
Percentage of families 
below the poverty line 
Rural 35.0% 26.8% 44.0% 
Urban 30.0% 27.8% 34.5% 
Source: Ibrahim (1982: 384), Table 12.2. 
 
In the labour market, mechanisms to absorb new people into the labour force also began to 
falter in the 1970s. The population in Egypt continued to increase by 2.31% per annum in average 
for ten years and was estimated to reach 38 million in 1976. This means that approximately 
900,000 people be added to the population annually. Although the labour market needed to absorb 
the increase, the capability to absorb workers was restricted. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the 
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public sector (both government institutions and public enterprises) already suffered from 
overstaffing and low productivity, partly because of government guaranteed public sector jobs to 
graduates of universities and higher-education institutes. The other main area of employment – 
migration to the Gulf countries – was also problematic. Although remittances from emigrants 
supplied the Egyptian economy with foreign currency, migration had a negative impact on the 
labour market. As migration attracted skilled workers, the home economy suffered workforce 
shortages in these areas. Indeed, wages in the construction sector began to increase in the 1970s 
(Ikram 1980: 67-69). As the infitah revealed the economic gaps between the rich and the poor, the 
government needed to find another source of the legitimacy to counter the deficit of distributive 
justice caused by the infitah. 
It was gradually revealed that some social welfare programmes also became dysfunctional 
during the infitah. The housing programme was one example. Although the Nasser government 
supplied public housing not only to the vulnerable but also to the middle and upper class, the 
government effort reached its peak in 1963. Public investment in housing could not keep up with 
rapid urbanisation. In addition, rent controls in the Nasser era discouraged private investment in 
housing. These factors led to a housing scarcity in the Sadat era. Whilst 90,000 new family units 
were formed annually between 1960 and 1975, only 28,000 new housing units were supplied 
annually during the same period. Consequently, the proportion of citizens without proper 
accommodation increased, from 21.7% in 1970 to 31.9% in 1977. The infitah exacerbated the 
housing crisis, increasing demands for housing. During the infitah, a construction boom increased 
the cost of real estates and materials (Hinnebusch 1985: 270-271). In such circumstances, 
government rent controls were fossilised: 
Landlord charged large fees for the right to rent (key money), kept flats off the market 
waiting for rich Arabs or foreigners or took to selling them at exorbitant prices, and 
conspired to oust tenants from rent controlled buildings so they could sell the land at 
big profits. In spite of rent control, the rent of a four-room apartment increased six 
times between 1960 and 1979 (Hinnebusch 1985: 271). 
Although the housing programme aimed to supply inexpensive housing to the vulnerable (as well 
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as people in the middle class), it failed to achieve its goal (Waterbury 1978: 177-198). 
In the 1970s, it was revealed that the healthcare programme was also an ineffective social 
welfare programme for the vulnerable. 
Public hospitals fell into abysmal squalor; standards of sanitation were appalling, 
quality nursing almost absent and equipment old and deteriorating. In the insane 
asylum of Abbassiyya, a handful of doctors and nurses were responsible for 5000 
patients, violence went uncurbed, and lavatories were left out of order (Hinnebusch 
1985: 272) 
The Sadat government did not intend to upgrade public healthcare especially for the vulnerable. 
Instead its method was to encourage the private sector to develop high-quality facilities for those 
who could pay for the service. Consequently, new private clinics opened, importing up-to-date 
medical equipment. As these clinics targeted the ‘haves’, the quality of healthcare for the 
vulnerable worsened during the infitah. (Hinnebusch 1985: 272). 
In such economic and social conditions, the Sadat government considered populist welfare 
provision as a means for enhancing the legitimacy and strengthening the sustainability of his 
regime. John Waterbury (1983) characterises the Sadat era as one of increasing political 
‘giveaways’, which strategically bought incumbency through distributive measures. As he remarks: 
Because his incumbency was so closely associated with rapid inflation, he had little 
choice. He raised the minimum wage four times, beginning in 1972 … and lastly on 
May Day 1981. … [After the October War] he raised the minimum wage to £E 12 
(again on May Day), raised the tax exemption floor from annual incomes of £E 250 to 
£E 300 thereby affecting 1.8 million people, and raised the minimum pension payment 
from £E 3.6 to £E 6 per month. He followed this at the beginning of Ramadan and on 
the first anniversary of the October War with a one-month’s salary bonus up to a 
maximum of £E 30 and ended the practice of docking salaries one-day’s pay per 
month (Waterbury 1983: 228-229). 
 
In this process the Sadat government exploited the concept of ‘socialism’ to justify populist 
welfare provision, which had the positive feedback effect of reproducing the populist social welfare 
system, although this socialism differed from what had been dominant in the Nasser era – Arab 
socialism. When President Sadat announced his intention of forming a new ruling party – the NDP, 
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he exploited the concept of ‘democratic socialism’ and manifested it as the core ideology of the 
NDP in May 1977 (Waterbury 1983: 370). In a speech on 15 August 1978, moreover, President 
Sadat mentioned in The Times that the new party – the NDP had “two main goals: enough food for 
every Egyptian and a house for each family” (Anon. 1978). In other words, his ‘socialism’ was a 
mere claim that the government would deliver social welfare benefits by increasing populist 
welfare provision. 
Sadat’s speech reflected a fear that social welfare reform would lead to social instability and, 
in the worst case, trigger demonstrations against the government. The food riots in 1977 were a 
critical example.14 Because of a decline in foreign currency reserves, the Sadat government began 
negotiations with the IMF about a stand-by loan, which meant that the government would be forced 
to implement a financial stabilisation programme (including reduction of expenditure on food 
subsidies). In January 1977 the Sadat government announced the lifting of food subsidies, 
triggering food riots. In response, the Sadat government immediately cancelled subsidy cuts. The 
food riots forced the Egyptian authoritarian regime to continue providing populist welfare and 
strengthened path-dependent change in the social welfare system. This reaction indicates that 
authoritarian leaders might be forced to change their survival strategies, and that mass movements 
are reactive to their decisions and function as a signal for them, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
A.  Case (1): Social Insurance and the Sadat Pension 
In the Sadat era the social insurance programme dramatically changed its characteristics, 
expanding coverage to more vulnerable people. Beneficiaries of the institutional expansion were 
divided into three groups: (1) employers and the self-employed, (2) Egyptian citizens working 
abroad and (3) casual workers. This programme provided these three groups with three schemes: 
old-age, disability and death pensions. The first category was employers and the self-employed. 
Law 61/1973 applied this scheme to some categories of employers and, furthermore, it began to 
cover employers and the self-employed through a new law (Law108/1976) in 1976 (MSI 1984: 
                                                     
14 The details of the 1977 food riots will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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435-437). The insurance scheme for this category was compulsory and fully funded. This category 
accounted for 8.18% of the total contributors in 1977 (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 6). 
The second category was Egyptians working abroad. Since Egypt is a country exporting 
human resources, the government concluded social insurance agreements with some other states 
and needed to supplement them through domestic laws. Law 74/1973 was enacted as a supplement 
to these agreements and covered Egyptian citizens working abroad under individual labour 
contracts. Law 50/1978 began to cover all Egyptians working abroad whether employees or 
individual workers. A character of this programme was that the workers had to pay all of their 
contributions and employers did not have to contribute (MSI 1984: 437-439). 
Benefits are financed by monthly contributions paid by the insured persons at the rate 
of 22.5 per cent of the income category they select from among the 16 possible 
categories listed; contributions range from £E 15 to £E 300 per month. 
The insured person may request the amendment of the category he had selected to the 
next higher one (on condition that his age does not exceed 55 years on 1 January 
following the request for amendment) to a lower category (MSI 1984: 437). 
Whereas the first category (employers and the self-employed) was compulsory, workers in this 
category could choose whether they would enrol or not (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 6). 
The third category was casual workers and those who had been excluded from social insurance. 
Law 112/1980 stipulated that the social insurance programme should cover those vulnerable 
people. 
[According to Law 112/1980] beneficiaries include the following categories of 
workers: temporary workers in agriculture and related activities, fishermen employed 
on sailing boats, smallholders, home-owners whose annual revenue is less than £E 250, 
small-scale self-employed persons who do not work in a fixed workplace, domestic 
servants, self-employed fishermen, self-employed carriers (MSI 1984: 433). 
This programme covered old-age, disability and survivor’ pensions. The sources were categorised 
into three. The first source was contributions from insured workers (ranging from £E 0.1 to £E 0.3), 
which were trivial in the financing. The second source was some indirect sources, such as (1) the 
resources allocated for this scheme in the budget of the Nasser Social Bank, which was an Egyptian 
social bank to finance some social security expenditure; and (2) miscellaneous license fees and 
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taxes. The third category was the direct government support from the exchequer (Maait, Ismail & 
Khorasanee 2000: 10). It should be noted that, to stabilise the insurance scheme for casual workers 
as a poverty alleviation programme, the government was responsible for mobilising other resource, 
unlike the existing social insurance programme. 
This institutional expansion to casual workers was named the ‘Comprehensive Social 
Insurance Scheme (CSIS) and was part of Sadat’s strategy to achieve social justice through social 
safety nets.15 It became a turning point for the development of the social insurance programme. 
Whereas existing social insurance was dependent mainly on contributions from employers and 
insured workers, this scheme was a non-contributory and supplementary scheme to the fully 
contributory one (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 6). 
Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has implemented a new widely stratified SIS [Social 
Insurance System] operated as a fully funded scheme where employees pay their 
contributions that should be invested and then repaid to them afterwards as pensions. 
The system has gradually shifted to be partially funded on a PAYG [pay-as-you-go] 
with a defined benefits scheme (Selwaness 2012: 4). 
As a result of this expansion, beneficiaries of the social insurance programme dramatically 
increased in the 1970s. The number of social insurance contributors increased by 204% in the Sadat 
era, from 3.6 million in 1973 to 10.94 million in 1983. Payments to beneficiaries more dramatically 
increased by 447% during the same period (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 4). 
At the same time, the Sadat government also expended the social assistance programme to 
alleviate poverty. Law 30/1977 stipulated that the government should further expand 
non-contributory, means-tested payments to those who were not covered by the social insurance 
programme and create the ‘chastity pension’ for unmarried women (Bibars 2001: 83). Moreover, 
the government introduced a new safety net – the Sadat Pension, which was the other part of 
Sadat’s strategy (including the CSIS – discussed above). This scheme, established by Law 
112/1980, was created as a direct non-contributory scheme to aid the working poor. The pension 
was provided under the same conditions as the CSIS (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 10). 
                                                     
15  The other part was the Sadat Pension (will be explained below). 
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The Department of Social Assistance delivers this system. Beneficiaries of this system 
are persons over 65 years, mainly widows (23%), divorced women (20%), disabled 
(29%), elderly (19%), children of divorced women (15%) and others. … Sadat 
Pension beneficiaries are 15.9% of all pension beneficiaries in 1994/95” (Nassar 2002: 
193). 
The government regarded the Sadat Pension as an important source of legitimacy. This was obvious 
from the fact that President Sadat put his own name on the Pension (Sabry 2005: 32). 
This case study shows that social welfare programmes became more and more populist, and 
that the boundary between the industrial and residualist programmes blurred during the infitah. The 
social insurance programme was gradually expected to work as a poverty alleviation programme 
and the government increased financial support to it. Additionally, the social assistance programme 
reinforced its function as a poverty alleviation programme, expanding its targets and establishing 
the Sadat Pension. 
 
B.  Case (2): Food Subsidies and Public Employment 
The social welfare system in the Sadat era could be characterised as the dramatic expansion of 
alternative social welfare programmes, represented by food subsidies and public employment. 
Food Subsidies: As will be explained in Chapter 4, the government expanded the food 
subsidy programme, changing its features from a tool to help industrialisation to a mechanism to 
provide cheap foodstuffs to citizens. Although the government began to depend on imported wheat, 
which imposed a heavy burden on the budget, the Sadat government kept the price of subsidised 
commodities low and even increased the number of subsidised commodities. Foods, such as beans, 
lentils, and frozen fish, meat and chicken, in addition to wheat, rice and yellow maize, were added 
to the list. Although the devaluation of the Egyptian pound between 1977 and 1979 increased the 
import costs of foodstuffs, the government would not pass on a percentage of the additional cost to 
the population and covered the difference between the increasing import costs and the subsidised 
prices itseld. 
Public Employment: As will be discussed in Chapter 5, public employment dramatically 
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expanded in the 1970s. In an environment where the public sector was still dominant in economic 
activities, high wages in the public sector attracted university graduates to the public employment 
programme. Workers’ salaries in public enterprises were approximately 1.5 times of those in the 
private sector (Posusney 1997: 175). In the 1970s, the wage gap between the public and private 
sectors continuously became wider. Consequently, demand for public sector jobs increased and 
exceeded supply for these jobs in the Sadat era. The government gradually recognised the 
importance of measures to limit the number of permanent workers in the public sector. Although 
the government clamped down on wage rises despite inflation and the rising cost of living, it 
simultaneously increased the number of contract workers. Nonetheless, public employment still 
attracted young workers as it still provided them various privileges (such as social insurance and 
labour protection). Consequently, the public sector became progressively more overstaffed in the 
late 1970s. These two programmes expanded dramatically in the Sadat era, hand in hand with the 
progress of the infitah. 
 
C.  Path Dependence and the Reinforcement of Populist Welfare Provision during the Sadat 
Era 
During the Sadat era the populist features of the social welfare system, which had been 
established in the Nasser era, were strengthened (path dependence). While the infitah led to an 
increasing income gap between the haves and the have-nots and damaged distributive justice, 
political liberalisation – the introduction of multiparty elections – did not resolve the distributive 
justice deficit. Moreover, several existing social welfare programmes fell into dysfunction in the 
1970s, which stimulated discontent among Egyptians with the social welfare system. To enhance 
the legitimacy of his rule, the Sadat government paid more attention to populist welfare provision, 
which stemmed from Arab socialism. The concept of ‘socialism’ also added legitimacy to the 
expansionary welfare provision, even though it was far from Arab socialism. 
An increase in external resources enabled the government to implement expansionary 
measures. The first source was a steep rise in oil prices. The second source was a peace agreement 
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with Israel. The peace treaty promised the return of the Suez Canal to Egypt, and it enabled the 
county to use oil resources from the Sinai Peninsula. Also, the peace treaty with Israel attracted 
tourists from Western countries back to Egypt. The third source was the renewal of foreign aid. The 
Egyptian government received aid from the United States as well as Arab countries after the peace 
treaty with Israel (Amin 2011: 53-54). As indicated in Figure 2.4, an increase in external resources 
benefited the national budget, continuously increasing the ratio to the total revenue until FY 
1980/81. 
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage of Exogenous Revenue in Total Revenue 
 
Source: Ahmed (1984: 13), Table 7. 
 
It should be noted that path dependence during the Sadat era (unlike during the Mubarak era) 
was still sustained by the economic and political structures (especially the economic structure) that 
had been established in the Nasser era. In the political structure, organised labour was gradually 
marginalised and the business class established strong connections with the regime. In contrast, the 
public sector still played a dominant role in the economic structure, even though the infitah 
promoted the interests of the business elite. The dominance of the public sector enabled the 
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government to continue spending extensively on expansionary social welfare programmes and 
justified the use of the concept of ‘socialist’ welfare that had been consolidated in the Nasser era. 
 
 
2-4.  A Summary of the Argument 
 
The legacy of the social welfare system in the Nasser era had a significant impact on the 
evolution of the system thereafter. Although the size of the social welfare system was restricted in 
the era of the British Protectorate, the 1952 Revolution became a turning point for welfare 
expansion. Whereas the revolution removed several obstacles by excluding dominant political 
actors who were not interested in expanding welfare provision (such as the Palace, the British 
Authority and the landlord class), the following policies – the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 
particular – contributed to the consolidation of socialist ideas among the ruling elite. Socialist 
ideals encouraged the government to expand the dualist social welfare system. The first layer was 
industrial, core programmes, represented by social insurance. The industrial programmes were 
pro-labour and their main beneficiary was organised labour. Simultaneously, they were expected to 
work as a tool to promote Nasser’s industrialisation project. The social insurance programme 
re-invested its surplus in long-term industrial projects. The second layer was residualist 
programmes (such as the social assistance programme). Although these programmes were 
expanded as a result of the introduction of the Arab socialism, they were also limited by financial 
restraints. It should be noted that, despite the dualist feature, social welfare programmes – whether 
industrial or residualist programmes – had populist features. Although the Nasser government did 
not need to depend only on distributive justice via populist welfare provision because of his 
charisma, this distributive justice had a significant impact on the development of the social welfare 
system in the Sadat era. 
President Sadat needed to be more dependent on populist social welfare than his predecessor 
for three reasons: (1) the infitah promoted a widening of the income gap between the rich and the 
poor, (2) some existing social welfare programmes dysfunctioned in the 1970s, and (3) political 
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liberalisation did not resolve distributive justice deficit by enhancing the quality of democracy. 
Moreover, an increase in external resources enabled the Sadat government to expand the social 
welfare system. As a result, the Sadat government strengthened the populist features of the social 
welfare system (path dependence), paying more attention to populist welfare provision that had 
stemmed from Arab socialism. This process was irreversible. Although the Sadat government 
attempted to implement subsidy reform in 1977, this was cancelled following the food riots. After 
the 1977 food riots, the government strengthened the discourse of social justice to avoid social 
instability. Sadat’s new ruling party, the NDP, also addressed the idea of ‘democratic socialism’, 
which promised sufficient welfare provision for the population, the needy in particular. The 
government further expanded the social welfare system and avoided drastic reform for fear of 
further protests. Such institutional change demonstrates that popular behaviour (the 1977 food riots, 
in this case) might play an important role in the development of the social welfare system, but was 
reactive to government choice (the subsidy reform, in this case). 
It should be noted that change in the populist social welfare system during the Sadat era was 
still sustained by the economic and political structures (especially the economic structure) that had 
been established in the Nasser era. The public sector still played a dominant role in the economic 
structure, which enabled the government to continue spending heavily on expansionary social 
welfare and made it reasonable to exploit the concept of ‘socialism’ when justifying populist 
welfare provision. The structural characteristics that had been established in the Nasser era were 
still dominant and reproduced the populist social welfare system in the Sadat era. In contrast, the 
economic and political structures that sustained the populist social welfare system eroded in the 
Mubarak era. Therefore, the social welfare system thereafter evolved, following the logic that 
populist social welfare strengthened the ‘social contract’ between the government and the 
governed. 
 
127 
Chapter	3	
Change	in	the	Political	and	Economic	Structures	and	
Continuity	of	the	Social	Welfare	System	under	Mubarak’s	Rule	
 
On 6 October 1981, President Sadat was assassinated and Vice-President Hosni Mubarak 
succeeded him. Under Mubarak’s rule, the political and economic structures, which sustained the 
social welfare system that was established in the Nasser era, changed. Since the infitah began in the 
1970s, the economic structure had gradually changed as a result of economic liberalisation – a shift 
from etatism to an open economy. In the 1990s the government began a structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. In the 2000s, moreover, further 
economic liberalisation was adopted by Prime Minister Nazif and Gamal Mubarak (a son of 
President Mubarak). However, this economic liberalisation policy did not achieve an open 
economy and led instead to crony capitalism. This was partly because, as economic structures 
changed, the political structure altered its features. The Mubarak regime shifted its ruling coalition, 
to pro-crony capitalist. It co-opted many business elites, who increased their wealth in the infitah 
and economic liberalisation, into the ruling party (the NDP) and the government. Under the ruling 
coalition with the business class, the Mubarak government pursued a developmental state model, 
prioritising economic growth over income distribution. 
Despite dramatic changes in the political and economic structures, demand for populist social 
welfare increased. Social deprivation obliged the Mubarak government to continue providing 
existing populist social welfare. While the fiscal deficit restricted the ability of the government to 
further expand the system, the discourse of the ‘social contract’ (and distributive justice, in 
particular) which had been strengthened in the Sadat era made it difficult for the government to 
concentrate its resources on poverty alleviation by reforming social welfare programmes. The 
Mubarak government continued to spend heavily on the populist social welfare system, thereby 
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neglecting financial misallocation in the system. In that the country experienced this economic and 
political structural change and eroded the basis of the populist social welfare system that was 
constructed in the Nasser era, the Mubarak era can be classified as a reactive sequence for the 
development of the Egyptian social welfare system (see also Chapter 1). 
This chapter focuses on how the changed political and economic structures influenced the 
development of the populist social welfare system and, more importantly, how the social welfare 
system was now driven by its own dynamics regardless of political and economic structural change. 
To achieve these goals, it first explains how the political and economic structures changed in the 
1990s and 2000s. Second, it demonstrates that the social welfare system maintained its populist 
features regardless of the political and economic structural change in the Mubarak era. Moreover, it 
claims that the dynamics of the social welfare system eroded its function as a poverty alleviation 
instrument and resulted in misallocation of resources. 
 
 
3-1.  Structural Change in the Political and Economic Systems in the Mubarak 
Era: Neo-Liberal Economic Reform 
 
In the last years of Sadat’s rule, the government depended on borrowing from abroad to 
expand social welfare. The loans also had a negative impact on the Egyptian economy. “Western 
banks were seeking outlets to invest surplus oil revenues and began to flood Third World countries 
with loans at exorbitant interest rates, whether or not these countries actually needed them. Egypt 
certainly did not need such loans. Taking on loans of such magnitude in an era of prosperity had no 
justification” (Amin 2011: 54). Nonetheless, by 1975, Egypt needed $2,083 million for principal 
repayments and interest on the short-term debt. Whereas this amount accounted for one third of 
Egypt’s total external debt, the total payment on Egypt’s external debt was equal to 78% of total 
exports in the same year (Amin 2011: 54-55). “Total debt outstanding exceeded $40 billion by June 
1987, equivalent to 112 percent of GDP. This last figure is calculated using the official exchange 
rate; it works out at about 184 percent if calculated at the prevailing free markets rate, which would 
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have made Egypt the most heavily indebted major debtor country in the world” (Ikram 2006: 56). 
At the time, the country was not able to pay its foreign debt arrears and needed further reforms to 
achieve economic recovery. 
 
Table 3.1: Current Account – Goods and Nonfactor Services FY1982-FY1988 (US$ billion) 
Fiscal Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Exports 7.96 7.85 8.48 8.71 7.84 7.27 8.28 
Imports 11.66 11.52 13.41 13.68 12.88 10.63 12.62 
Gap -3.70 -3.66 -4.93 -4.97 -5.04 -3.36 -4.34 
Source: Richards (1991: 1723), Table 2. 
 
Table 3.2: Debt-Service Ratio, FY1982-FY 1987 (%)  
Fiscal Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Ratio 26.2% 26.7% 23.1% 26.9% 36% 42.4% 
Source: Richards (1991: 1724), Table 4. 
Note: Ratio = debt service / exports of goods and service, including workers’ remittances but 
excluding oil exports by foreign oil companies. 
 
Moreover, the country experienced a macro-economic crisis caused by the twin gaps between 
investment and savings, and between imports and exports. The former gap was mainly caused by a 
decline in public sector savings. As oil revenues declined and public enterprises accumulated losses, 
public enterprises decreased their savings. As the same time, private savings were restricted by 
negative real interest rates on Egyptian pound deposits. Given the lack of incentives to place their 
saving in the domestic banking system, private estates were invested in abroad. The pattern of 
investment was not solid. Most funds were distributed to infrastructure, not to manufacturing. This 
pattern led to the relative neglect of the export-led manufacturing sector (less than 20% of the total 
investment). The latter gap was related to the weakness of the export-led manufacturing sector. As 
indicated in Table 3.1, although the gap between imports and exports narrowed in the late 1980s, 
the decline was because of declining imports rather than improved export performance. In addition, 
as export developments in the 1980s were heavily dependent on petroleum, a decline in oil sales – 
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from US$ 2.9 billion in 1983 to US$ 1.36 billion in 1987 – led directly to poor export performance. 
The twin gaps were exacerbated by the government deficit. Although the Mubarak government was 
internationally pressurised to cut the deficit, it remained high at around 16% of GDP (see Table 
3.2). In the shortage of foreign lending, the government budget was sustained by the domestic 
banking system, which fuelled inflation (Richards 1991: 1722-1724). 
Although the Egyptian economy fell into a serious decline, structural reform in the economic 
system was not implemented until 1991, for the Mubarak government was reluctant to implement 
drastic economic reforms, deploying several tactics. One tactic was ‘to promise much and to 
deliver little’. The government declared its intention to implement ‘bold new reforms’ throughout 
the economy, but the contents were unsatisfactory when compared to tougher policy 
recommendations from the IMF. It also utilised various tactics to delay drastic reform, such as 
‘numbers games’, ‘smoke screens’ and ‘musical ministers’. Government statistical data regarding 
inflation rates, GDP, and government revenues and spending were distorted or concealed, which 
forced the IMF to question the credibility of the data supplied by the government (the ‘numbers 
games’ tactics). To confuse outsiders, the government established several ministerial committees 
which had overlapping jurisdictions. This tactic also enabled the government to gain time by 
having different actors state opposing opinions (the ‘smoke screens’ tactic). Although the staff 
working for the IMF or the World Bank often met with a government negotiation team composed 
of four or five ministers, the government had the ministers disagree with each other. Moreover, it 
repeatedly replaced ministers with other ministers on the pretext of ‘important business’ (the 
‘musical ministers’ tactics) (Richards 1991: 1728). 
The Gulf War in 1991 was a turning point for the economic structure in Egypt, providing the 
country with a good opportunity to revitalise the economy. It should have been an opportunity to 
begin the drastic structural reforms recommended by the IMF and the World Bank because these 
international aid donors promised financial support to the Egyptian government in exchange for 
support during the Gulf War in 1991. 
A Paris Club Agreement in conjunction with 17 other creditor governments provided 
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50 per cent relief (amounting to $10 billion) on outstanding commercial debt to be 
written off over three years as long as the country complied with the IMF agreements, 
while the US wrote off $6.7 billion in military debts. At the same time, Arab states 
wrote off long term debt valued at $7 billion (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a: 40). 
Their debt waiver (amounting to approximately US$ 24 billion) facilitated the government’s 
attempts to stabilise the macro economy and to reform the economic structure. 
Thus, the Mubarak government accepted a SAP, signing a Standby Loan agreement with the 
IMF (SDR 234 million) and an agreement with the World Bank on a Structural Adjustment Loan 
(US$ 300 million) in 1991. These loans promoted stabilisation measures in the short term. The IMF 
programme focused on four pillars: 
1) establishing external and internal balance, 2) pursuing normal anchors to achieve 
deflation, 3) currency reforms to accelerate exchange stabilisation and 4) structural 
reforms to remove price distortions. The keystone for establishing the macro 
fundamentals was fiscal stabilisation while an exchange rate anchor accompanied by 
strict monetary and credit targets was chosen as the normal anchor rather than the 
statist approach of wage and price controls (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a: 39). 
Simultaneously, these loans encouraged the government to implement structural reforms, shifting 
from a state-controlled to a liberalised market economy. The range of structural reforms was very 
wide, including privatisation of public enterprises, removal of state control over private investment, 
the liberalising of the trade regime, and well-targeted price subsidies (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a: 
39-40). In order to carry out the SAP, the government devised the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP). 
The government’s effort to stabilise the economy by implementing the ERSAP was praised by 
the IMF and considered to be a successful case: 
The key policy elements were a large fiscal adjustment, use of an exchange rate 
anchor that [had] endured for over six years, supported by prudent monetary policies, 
and early moves to liberalize interest and exchange markets. The outcome included the 
avoidance of an output collapse despite the magnitude of fiscal adjustment; avoidance 
of stresses on the financial system; reversal of endemic dollarization; financial 
deepening at the expense of the banking system; and maintenance of external viability 
despite a lackluster export performance (Subramanian 1997: 1). 
Among the short-term stabilisation measures, minimising the fiscal deficit was the most important 
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element in the economic shift at the macro level because, in general, SAPs restrict the discretion of 
the implementing governments to make decisions about costly social welfare programmes that are 
considered inefficient for poverty alleviation. The government successfully reduced the fiscal 
deficit, from 15% of GDP in 1987/88 to 2% in 1996/97. Whereas 42% of the deficit deduction was 
a result of the government’s efforts to increase revenue, the rest was composed of expenditure cuts. 
In order to increase tax revenue, the government implemented tax reform, introducing a new sales 
tax and raising customs and stamp duties. Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also helped 
the government to reduce the deficit. Whereas government’s subsidies to SOEs were cut off, their 
managers were forced to operate them on commercial lines without the subsidies (the Public 
Enterprise Law, Law 203/1991) (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a: 40-42). 
In the 2000s, the Mubarak government seemingly stated its intention to further liberalise the 
economy, with the rise of Gamal Mubarak (a son of President Hosni Mubarak), in the ruling group. 
As President Mubarak was aging, Gamal Mubarak became an advisor to the President and was 
expected to succeed him. In February 2000, he was appointed to the governing body of the NDP. In 
September 2002, furthermore, he was promoted to become the third-ranking official and the chair 
of the Policies Secretariat in the NDP. “This new secretariat was described by the secretary general 
of the NDP (Safwat al-Sharif) as the party’s throbbing heart and its tool for turning new thoughts 
into reality and crystallizing a clear political vision on all national issues” (Rutherford 2008: 219). 
As he did rely not on the military and the intelligence but on the upper business group, he was 
regarded as an advocate of economic liberalisation. “He imposed a structure within the NDP 
through which he promoted his trusted elite, channelled ideas and projects and found roles (and 
government positions) for the favoured capitalists” (Osman 2010: 135). The appointment of Ahmed 
Nazif to Prime Minister was another sign of the economic structural change. He was appointed 
Prime Minister in July 2004. The new cabinet included several members who worked such 
international organisations as the IMF and the World Bank (such as Yousuf Botrus Ghali and 
Mahmoud Moheildin). These appointments indicated the government planned to liberalise the 
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economy for further economic growth and restructure public policies related to manufacturing and 
export-led economic growth (Adly 2013: 95). 
Government efforts to liberalise the economy produced two significant outcomes: (1) a shift 
within the ruling coalition and (2) crony capitalism. The first outcome was a shift within the ruling 
coalitions to pro-capitalist. Although the Mubarak government and its ruling party – the NDP – still 
maintained formal pro-labour organisations and ideology – however surficial they are, it changed 
the main partner, from urban workers and trade unions to capitalists and businessmen. In general, 
partial political liberalisation favoured businessmen who had benefited from the infitah by allowing 
them to organise their interest groups. 
The commercial bourgeoisie were given new rights to organise and lobby, resulting in 
the establishment of clubs and organisations such as the Egyptian-US Chamber of 
Commerce, the Egyptian Businessman’s Club and the Federation of Egyptian 
Industries to defend their interests. President Sadat’s re-modelled political system 
provided a number of spaces in which private-sector interests could use their influence 
to affect major policy decisions, notably through the specialised committees of the 
Peoples’ Assembly and the public role assigned to major business groups like the 
important Egyptian Businessmen’s Association with its three representatives on the 
board of the National Investment Authority (Ehteshami & Murphy 1996: 761). 
These groups aimed to create organisational channels of influence into the government and civil 
service, so public policies would reflect their preferences. Their political influence was 
strengthened in the Mubarak era. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the introduction of multiparty elections enabled big business 
players to seek seats in parliament. This change was beneficial both for big business and the 
Mubarak government. Whereas the businessmen were able to obtain economic benefits by 
participating in the ruling circle, the government strengthened its ruling structure by co-opting them. 
The most significant example was Ahmad Ezz, the chairman and managing director of al-Ezz Steel 
Rebars. His company, established in 1994, was the largest steel producer in the MENA region, 
controlling approximately 60-70% of the Egyptian domestic steel market. At the same time, he 
established a close relationship with Gamal Mubarak and worked as the NDP’s secretary for 
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organisational affairs. In the 2005 election, Ezz mobilised various measures to win it: 
Ezz was elected, largely on the strength of the votes of the approximately 11,000 
workers he employs in his steel mills in Sadat City, a new city on the periphery of 
Cairo located in Minufiyya [his constituency]. To further secure his election, Ezz 
reportedly distributed large quantities of fertilizer to farmers in the rural areas of his 
constituency (Beinin 2009a: 31) 
In this election, 12 of 25 constituencies in Cairo City were contested by business elites. In the 
Mubarak era, the proportion of business elites who were parliamentary members in the Lower 
House steadily increased, from 12% in 1995 to 17% in 2000 to 22% in 2005 (Beinin 2009a: 31-32). 
The multiparty elections enabled the Mubarak government to exploit the privatisation of 
public enterprises as a resource for the government to use in co-opting the economic elite. As the 
government had no rules on selling assets from public enterprises at market value, it sold these 
assets to small and privileged economic elite at low prices (King 2009: 113-124). Moreover, 
changes in regulations provided the business elite with various opportunities to make money. For 
example, the private sector began to compete in the telecommunication sector (such as TV 
channels) and ‘build, own, operate, transfer’ infrastructure facilities (such as airports, ports and 
power plants). In addition, the government allowed private companies to make profits through their 
transactions with public enterprises (Wurzel 2009: 108). These factors cemented strong 
relationships between the government and the business elite. 
Accordingly, the NDP became a vehicle for businessmen to increase their political influence 
and to further their interests through public policies. 
In less than ten years, a mesh was formed between the regime … and some Egyptian 
business and finance tycoons. … The mesh comprised the most important vehicles of 
the NDP (especially the highly influential policy committee); the key secretariats and 
committees of parliament (also controlled by the NDP); some of the largest and most 
important economic sector in the economy; the entire banking sector; some of the 
most active civic and charity organizations in Egypt; and of course the government 
itself (Osman 2010: 135). 
Gamal Mubarak was in the centre of the network, linking various organisations outside the NDP, 
such as the Future Generation Foundation, the US-Egypt Business Council, the Social Fund for 
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Development (SFD) and the ECES (King 2009: 116). 
These changes weakened the political influence of organised labour, although it was still an 
official partner of the authoritarian regime. In the 1990s, the government attempted further control 
over organised labour through several laws. Law 12/1995 was an example, restricting running for 
union elections to workers on permanent contracts and excluding workers on fixed-term contracts. 
The number of workers on fixed-term contracts increased as the government stopped issuing 
permanent contracts to new government employees (Kienle 1998: 227). As unions and workers are 
vulnerable in times of crisis, and were potential challengers to the government, this measure aimed 
to reduce “the likelihood that unions voice genuine opposition or exert pressure during economic 
restructuring” (Kassem 2002: 64). Another measure to control organised labour was the co-option 
of union leaders. This measure aimed to prevent unions from reflecting the ‘true’ voice of workers 
in policy making in the NDP. As economic liberalisation made progress, workers’ living standards 
worsened and workers were increasingly regarded as challengers to the government policy of 
economic liberalisation (Kassem 2002: 64-65). Consequently, organised labour altered its role in 
the government from a partner of the regime to a potential challenger (or obstacle) to government 
policy. 
The second outcome was crony capitalism. This structural change occurred hand in hand with 
the shift of the ruling coalitions. As Stephen King (2009) discusses, the ruling elites exploited 
economic policies as tools to maximise economic rents. This strategy strengthened the informal 
connections between the government and the private sector, big business men in particular, after the 
infitah. The Mubarak government preferred informal networks to institutionalised channels because 
they were cheaper than institutionalised connections. While the government provided a restricted 
group of businessmen with privileges or financial support for their business, the privileged 
businessmen supported the government. This meant an increase in opportunities for big 
businessmen to seek rents. For small or medium size entrepreneurs, the lack of institutionalised 
channels to the government meant that they could not obtain useful information on, for example, 
136 
exporting and foreign markets from the government (Adly 2013: 92). Big businessmen who had 
strong connections with the ruling elites were granted privileged access to public bank credit: “In 
2002 twelve clients held almost 18 percent of total non-performing loans in the banking sector. … 
An estimated 53 percent of total credit extended to the private sector was furnished without 
sufficient collateral” (Adly 2009: 11). These figures were personally close to the President or his 
inner circle members in general. 
Ahmad Bahgat, a leading businessman and industrialist who held loans in excess of a 
billion Egyptian pounds in the late 1990s, has been reported to be personally close to 
the President’s elder son Alaa Mubarak. Abdallah Tayel who was arrested and tried in 
1999 together with 19 businessmen for issuing loans worth of L.E. 592 million 
without sufficient collateral from Misr-Exterior Bank, was the head of the economic 
committee at the People’s Assembly as well as the Chairman of the Bank’s board 
(Adly 2009: 12). 
In this environment, the government tended to restrict the numbers of individuals who could 
benefit from patronage in order to maintain its hold on its authoritarian regime. Consequently, the 
Mubarak government was reluctant to implement radical economic reform because such reform 
might decrease resources for rent-seeking, which were necessary for the survival of the 
authoritarian regime. 
In Egypt, there were only a small number of independent business elites that were opposed to 
government corruption. They posed a challenge to authoritarian rule by demanding that the 
government should implement further political liberalisation and democratic transition. They, 
supporting the new, rightist Wafd Party in general, were a minority among Egyptian business elites 
(Hashem & El-Mikawy 2002: 51). Most business elites in the country supported and depended on 
the government. As Ulrich Wurzel (2009: 111) remarks: 
The regime is still powerful enough to destroy the business operations of any 
entrepreneur who does not conform to what is considered appropriate behaviour. 
Business people of a particular standing are thus forced to play by rules set by the 
regime. 
Under these conditions, it was rational for the Mubarak government to establish binding 
connections with business groups. 
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Consequently, the government was not eager to implement structural economic reforms. In 
comparison to other countries, Egypt had enough donor support to implement structural reforms, 
but the regime had no intention of implementing economic liberalisation that might threaten its 
political base, or upset allied business groups. Indeed, the process of trade reform was not enough 
for a shift from the etatist to a market economy driven by exports of manufactured commodities. 
Despite tariff reduction, Egyptian trade-weighted nominal average tariff (28%) in the end of the 
1990s exceeded the average tariff in other developing countries (21.4%). This prevented domestic 
manufacturers from improving productivity (Fawzy 1998: 10). The World Bank also concluded as 
follows: 
Egypt remains an inward looking economy, with a lukewarm performance of non-oil 
manufacturing exports both in terms of growth and composition, as well as not being a 
major recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). Other growth sectors, in particular 
services and construction, while creating new employment, are also not contributing to 
improving productivity and the economy's competitiveness (World Bank 2001: 1). 
Thus, the Mubarak government did not implement the drastic economic reforms that the IMF and 
the World Bank recommended, and the change in the economic structure was significant. 
 
 
3-2.  The Social Contract and the Social Welfare System: Reactive Sequence 
and Path Dependence 
 
The dramatic political and economic changes during the Mubarak era could have led to drastic 
change to social welfare. As discussed in Chapter 1, first, economic liberalisation can have a 
significant impact on social welfare systems. Economic liberalisation was promoted by the IMF, 
the World Bank and the United States, who demanded drastic social welfare reform. As there are 
fewer obstacles in the absence of democracy, political leaders in authoritarian regimes can easily 
rationalise social welfare systems unlike in democracies (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis assumes 
that the role of social welfare systems would restrict poverty alleviation. Second, political 
liberalisation – the introduction of quasi-competitive elections – may influence changes in social 
welfare systems. Such elections may encourage authoritarian leaders to exploit social welfare 
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systems as a means to win elections and may subvert institutional goals (Hypothesis 2). This 
hypothesis assumes that the role of social welfare systems would change to a ‘machine’ of 
authoritarian leaders in quasi-competitive elections. In Egypt a multiparty electoral system was 
introduced during the Sadat era, which means that, although the Mubarak government could 
control outcomes of elections by fraud, it had to pay more costs to do that. Moreover, it might 
enhance its legitimacy if it could win elections without coercive measures. Therefore, it is expected 
that the Mubarak government still had incentives to mobilise specific social strata with pork-barrel 
measures (such as exploiting the social welfare system) in order to enable it to win elections, 
although these elections were ‘quasi’ competitive. Consequently, the social welfare system would 
drastically change, targeting specific groups (or social strata) with generous welfare provision. 
 
Figure 3.1: Spending Patterns on Social Protection 
 
Source: World Bank (2005: 12), Figure 2.1. 
 
However, it should be noted that changes in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era 
was not dramatic but path-dependent. The social welfare system maintained its populist features 
that were reinforced in the Sadat era. Indeed, levels of expenditure on social policies during the 
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Mubarak presidency were still high. Egypt still spent more on social welfare programmes than 
average developing countries in Latin America and East Asia. The World Bank (2005) 
demonstrates that average public expenditures on social security and welfare as a percentage of 
GDP in MENA countries was 4.7 whilst those in Latin America were 2.9% and in East Asia were 
2.4%. This trend was applicable to Egypt, where the government spent relatively heavily on social 
security and welfare (4.8% of GDP) (Figure 3.1). 
Theoretically speaking, the Mubarak era could be categorised as a period of a ‘reactive 
sequence’ (see also Chapter 1). Although, as explained the political and economic structures that 
had provided the populist social welfare system with its basis drastically changed, the populist 
feature of the social welfare system did not change and instead evolved in accordance with its own 
logic. In this case, the logic of the social contract could explain the relatively large amount of social 
expenditure during the Mubarak era. According to the World Bank (2004: 3), the social contract is 
established as a result of “an authoritarian bargain, with citizens trading restrictions on political 
participation in exchange for economic security and the public provision of social services, welfare, 
and other benefits”. Indeed, the importance of the social contract was still recognised not merely by 
ruling elites in Egypt but also by the IMF and the World Bank. The World Bank (2004) asserts that 
MENA countries, including Egypt, should produce a new social contract through further economic 
and social reforms. As this report points out, the “economic crisis has eroded – but not eliminated – 
[the] preferences for redistribution, equity, and economic security that have marked economic and 
social policy in MENA since independence” (World Bank 2004: 42). 
In preserving important elements of the interventionist-redistributive social contract – 
and in seeking to avoid imposing adjustment costs of policy reforms on the least well 
off – MENA governments are responding to widely held understandings about the 
legitimate purposes of the state and the appropriate aims of economic policy. No less 
than their European, Anglo-American, or Asian counterparts, Arab modes of 
capitalism reflect the legacies of long-standing social preferences that are not easily 
transformed (World Bank 2004: 42-43). 
The term ‘social contract’ was also included in the country’s Human Development Reports (UNDP 
& INP 2005, 2008). The old social contract addressed the importance of distributive justice and 
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was valid during the Mubarak presidency. The population still expected the government to fulfil the 
social contract through generous welfare provision. 
Since the 1990s, the concept of the social contract increased in its political importance because 
of the political and economic exclusion of the ordinary population who required compensation. 
Eberhard Kienle explains the logic behind the social contract by revealing the process underpinning 
political and economic exclusion in the 1990s. He refers to several factors for promoting political 
and economic exclusion.1 The first factor was worsening conflict with Islamic opponents, which 
encouraged the government to restrict political liberties. As some Islamic movements became more 
and more radicalised, Egypt began to suffer from bombings, assassinations and ambushes, 
especially in Upper and Central Egypt in the 1990s. These groups aimed carried out assassinations 
of high rank government personnel and attacks on tourists. As the number of victims increased, the 
government justified tough restrictions in the name of suppressing armed groups. The Mubarak 
government furthermore attempted to restrict the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting 
many Islamist activists, as the organisation’s popularity threatened Mubarak’s rule. 
In reality, the arrest targeted the unarmed Islamists, whether, like ‘Adil Husayn, they 
belonged to the Labour Party, or whether they belonged to the Muslim Brothers 
[Brotherhood], whose candidates performed strongly in the elections in various 
professional syndicates , including those of doctors, chemists, engineers and lawyers 
from the mid-1980s onwards (Kienle 2001: 137). 
The conflict also had a significant impact on freedom of expression. The government strengthened 
censorship in the 1990s, when an increasing number of publications began to justify the use of 
violent measures in the name of Islam (Kienle 2001: 132-140). 
Second, electoral reforms restricted choice. The Egyptian government switched from party 
lists to majority vote, as a result of the rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1990. This 
reform had a negative impact on the cohesion of parties, including the NDP. To deal with 
organisational fragmentation, the Mubarak government tried to preserve its majority in parliament 
through fraudulent practices. This electoral manipulation enabled the Mubarak government to 
                                                     
1  In addition to these three factors, the author briefly refers to another two factors: streamlining 
(or rationalising) the state apparatus and the weakness of liberal values (Kienle 2001: 164-165). 
141 
maintain a safe parliamentary majority and consolidated the regime’s position (Kienle 2001: 
140-144). 
Third, the economic situation in the 1990s also resulted in political and economic exclusion. 
The fruits of economic reforms were unfairly distributed. Whereas government supporters took 
advantage of opportunities and became economic winners, most citizens were faced with economic 
difficulties. Indeed, household expenditure surveys indicated that real per capita consumption 
declined between 1990/91 and 1995/96. The percentage of those living below the poverty line 
increased in this period, from approximately 40% (both in urban and rural areas) to 45% (in urban 
areas) and over 50% (in rural areas) (Mitchell 1999: 32). Yet, in contrast to the majority of the 
population, a small number of Egyptians benefited from the neo-liberal economic reform and crony 
capitalism, as discussed above. 
Reliable guides to the changing share of consumption by the very wealthy do not exist, 
since surveys fail to record most of their spending. If household expenditure surveys 
for 1991-92 are extrapolated to the national level, the figures show the population as a 
whole spent $15 billion. Yet national accounts give the total expenditure as $30 billion. 
In other words, about half the country’s consumer spending is missing from the 
surveys. It is plausible that the bulk of these missing expenditures belong to the 
wealthiest households (Mitchell 1999: 32). 
Economic liberalisation led to an increase in the number of people in poverty. Although the 
situation improved slightly in the 2000s, economic deprivation obliged the Mubarak government to 
address the challenge of social justice (Harrigan & El-Said 2009b: 87). 
As the economic situation became more severe, the number of protests against economic 
reforms increased, which led to further restrictions on freedom of expression through, for example, 
de-liberalisation of private media outlets (Kienle 2001: 144-158). Law 93/1995 was a typical 
example of the government’s clampdown on news questioning economic policies: 
The great majority of criminal offences redefined or newly defined under that law, and 
the tougher punishments it imposed, made easier to the suppression of information 
which either explicitly or implicitly contained accusations of corruption. One of the 
key aspects of that law was to widen significantly the definition of crimes such as the 
propagation of ‘false information’ and to punish them with greater severity (Kienle 
2001: 155). 
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Furthermore, the economic crisis gave wealthy candidates electoral advantages because they could 
access private funding, unlike candidates dependent on political parties for limited support. As a 
result, wealthy candidates had a greater chance of becoming an MP and enjoying the benefits, 
which led to a further income gap (Kienle 2001: 158-159). 
As Eberhard Kienle (2001) remarks, a long-lived authoritarian regime repeatedly tends to 
exclude those who are less loyal to the regime for its survival: 
The appointment of trusted individuals to sensitive and less sensitive posts is 
necessarily undertaken at the expense of incumbents or candidates who are considered 
less loyal, sometimes wrongly so. Inevitably the latter are losers in material or 
symbolic terms. …  
The strategy of exclusion that is supposed to contribute to the stability of the regime 
readily contributes to its isolation, its contestation, and indeed to its weakening. 
Conscious of the losses that it causes, the regime seeks to pre-empt all opposition, 
resistance or vengeance. It therefore further reinforces the measures of exclusion and 
accompanies them with measures of prevention and repression. In other words, it 
embarks on a spiralling restriction to the liberties of its victims and of its real or 
potential adversaries (Kienle 2001: 166). 
Although an exclusion strategy was needed to maintain the authoritarian regime, it gradually 
delegitimised Mubarak’s rule at the same time. 
In the 2000s, various types of protest against the Mubarak regime were activated, which 
showed that the regime was being de-legitimised. For example, the Kefaya Movement – more 
formally the Egyptian Movement for Change – between 2003 and 2005 was the first wide-spread 
political movement for liberty and democracy since the 1952 Revolution, criticising “hereditary 
rule; political corruption and stagnation; the blurring of the lines between power and wealth; and 
the regime’s cruelty, coercion and disregard for human rights” (Osman 2010: 137). The movement 
spread widely and attracted various groups in society: 
Kefaya was widely diverse, uniting communist, nationalist, and Islamist members in 
the most significant model of modern political parties in the Arab world. This union 
was historic; there had never been such a coalescence of Egyptian political groups 
around any set of issues, much less in direct response to the ruler and his potential 
successor (Oweidat et al. 2008: 11). 
Although anti-Mubarak sentiments were widely spread in the 1990s, the Kefaya Movement was 
143 
historic in that it explicitly claimed democratic transition. 
Beside the Kefaya Movement, there were increasing strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and riots 
throughout the 2000s. The number of protests jumped from 114 in 1998 to 454 in 2008. Labour 
protest was active especially from 2006 to 2007 (see Table 3.3). One strike occurred at one of the 
biggest public-sector spinning and weaving factories (employing 27,000 workers). 
As the massive strikes of 2006/2007 illustrate, the negative outcomes of authoritarian 
restructuring for large segments of the population can create their own dynamics of 
growing discontent and opposition. Under certain circumstances, the new dynamics of 
such opposition, together with the increased room for activists resulting from 
globalization (increased information, external support, protection through worldwide 
media coverage, etc.), can lead to a partial challenge to traditional power , albeit 
without implying a serious threat to the established system as such (Wurzel 2009: 
121). 
In this way, political and economic exclusion fuelled social protests and delegitimised Mubarak’s 
authoritarian rule. 
 
Table 3.3: General Indicators of Protests (1998-2008) 
Year Protests Strikes Sit-ins Demonstrations Gatherings Total 
1998 42 40 18 14 N/A 114 
1999 60 54 32 18 N/A 164 
2000 N/A 40 48 47 N/A 135 
2001 N/A 19 32 64 N/A 115 
2002 N/A 24 26 46 N/A 96 
2003 N/A 25 22 6 33 86 
2004 N/A 43 90 46 87 266 
2005 N/A 46 59 16 81 202 
2006 N/A 47 81 25 69 222 
2007 19 74 179 49 179 500 
2008 29 129 218 78 N/A 454 
Source: Adly (2013: 210), Table 10.3. 
 
Under these conditions of economic and political deprivation, maintaining the populist social 
welfare system was the sole means of legitimising Mubarak’s rule and achieving a small measure 
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of distributive justice. Before the case studies, however, another factor should be considered – 
fiscal restrictions. The country was faced with a fiscal crisis in the Mubarak era. In 1981, when 
Hosni Mubarak assumed power, the government’s revenue stood at approximately 60% of GDP. 
“Egypt since the mid-1970s is an instance of an authoritarian regime whose stability had depended 
on a quasi-rentier state that obtained large influx of money from oil, Suez Canal revenues, and 
foreign aid” (Soliman 2011: 3). In the late 2000s, however, the revenue decreased to only half of 
that in the 1980s. There were several reasons why the country experienced a steep decline in the 
revenues. First, the fiscal crisis in industrialised countries had a negative impact on the amount of 
foreign aid that the country received. As Egypt was one of the largest recipients of foreign aid 
among developing countries, the impact on the budget was significant. At the same time, 
demographic factors further reduced the effects of the foreign aid in that the dependent population 
drastically increased in the 1980s. Second, rentier incomes from oil and Suez Canal revenues 
declined at the same time. Third, tax revenue was also influenced by the economic depression. 
“More than a third of the government’s yield from capital gains taxes comes from the General 
Petroleum Organization, the Suez Canal Company, and the Central Bank. As rentier incomes 
dropped, so did the taxes paid by those organizations” (Soliman 2011: 42). This is why the 
Mubarak government was forced to implement austerity measures in 1990s. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the government feared protests against austerity and reached a 
compromise with the population. The Mubarak government feared that, like the Sadat government 
in 1977, its legitimacy would be damaged the demonstrations continued. 
The scale of the demonstrations in Cairo was such that [Sadat] government imposed a 
curfew and ordered armed police and the army to shoot anyone found out of doors 
without permit. The sounds of explosions continued to interrupt the curfew, however, 
with demonstrators fighting police after nightfall in two densely populated suburbs. … 
The final official death toll (widely considered extremely conservative) was 73. At 
least 600 people were arrested in Cairo during the demonstrations and many more 
detained in Alexandria (Seddon 1993: 100). 
Although the social contract seemingly encouraged the Mubarak government to adopt populist 
expansion of the social welfare system (like that in the Sadat era), a decline in revenues seemingly 
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made such a strategy impossible (Soliman 2011).  
Ultimately the Mubarak government prioritised the maintenance of political stability (and 
regime survival), implementing only minimum reform of the social welfare system. Since the 
1990s, increases of the cost-of-living drove workers to demonstrate against the government’s 
economic policy. In the late 2000s, the country experienced a number of mass workers’ strikes in 
both the private and public sectors. In particular, the strike by textile workers of Mahalla al-Kubra 
was regarded as the most effectively organised labour movement in the country since the Second 
World War (Bayat 2013). It might have been possible for the Mubarak government to suppress 
demonstrations and protests against economic reforms by using security forces and police. Such 
coercive measures, however, damaged its reputation. This was critical for the Mubarak government 
because it already suffered from declining legitimacy given its failure to ensure economic growth 
and democracy. 
This research refers to two cases to understand changes to social welfare in the Mubarak era: 
(1) social insurance and (2) food subsidies and public employment. These case studies reveal that, 
whilst the government spent heavily on social welfare programmes, it was reluctant to implement 
reforms involving budget cuts. 
 
A.  Case (1): Social Insurance 
In the Mubarak era, the shortcomings of social insurance as a social welfare programme rose 
to the surface. The first shortcoming was the limited coverage of the programme. Although the 
social insurance programme had seemingly expanded the number of people it served during the 
Sadat era, it actually only covered a limited number of the population. First of all, not only 
employers but workers tended to avoid enrolling because of its high contribution rates (14% of the 
payroll for employees and 26% for employers). Because of their immediate financial needs, some 
workers chose not to enrol even if their employers encouraged them to do so. More commonly, 
employers did not give their employees the option in order to avoid paying contributions. Even if 
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employers seemingly paid their contributions, the amount paid was deducted from workers’ basic 
wages in some cases (Sieverding & Selwaness 2012: 3). Poor administration worsened this 
situation. Whereas almost 100% of employees in the government sector and public enterprises were 
insured, only 62% of employees in the private sector were covered by social insurance. The 
National Social Insurance Organisation, which was responsible for the programme, could not 
effectively supervise private employers (Loewe 2000: 15). 
The privatisation of public enterprises also had a negative impact on the coverage. The 
percentage of insured workers to the total workers declined, from 51.6% in 1998 to 41.8% in 2006. 
The decline occurred in conjunction with the privatisation of public enterprises in the 2000s. As 
privatisation reduced the number of jobs in the public sector, young people tended to start their jobs 
in the informal private sector (i.e., jobs without social insurance coverage) (Roushdy & Selwaness 
2012: 11-15). This tendency was obvious from the fact that insurance coverage of the youth 
(32.7%) was lower than that of elder groups, which was 59.2% for the 40-49 year old age group 
and 58.2% for the 50-59 year old age group (see Table 3.4). 
These figures could indicate a life-cycle model in which workers start out in the 
informal sector and then move into formal employment as they gain experience. … 
However, in the context of Egypt, existing evidence indicates that mobility out of the 
informal sector is low, particularly for the low-educated (Sieverding 2012: 10). 
As a result, the shortcomings of the social insurance programme resulted in exclusion of the youth 
from the programme. 
 
Table 3.4:  Percentage of Current Workers Enrolled in Social Insurance, by Age Group, 
Gender and Residence (2006) 
Age Group Male Female Urban Rural Total 
25-29 31.8  36.9  45.1  22.8  32.7  
30-39 47.2  45.2  59.9  36.2  46.7  
40-49 61.5  53.5  73.5  46.5  59.2  
50-59 62.5  44.6  77.3  40.8  58.2  
Total 40.6  38.7  56.2  28.4  40.2  
Source: Sieverding (2012: 10), Table 1. 
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The second shortcoming was low benefits. Although the income replacement rates of social 
insurance benefits in Egypt were higher than those in other middle-income countries, the actual 
benefits paid out were inadequate for many Egyptian households. This was because pension 
benefits were not automatically adjusted in accordance with inflation and were determined by 
government decrees. Whereas benefits increased only 10% per annum in average, inflation peaked 
at 20% in the 1980s. Moreover, actual contribution rates fell below legal contribution rates: 
According to legal provisions, the combined employer and employee contributions 
make up about 32-33 percent of covered earnings. However, the NSIO’s annual 
reports imply that aggregate contributions represent just 17 percent of taxable wages. 
There is no explanation for this except that often non-payment of contributions is not 
severely sanctioned (Loewe 2000: 15). 
The programme was particularly unfriendly to the vulnerable, such as the work-disabled and 
surviving family members. For example, if an earner was injured or died at young age, the 
contributions accumulated were so low that his family members could not afford to live on only 
with survivor benefits. This was why households without a male earner tended to fall below the 
poverty line in the country (Loewe 2000: 15). 
The third shortcoming was high dependency ratios. Although the country had a young 
population structure, the ratio of the programme’s beneficiaries to the population was relatively 
high (38% in 1998) (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 4). The ratio was remarkable when 
comparing it with those in the MENA region (27%), Latin America (25%) and Asia (11%). The 
beneficiaries increased because of several factors: improved life expectancy, a decline in the birth 
rate and increasing employment especially among young people (Helmy 2008: 204). In the 1990s 
the introduction of early retirement schemes, which aimed to facilitate the privatisation of public 
enterprises and to ease pressure on the labour market, also contributed to an increase in the 
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the number of the beneficiaries reached 6.5 million in 1998 (4.16 
million in 1983) (Maait, Ismail & Khorasanee 2000: 4). Moreover, the government failed to 
increase the contributions, as explained above, which meant that there were financial shortfalls. 
Despite such shortcomings, which were critical to the programme’s sustainability, the 
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Mubarak government increased expenditure on the programme without drastic reforms. Since 1987 
the exchequer financially supported the scheme to pay assured pension benefits (in addition to the 
existing contributions the government also had to pay). The government’s additional payments to 
the social insurance funds aimed to alleviate the high costs of living and to maintain benefits at the 
same level as before. Consequently, it steadily increased from approximately £E 8.0 billion in 
2000/01 to approximately £E 13 billion in 2004/05 (equivalent to 8.2% of the total public 
expenditure) (Helmy 2008: 207). The government’s inefficient investment strategy also imposed a 
heavy burden on the exchequer. The social insurance funds had accumulated reserves, which were 
invested in government debt instruments (such as bonds and Treasury bills) and in the National 
Investment Bank (NIB). Although the invested reserves were expected to generate a surplus, low or 
negative actual returns had been recorded since 1975 and eroded the reserves (see Table 3.5). 
Consequently, the failed investments forced the government to spend on ad hoc financial support to 
maintain the level of benefits (Maait & Demarco 2012: 162). 
 
Table 3.5:  Average Annual Rates of Return on Egyptian Pension Fund Assets Compared 
with Annual Inflation Rates, FY2001/02–FY2010/11 
Fiscal Year Total value of 
pension funds’ 
investments 
(£E billions) 
Average rate of 
return on 
investments (%) 
Nominal inflation 
rate (CPI) (%) 
Real rate of return 
on investments 
(%) 
2001/02 167.3 9.7 2.7 7.0 
2002/03 189.6 9.2 4.2 5.0 
2003/04 213.0 8.9 16.5 -7.6 
2004/05 239.2 9.0 4.8 4.2 
2005/06 264.1 9.0 7.7 1.3 
2006/07 270.0 8.3 9.5 -1.2 
2007/08 284.7 8.3 18.3 -10.0 
2008/09 296.3 8.3 11.8 -3.5 
2009/10 308.0 8.1 11.8 -3.7 
2010/11 311.0 8.4 11.1 -2.7 
Source: Maait & Demarco (2012: 161), Table 5.1. 
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However, the interdependence between the exchequer and the social insurance funds had a 
serious impact on the soundness of the social insurance programme. First, fiscal restrictions meant 
that the exchequer was unable to cover the pension liability in full from the beginning of the 2000s 
onwards. The liabilities amounted to over £E 35 billion in 2004/05 (Helmy 2008: 208). As a result, 
the government needed to restrict annual increments to beneficiaries as of 2004/05. This 
government indebtedness imposed a burden on the social insurance funds: 
Funds owed to the pension system by the public treasury generate no investment 
returns as result of not transferring these funds to the National Investment Bank. Lost 
returns negatively affect the financial strength of the pension system (Helmy 2008: 
226). 
Second, the legal restriction (by Law 119/1980) that the investments should be restricted to these 
government-related funds: 
Pension funds represent approximately 70 percent of financial resources available to 
the National Investment Bank. The Bank lends the public treasury to fund 
approximately 86 percent of public investments at 12 percent annual rate of return. 
The public treasury’s indebtedness to the National Investment Bank amounted the LE 
143.7 billion in 2004/05 (approximately 41 percent of the government’s public net 
domestic debt, which amounted to LE 349.2 billion) (Helmy 2008: 210). 
As a result, future generations were expected to bear such the burden of paying for the government 
indebtedness through the social insurance programme. 
 
B.  Case (2): Food Subsidies and Public Employment 
Similarly to the social insurance programme, the government could not ignore the 
shortcomings of these two programmes for long in the Mubarak era. However, it should be noted 
that there was a fundamental difference between social insurance and these two programmes. 
Social insurance could be justified as an important social welfare programme even though it had 
several shortcomings. In contrast, these two programmes were considered to be inefficient as social 
welfare programmes. The food subsidy programme was strongly linked to the price control 
mechanism, which was the legacy of the etatist economic structure. The public employment 
programme was sustained by the large public sector. Therefore, the Mubarak government was 
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pressured to reform these programmes by Washington-based donors (such as the US government, 
the World Bank and the IMF). Despite such pressure, these two programmes survived in the 
Mubarak era. The government prioritised social stability over drastic reforms. Consequently, the 
government did not correct its financial mismanagement: Despite the fact that the Mubarak 
government spent so much on them, these programmes failed to meet demands of the population. 
Moreover, the fiscal deficit also restricted the government’s choice. 
Food Subsidies: Although the Mubarak government began reform of food subsides in the 
1980s, the reform was implemented in obscure ways. The reform successfully reduced a burden on 
the exchequer until the 1990s, but contents of the reform were restricted in a way which meant that 
the government did not change the institutional feature that enabled every citizen to access 
subsidised bread. This institutional feature led to the drastic expansion of food subsidies in the 
2000s. These institutional changes indicate that stable provision of inexpensive food (especially 
wheat and bread) was an important part of social justice and the social contract between the 
government and the population. Despite its institutional expansion in the 2000s, the government 
could not alleviate discontent over the food subsidy programme. Although the fiscal deficit might 
have restricted the government’s choice, the biggest problem was financial misallocation. The 
Mubarak government tended to expand the programme without drastic reallocation of resources. 
Ahmad Galal (2003) refers to the efficiency of the subsidy programmes. He states: “there are 
several studies documenting the benefits, leakages and targeting. Not much attention has been 
directed however to the economic (rather than budgetary) cost of these subsidies, nor to the 
alternative policies of meeting the basic needs of the disadvantaged” (Galal 2003: 8). The fiscal 
restrictions encouraged the financial misallocation to be significant (see Chapter 4). 
Public Employment: As discussed in Chapter 5, public sector workers suffered from a 
decline in their real wages. Although the government promised wage rises (on May Day or before 
elections), the actual wage raise did not match inflation rates. In addition, a number of university 
graduates were unemployed because they tended to wait for public sector jobs. The government’s 
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choice eroded support from the new middle class, who had voted for previous governments. In the 
Mubarak era, public sector workers went on strike to complain about a decline in their real wages 
and an increase in their living costs. As a result, the Mubarak government lost powerful support 
from organised labour, especially workers in the lower ranks. 
 
D.  Distributive Justice and Path-Dependent Change in the Social Welfare System 
As indicated in the logic of the ‘social contract’, maintaining populist social welfare was the 
sole means to legitimise Mubarak’s rule under conditions of political and economic deprivation. 
However, because of fiscal restrictions, the government was not able to expand the populist welfare 
system. Although drastic reform of inefficient social welfare programmes might have been the most 
effective means to achieve distributive justice, the government did not implement such drastic 
reform and instead maintained inefficient social welfare programmes in order to stabilise the social 
order. Indeed, the Mubarak government would not abandon several important social welfare 
programmes that the Nasser government had constructed, although the IMF and the World Bank 
have repeatedly criticised them for their inefficiency as poverty alleviation programmes. The 
Egyptian officials “justified the slow implementation of the privatization programme by the need to 
avoid the negative repercussions its acceleration would have had on employment and salaries” 
(Kienle 2001: 151). For example, although expenditures on price subsidies to GDP declined in the 
1990s (Galal 2003: 3), price subsidy programmes still survived despite repeated criticisms from the 
IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the employment guarantee scheme for university graduates 
was long-lived even though the programme had a negative impact on the labour market (World 
Bank 2004: 35). 
Were the two hypotheses (discussed in Chapter 1) applicable to the Egyptian case? If 
applicable, how was it different from what the theory expected? Hypothesis 1 was partially 
applicable to changes in the Egyptian social welfare system. The example was the establishment of 
a new poverty alleviation programme – the Social Fund for Development (SFD). The Mubarak 
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government introduced this programme to ease the negative impacts of the ERSAP on the 
vulnerable in 1991. As this programme benefited not only the government but the population, the 
government was willing to introduce this programme to reform the social welfare system. The SFD 
was established under the auspices of the World Bank and other regional aid institutions as a third 
social safety net programme, along with the food subsidy and social assistance programmes 
(El-Mahdi 2011: 97). This financial feature enabled the government to alleviate poverty without 
making it find new sources for the new programme. In contrast, retrenchment was a difficult task 
for the Mubarak government. Unlike textbook theory, Egypt’s economic liberalisation did not lead 
towards an open market. It led instead to the development of crony capitalism, in which a small 
number of business elites forged strong connections with and became enmeshed with the ruling 
elite. In this context, rulers and their allies generally have incentives to avoid political instability 
and maintain the status quo. The crony business elites did not expect the government to implement 
drastic reforms that might trigger popular protests and threaten their patronage connections with the 
government. Thus, it was rational for the Mubarak government to maintain the existing structure of 
the social welfare system even though the social welfare system was faced with resource 
misallocation. 
Hypothesis 2 was applicable to the Egyptian case when focusing on short-term changes to the 
social welfare system. Existing academic literature asserts that authoritarian leaders exploited 
several social welfare programmes for electoral purposes: the SFD (El-Meehy 2009), public 
employment (bonus in particular) and social insurance (especially retirement pensions) (Blaydes 
2011). As will be explained in the following chapters, the government promised that it would 
maintain food prices by controlling them via food subsidies before elections (see Chapter 4). In 
addition, the public employment programme was also important as a means to obtain political 
support from public sector workers in elections. The Mubarak government promised then wage 
rises before elections as well as on May Days (see also Chapter 5). Multiparty elections were 
seemingly the main factor of changing the social welfare system during the Mubarak era when 
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focusing on short-term change. 
However, when focusing on long-term change, as discussed above, the Mubarak government 
expected multiparty elections to be channels to use to strengthen the relationship with the business 
class, rather than a means to achieve distributive justice. In democracies, competitive elections 
generally contribute to the consolidation of distributive justice by promoting competition between 
political parties (Haggard & Kaufman 2008). In contrast, the government had no intention of 
introducing ‘true’ competitive elections in Egypt’s case. It might be undeniable that elections under 
authoritarian rule could help social welfare systems to reinforce distributive justice in the long term 
as well. As anticipated in Hypothesis 2, authoritarian governments might be able to intensify 
income distribution to a specific social group or class (such as the vulnerable) to win elections. In 
Egypt’s case, however, the populist social welfare system was unable to achieve distributive justice 
without drastic welfare reform because of fiscal restrictions. The government prioritised regime 
survival by avoiding political instability and expected the social welfare system to function as an 
instrument for political stability. It did not sincerely deal with social problems. Therefore, it could 
not adopt, for example, a strategy of concentrating its resources on a specific social class (such as 
the vulnerable) and cutting social expenditure previously distributed to other wealthier social 
groups in order to win elections. 
The outcome of path dependence was enduring fiscal misallocation. As Markus Loewe (2000: 
9) remarks, the major problem in the social welfare system was “not a lack of financial resources 
but their inefficient allocation and uneven distribution among different groups of the population”. 
Egypt’s social security systems are not equitable, either. Most of the systems 
discriminate against the poor and benefit the urban upper and middle classes. While by 
law, every Egyptian is covered by social insurance, in practice only half the population 
is insured. Moreover, insurance benefits for the rich and the state elite are much more 
generous than are those for the poor. Similarly, the country’s subsidisation policy 
benefits the middle class more than it supports the poor. 2.3 percent of GDP is spent 
on subsidies but less than 0.2 percent on social assistance (Loewe 2000: 9). 
The fiscal misallocation had two remarkable outcomes. The first outcome was the erosion of the 
middle class, despite the fact that the upper and middle class benefited more than the vulnerable. 
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The ad hoc strategy, or the lack of the long-term strategy, damaged the middle class. 
The educated, formerly well-to-do members of the middle class (government 
employees and college students) have been pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in 
labour, health and housing markets. More importantly, the new labour law has 
practically eliminated both job security and the state guarantee of employment for 
graduates in exchange for a (restricted) right to strike (Bayat 2006: 140). 
The second outcome was enduring poverty. Most social welfare programmes were inefficient ways 
of alleviating poverty because they benefited not only the needy but also the middle classes and the 
upper-middle class in general. The food subsidy programme was the most famous case of such 
financial misallocation (see Chapter 4) (Loewe 2004). 
 
 
3-3.  A Summary of the Argument 
 
In the Mubarak era, the country experienced dramatic change in the political and economic 
structures, which had been the basis of the Egyptian social welfare system since the Nasser era. 
Although the economic structure changed during a wave of economic liberalisation (from etatism 
to an open economy), the change was different to those that the World Bank and the IMF expected. 
The Mubarak government embarked on structural adjustment in the 1990s and adopted further 
economic liberalisation policies in the 2000s under the leadership of Prime Minister Nazif and 
Gamal Mubarak (a son of President Mubarak). However, economic liberalisation led to crony 
capitalism. As the economic structure changed, the political structure altered. The Mubarak regime 
shifted its ruling coalition to pro-crony capitalist. It co-opted the business elites, who increased 
their wealth during the infitah and economic liberalisation, into the ruling party (the NDP) and 
government. The Mubarak government also pursued a developmental state, prioritising economic 
growth over income distribution. In contrast to the business elites, organised labour gradually 
became an obstacle to economic reform, although it was still an official partner of the regime. From 
the point that the country experienced the economic and political structural change and eroded the 
basis of the social welfare system that was constructed in the Nasser era, the Mubarak era was 
155 
classified as a reactive sequence for the development of the Egyptian social welfare system (see 
also Chapter 1). 
However, dramatic change in the political and economic structures led to path-dependent 
change – the continuation of the populist social welfare system. Social deprivation caused by the 
changes obliged the Mubarak government to maintain the existing social welfare system. While 
fiscal deficit made the government unable to further expand the system, the discourse of the social 
contract (and distributive justice in particular) which was strengthened in the Sadat era made it 
difficult for the government to concentrate its resources on poverty alleviation and social welfare 
reforms. The Mubarak government continued to spend heavily on social welfare, neglecting 
financial misallocation in the system (see Table 3.6). 
The Egyptian case indicates that the two hypotheses did not take into consideration the 
institutional legacy – populist welfare provision – to analyse long-term change in the social welfare 
system. As theoretically expected in Hypothesis 1, the Mubarak government established a new 
safety net – the SFD because its establishment did not have a negative impact on the citizens. The 
government successfully improved the social safety net in the 1990s. Furthermore, as Hypothesis 2 
expects, quasi-competitive elections encouraged the government to exploit the social welfare 
system to win elections. The existing literature demonstrates the relationship between elections and 
an increase in expenditure on social welfare programmes during the Mubarak era, using the large-N 
approach. Nonetheless, reform of the populist social welfare system was prevented by the logic of 
the ‘social contract’. Unlike the predictions, the logic of the ‘social contract’ rejected the 
government’s efforts to rationalise the social welfare system even though the economy was 
liberalised. In Egypt’s case, moreover, quasi-competitive elections did not function as a means to 
achieve distributive justice in the long term. The populist social welfare system was unable to 
achieve distributive justice without drastic welfare reform because of fiscal restrictions. 
Nonetheless, the Mubarak government did not sincerely deal with social problems, which social 
welfare programmes should resolve, by reforming the system and concentrating its resources on 
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poverty alleviation because drastic reform might trigger social unrest. It prioritised regime survival 
by avoiding political instability to achieving distributive justice through social welfare reform. This 
choice eroded a function of the social welfare system as a poverty alleviation instrument and 
resulted in misallocation of resources. 
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Table 3.6 Changes of the Political and Economic Structures and Features of the Social Welfare System in Egypt 
 
Features of the Political Structure Features of the Economic Structure 
Features of  
the Social Welfare System 
The British Protectorate 
 
A triangular power struggle between the 
British authority, the King & the landlords 
 
 
An initial stage of industrialisation 
 
No incentive to expand the system 
The Nasser Presidency 
(Critical Junctures) 
 
< Permissive conditions > 
- The 1952 Revolution: 
(1) The exclusion of the British authority & 
the king from the political arena 
(2) The necessity to eliminate the political 
power of the landlord class 
 
< Productive conditions > 
- The introduction of Arab socialism 
 A coalition with organised labour (the 
organisational proliferation strategy) 
 
 
 
 Dependence on the private sector (the 
state’s passive role in industrialisation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 The state’s pivotal role in the economic 
production (the large size of the public 
sector) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dualist social welfare system (for 
industrialisation + distributive justice) 
(1) The industrial programmes 
(e.g., social insurance, food subsidies 
and public employment) 
(2) The residualist programmes 
(e.g., social assistance and healthcare) 
 
158 
The Sadat Presidency 
(Structural Reproduction) 
 
Partial political liberalisation (the introduction 
of quasi-competitive elections) 
 Co-option of business elites to the regime 
and their participation in the 
decision-making process 
 
 
Partial economic liberalisation (the infitah) – 
promoting investment in the private sector 
 The necessity to compensate the losers of 
the infitah 
 
The expanding social welfare system 
 The Sadat government exploited the 
ideology of ‘socialism’ to legitimise the 
expansion (the positive feedback effect). 
 Its primary purpose shifted (from 
industrialisation to income distribution) 
 
The Mubarak Presidency 
(Reactive Sequence) 
 
(1) A failure to distribute benefits of economic 
growth to the population 
(2) De-liberalisation (continuing 
quasi-competitive elections) & a rise of 
Islamists 
 
 The necessity to mobilise the people in 
elections by distributing resources to them 
through social welfare programmes 
(Hypothesis 2): 
This hypothesis was applicable only in the 
short term. 
 
 
 
 
Structural adjustment (ERSAP) & further 
economic liberalisation under the Nazif 
administration 
 
The necessity to implement drastic reform 
to benefit business groups & to appropriate 
the resources to investment – minimalizing 
the social welfare system (Hypothesis 1): 
This hypothesis was partly applied, but the 
retrenchment was prevented by the logic of 
the ‘social contract’.. 
 
 
The lack of a long-term strategy: maintaining 
the populist social welfare system despite a lack 
of sufficient resources to avoid political 
instability 
 
 Neglecting misallocation of resources 
Source: Author 
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Chapter	4	
Case	Study	(1)	–	The	Food	Subsidy	Programme	
 
This chapter analyses how the role of the social welfare system changed by focusing on a 
specific social welfare programme – the food subsidy programme. The food subsidy programme 
principally aims to stabilise food prices, especially those of basic foodstuffs. The Egyptian 
government imports and purchases a large amount of foodstuffs. Although food prices in 
international markets are unstable, the government does its best to control domestic prices by 
absorbing the gaps between their purchase and retail prices. Subsidised items are often changed, 
depending on their prices in the international market. Although the government spends mainly on 
subsidises for three strategic commodities – wheat (and baladi bread), sugar and cooking oil, it 
often subsidises other foods, such as lentils, broad beans and rice (Al-Jibali 2008: 11). Although the 
original goal of the food subsidy programme was to stabilise food prices, the food subsidy 
programme is also expected to work as a poverty alleviation programme because social welfare 
programmes (such as social insurance) are restricted and ineffective in alleviating social risks of the 
people (Noureldeen 2012). The food subsidy programme has thus changed its role since its 
establishment in the Nasser era. 
In order to analyse the institutional change, this chapter focuses first on the establishment of 
the food subsidy programme in the Nasser era. As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, the food subsidy 
programme was one of the industrial programmes in the dualist social welfare system in the Nasser 
era. Its goal in the Nasser era was not merely to achieve income distribution, but also to contribute 
to industrialisation. Although this programme had been established to control food prices in the 
inter-war period,1 it was converted to a mechanism to redistribute income to urban workers by 
                                                     
1  In a period 1919-1920, the government sold large quantities of imported wheat and flour at low 
prices to deal with inflation in basic food prices (Scobie 1981: 20). The similar measure was 
introduced during World War II. To deal with scarcity during the war, a food rationing system 
was applied to sugar, tea and non-food, which were supplied at relatively low prices in 1941 
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providing them with inexpensive foodstuffs in the Nasser era. At the time, it did not impose a 
heavy burden on the exchequer because it was sustained by indirect subsidies, or wealth transfer 
from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. However, this condition changed with the 
introduction of the infitah. 
Second, this chapter explains how the food subsidy programme changed its roles in the Sadat 
era, weakening the features of industrial programmes. The food subsidy programme in the Sadat 
era was characterised by its dramatic expansion. At the time, the social welfare system paid more 
attention to income distribution because the infitah widened the income gap between the ‘haves’ 
and the ‘have-nots’. The food subsidy programme was expected to function as a populist 
compensation mechanism, increasing the number of subsidised items and maintaining subsidised 
food prices at low levels. The food riots in 1977 reinforced his commitment to the food subsidy 
programme. After the food riots, the Sadat government regarded the food subsidy programme as a 
means to achieve distributive justice. 
Third, this chapter focuses on how the Mubarak government treated the food subsidy 
programme. In the 1990s the government struggled to cut subsidies because it had agreed to 
implement structural economic reforms proposed by the IMF. Structural adjustment aimed to 
rationalise the food subsidy programme by converting it to a poverty alleviation programme and 
restricting its beneficiaries to the vulnerable. However, the failure to generate equitable wealth 
growth obliged the government to depend heavily on distributional justice achieved through social 
welfare, including food subsidies. Consequently, the government avoided implementing explicit 
reforms in order to stave off political grievances and instability (such as the 1977 food riots) and 
failed to rationalise the programme, although it succeeded in reducing expenditure on the 
programme. In contrast to the 1990s, the food subsidy programme in the 2000s was characterised 
by its expansion, which was caused by government reliance on distributional functions for political 
legitimacy. Food price hikes encouraged citizens to purchase subsidised foodstuffs and increased 
                                                                                                                                                                
(Ali & Adams 1996: 1778). 
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expenditure on food subsidies. The dramatic increase in expenditure was caused by the 
programme’s feature that every citizen could purchase subsidised (baladi) bread. At the same time, 
the Mubarak government increased the number and range of subsidised items to avoid grievances 
about food prices triggering anti-government movements. As a result, the change in the food 
subsidy programme was restricted by institutional path dependency inherited from Nasser’s 
original institutional political economy, which ultimately sacrificed structural economic reform for 
regime survival. 
 
 
4-1.  The Formation of the Food Subsidy Programme in the Nasser Era 
 
The 1952 Revolution was a critical juncture for the development of the food subsidy 
programme in Egypt. As discussed in Chapter 2, the industrial programmes, including the food 
subsidy programme, were designed to boost Nasser’s ambitious strategy to promote 
industrialisation. To comprehend the dynamics of the food subsidy programme in the Nasser era, it 
is firstly necessary to understand the role of agrarian reform because this reform strongly related to 
the food subsidy programme. Whereas agrarian reform gave the state several tools with which to 
intervene in the agricultural sector, these tools helped the state transfer its wealth to the industrial 
sector, which led to capital accumulation in the public sector. Agrarian reform had three goals: (1) 
dismantling the old landlord class that had supported the monarchy, (2) encouraging landowners to 
invest in industry and (3) directly intervening in the agriculture sector. 
The first goal was to dismantle the landlord class that had supported the monarchy. The 
Agrarian Land Reform Law in 1952 stated that the amount of land owned by one person should be 
limited to 200 feddans2 although there were several exceptions.3 The government attempted to 
exclude Greek moneylenders, who had played a major role in rural credit, by replacing them with 
co-operatives, with the assistance of the government-owned agricultural bank (Sadowski 1991: 59). 
                                                     
2  Feddan is a unit of area used in Egypt. One feddan is equal to 0.42 hectares. 
3  As for the exceptions, see Margold (1957: 12). 
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The second goal was to support the landlord class to invest the money, which was paid to them as 
compensation for the confiscation of their land, in industry (Warriner 1962: 41). This goal resulted 
in failure because the land lord class and the private sector were reluctant to invest in ambitious 
industrialisation projects, as explained in Chapter 2. The third goal was that the state should obtain 
tools to intervene in the agricultural sector. Agrarian reform enabled the revolutionary government 
to control the production, marketing and distribution of food products. The revolutionary 
government established agricultural co-operatives that all peasants had to join and were expected to 
work in as an alternative to working for the previous landowners. These co-operatives were 
responsible for a compulsory system of crop rotation,4 agricultural credit, input subsidies and the 
marketing of products. Instead of the previous landlord class, they had three instruments to control 
their members, who had been peasants in the pre-revolutionary era: (1) appointing agricultural 
engineers as supervisors to elected co-operative councils; (2) co-operatives’ monopoly over the 
supply of key inputs (such as chemical fertilisers, insecticides and seeds); and (3) the co-operatives 
exercised control over the marketing of the most important crops and were also the instrument for 
enforcing the direct procurement of agricultural produce (Radwan & Lee 1985: 9-10). Whereas 
agrarian reform provided the state with a tool to intervene directly in the agricultural sector, it 
helped the state construct a mechanism to transfer wealth in the agricultural sector to the industry 
sector along with Nasser’s industrialisation project. 
The mechanism of transferring wealth from the agricultural to the industrial sectors was the 
compulsory delivery scheme, which functioned as de facto food subsidies by providing inexpensive 
foods to consumers. After this scheme was introduced in 1955,5 expenditure on wheat subsidies 
continued to decrease until the mid-1960s, although it reached £E13 million in 1951/52 (Alderman, 
                                                     
4  “The land-reform estates are divided into large blocks, and each block is further divided into 
three parts. The peasant who acquired land in a certain block was given to a plot I each unit. 
Under the compulsory system of crop rotation, each part must be sown with a single crop and 
the same crop cannot be cultivated in the same part for two years in succession” (Gadalla 1962: 
57). 
5  According to Kherallah et al. (2000: 3), “from 1976 to 1984, compulsory delivery was replaced 
by an optional delivery program, whereby farmers could voluntarily sell their wheat to the 
government at a fixed procurement price. In 1985, however, compulsory delivery was reinstated 
and maintained until the implementation of the Agricultural Reform Program in 1987”. 
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von Braun & Sakr 1982: 13). Although this scheme aimed to establish control over cotton, which 
was one of the most important exports for the Egyptian economy, it was partly applied to wheat 
crops and forced farmers to sell a quota of wheat at a fixed price. The fixed price was lower than 
that found in international markets (Kherallah et al. 2000: 3). This scheme covered not only wheat 
but certain portions of other food staples (e.g., rice, beans, lentils, sesame, and groundnuts) (von 
Braun & de Haen 1983: 23). Its beneficiaries were concentrated on urban areas because it was 
difficult to access subsidised food in rural areas. According to Alderman, von Braun & Sakr (1982: 
54-55), the government began to expand the subsidy system to rural areas in the 1980s and almost 
half of the villages they sampled did not have bakeries. In small villages, there were no shops 
selling subsidised (and rationed) commodities. Therefore, food subsidies were mainly distributed to 
and benefited urban workers in the Nasser era. 
 
Figure 4.1: Wheat Production, Commercial Imports and Foreign Aid (1949-1978) 
 
Source: Scobie (1981: 69-70), Table 14. 
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With the expansion of the public sector, the food subsidy programme became more important 
for Nasser’s industrialisation project. His policy was named the ‘low-wage, cheap-food’ policy. 
Whereas this programme provided inexpensive food stuffs to urban workers through the 
compulsory delivery scheme, this mechanism helped public enterprises, most of which were 
nationalised after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, to accumulate capital by keeping wages of 
their employees low in return for inexpensive food stuffs (Rowntree 1993: 423). In 1961, the 
government nationalised all foreign trade and monopolised wheat and flour imports (Scobie 1981: 
23). Although the amount of wheat imports increased in the 1960s and exceeded that of domestic 
production in 1962, expenditure on food subsidies were restricted because of foreign aid, especially 
from the United States (Figure 4.1). 
Although the government still utilised indirect food subsidies through the compulsory delivery, 
it gradually spent more on direct food subsidies in the mid-1960s. On the demand side, there were 
two factors. One was demographic change in the country. According to official statistics, the 
population in Egypt grew drastically, from less than 20 million in 1947 to more than 30 million in 
1966. Along with the increase in the total population, the percentage of the urban population 
relative to the total population increased, from 33.5% in 1947 to 40.0% in 1966. The population in 
urban areas doubled in twenty years (CAPMAS 2006: 33-34). The other factor was an increase in 
wheat consumption per capita. As indicated in Figure 4.2, whereas each person annually consumed 
64 kilograms of wheat in 1949, the amount almost doubled in 1963 (115 kilograms per year). On 
the supply side, the government had to depend on commercial wheat imports, which increased the 
amount of international payments by the government. Except for a few years after the 1952 
Revolution, domestic wheat consumption was mainly covered by domestic production and foreign 
aid (Figure 4.1). However, in 1967, food aid from the US was suspended because of the 
Arab-Israeli War (the Six-Day War). The government therefore had to import wheat to cover 
domestic demand (Ahmed et al. 2001: 5-6). Figure 4.1 indicates that commercial imports of wheat 
drastically increased in 1967 when Egypt received only 1,000 tons of foreign aid. 
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Figure 4.2: Domestic Wheat Consumption Per Capita (1949-1978) 
 
Source: Scobie (1981: 69-70), Table 14. 
 
It should however be noted that the burden of food subsidies on the exchequer was still 
restricted in the Nasser era. Whereas the government began to issue ration cards based on civil 
records to restrict consumption of several commodities (such as sugar, tea and fuel), it did not 
always subsidise these commodities. Moreover, it gradually regarded the agricultural sector as a 
mere source of revenue, as the country was faced with an economic and fiscal crisis in the 
mid-1960s. Although agriculture production (especially cotton crops) had been one of the most 
important tax bases, the land owners had endeavoured to maintain the relatively low rate of 
agricultural taxes. This situation was said to be unfair by industrialists, who asserted that the 
agricultural sector should shoulder more of the burden of taxes. Responding to the industrialists’ 
claims, the government began to impose a heavy tax burden on agriculture (Sadowski 1991: 
65-66). 
The Egyptian state began to do what agricultural marketing boards in other African 
countries had been doing for generations: it paid peasants less for their crops than the 
government earned by reselling their produce in local or international markets. To 
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prevent peasants from simply switching to other, untaxed, crops, the government 
required that all cooperative members plant certain volumes of taxable crops. … 
In 1965 this system of compulsory deliveries was extended to all major cereals, and in 
1966 to rice. Soon corn, lentils, onions, potatoes, and several smaller crops were 
subjected to the same regime (Sadowski 1991: 66). 
Figure 4.3 confirms this tendency. The losses incurred by agricultural producers exceeded 
consumer gains before the 1970s. This data indicates that, although investment in the agricultural 
sector declined, wealth in the agricultural sector was utilised to stabilise food prices as indirect 
subsidies. This trend continued until 1974, when the Sadat government experienced a steep rise in 
expenditure on food subsidies (Alderman, von Braun & Sakr 1982: 13). 
 
Figure 4.3:  Producer Losses & Consumer Gains from Price Policies & Food Subsidies on 
Wheat, Rice and Maize (1965-1980) (£E million) 
 
Sources: von Braun & de Haen (1983: 52-53), Table 13 & 14. 
 
In summary, the food subsidy programme functioned as one of the industrial programmes in 
the social welfare system in the Nasser era. By supplying inexpensive foodstuffs to urban workers, 
it contributed to capital accumulation of public enterprises. The resource was mobilised by the 
compulsory delivery scheme, in which wealth in the agricultural sector was transferred to the 
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industrial sector as indirect subsidies to foodstuffs for urban workers. At the time, the government 
did not necessarily consider that the food subsidy programme was an important mechanism for 
income distribution. Indeed, the government did not always subsidise foodstuffs until the 
mid-1970s, as discussed above. 
 
 
4-2.  The Dramatic Expansion in the Sadat Era: The Infitah and the Positive 
Feedback Effect 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, President Sadat introduced the infitah for economic growth, but it 
created ‘losers’. Whilst real wages only doubled in the twenty years (1970s and 80s) during the 
infitah, the cost of living index increased more than 2.5 times at the same time (Hansen & Radwan 
1982: 108-111). The Sadat government was forced to take measures to relieve the losers, 
alleviating citizens’ complaints. The food subsidy programme was a suitable tool to do so for two 
reasons. First, the government did not have an efficient bureaucratic organisation to grasp the 
income level of each citizen, which is a basis not merely to impose taxes on the citizens, but also to 
provide them with social security if necessary. Second, it already had experience in controlling 
food prices through food subsidies and the ration card system. Thus, the government expanded the 
food subsidy programme, changing its features from a tool to help industrialisation to a mechanism 
to provide cheap foodstuffs to citizens. 
Increasing dependence on imported wheat had a significant impact on the food subsidy 
programme (see Figure 4.1). International wheat prices rose from US$60 per ton to $250 in 1973. 
Although the amount of imported wheat and flour rose only by 8% and 30% respectively in one 
year (from 1973 to 1974), subsidy costs for these products increased by 174% (Alderman, von 
Braun & Sakr 1982: 13). Furthermore, domestic wheat prices also increased in the mid-1970s. 
Although procurement prices were almost equal to import prices (if the import prices were 
converted at official exchange rates), this situation changed in 1975. Whereas import prices 
declined at the time, procurement prices continued to increase because of inflation. The 
168 
government therefore abolished a compulsory delivery scheme and introduced a new voluntary 
delivery scheme,6 in which farmers could sell their products at a fixed price. Consequently, the 
food subsidy programme chose imported wheat rather than domestic production (Kherallah et al. 
2000: 23; von Braun & de Haen 1983: 4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Changes in Urban Consumer Food Price Index and Subsidised Flour (1971 = 100) 
 
Source: Calculated by Author, based on Alderman, von Braun & Sakr (1982: 20), Table 5. 
 
Despite such a difficult situation, the Sadat government kept prices of subsidised commodities 
cheap. Whereas the urban consumer food price index more than tripled in ten years (1971-1981) in 
Egypt, the price of subsidised flour remained low, from 5.5 piastres per kilogram in 1971 to 9.0 
piastres in 1981 (see Figure 4.4). Moreover, it increased the number of subsidised commodities 
and began to subsidise additional foods (such as beans, lentils, and frozen fish, meat and chicken) 
in addition to wheat, rice and yellow maize. At its peak, this programme covered 18 food items 
(Ahmed et al. 2001: 6). Although the devaluation of the Egyptian pound between 1977 and 1979 
                                                     
6  The compulsory delivery scheme was reintroduced in 1985 and maintained until 1987, when the 
government began to implement the Agricultural Reform Programme (Kherallah et al. 2000: 4). 
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increased the import costs of foodstuffs, the government would not pass on a portion of the cost 
increase to the population and covered the difference between the increasing import costs and the 
subsidised prices. Thus, expenditure on the food subsidy programme continued to grow. Before the 
devaluation, the government had attained some benefits through this programme because the 
government monopolised the transaction. After the devaluation, however, it sold most of the 
imported commodities at great expense (Alderman, von Braun & Sakr 1982: 15-16). 
The government’s strong commitment to this programme encouraged most citizens to become 
dependent on this programme. More than 90% of Egyptian citizens were ration cardholders and 
almost all Egyptians could access subsidised foodstuffs during the Sadat presidency. This means 
that ration cards lost their substance during this period (Ali & Adams 1996: 1778). Accordingly, 
more people depended on food subsidies. According to Alderman, von Braun & Sakr (1982: 75), 
for example, average farm households in Sharkiya Governorate spent 13.2% of the their total 
expenditure on subsidised and rationed food in 1981. Moreover, wheat consumption per capita 
increased, as indicated in Figure 4.2. This was partly because the government continued to provide 
the population with subsidised bread at low prices (Alderman, von Braun & Sakr 1982: 29). Thus, 
the food subsidy programme became the most important social welfare programme in the country. 
The institutional expansion created the expectation that the government should insulate consumers 
from unstable international markets at any expense. The Sadat government also maintained “the 
idea that consumer subsidies were not just a safety net protecting the needy, but an expression of 
equity granted to the mass of society as a counterbalance to the privileges enjoyed by the rich” 
(Sadowski 1991: 160). 
However, the government began to suffer from the increasing burden of the programme on the 
budget. In the Sadat era, expenditure on the programme sharply increased, from £E3 million in 
1970/71 (only 0.4 % of the total current expenditure) to £E1.1 billion in 1980/81 (approximately 
30% of the total current expenditure) (Alderman, von Braun & Sakr 1982: 13-15). Accordingly, a 
ratio of food subsidy expenditure in the total current expenditure reached 23.0% in 1974 (Figure 
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4.5). The high percentage of the expenditure restricted government discretion over the budget. 
Although citizens’ dependence on the programme made it difficult for the government to 
implement subsidy cuts, the increasing burden on the exchequer made subsidy reform inevitable. 
 
Figure 4.5:  Percentages of Food Subsidy Expenditure in the Total Expenditure (1970/71- 
1996/97) 
 
Source: Calculated by Author, based on Alderman, von Braun & Sakr (1982: 14), Table 1; Ahmed 
et al. (2001: 8), Table 2.1; and the CBE (1983-2002/03). 
 
The government took several measures to reduce the amount of expenditure on the programme. 
As the country changed its stance from pro-Soviet to pro-US, pressure was exerted directly by the 
US government and indirectly by the IMF and the World Bank in the Sadat era. Consequently, the 
government started negotiations with the IMF in 1976 (Hirst & Beeson 1981: 236-237). The IMF 
also recognised the necessity of economic reform in Egypt. On 16 October 1976, the IMF sent to 
the Minister of the Economy, Dr Zeki Shafei, a confidential memorandum, which addressed the 
necessity for radical economic reform (Haykal 1983: 90). In negotiations with the IMF, the 
government agreed to the economic reform package, which included a sharp devaluation of the 
Egyptian pound, reducing the fiscal deficit and cutting subsidies for consumer goods, especially for 
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bread and wheat. Accordingly, President Sadat notified the Parliament that the government had 
decided to reduce expenditure on consumer subsidies by 50%, from £E553.7 million to £E276.4 
million (Sadowski 1991: 154-155). It was expected that this subsidy would lead to increasing 
prices of subsidised commodities as follows: 72% extraction flour (67%), fino bread (50 %), 
butagas7 (46%), gasoline (26-31%), rationed rice (20%) and regulated sugar (4%) respectively 
(Ahmed et al. 2001: 7). The government seemed to think that, as the government excluded staples 
(i.e., baladi bread and wheat) from subsidy cuts, the influence of the cuts on an average family in 
Egypt would be minimised (Gutner 1999: 18-19). 
Contrary to the government’s expectation, the population rejected this proposal. Their 
complaints exploded, taking the form of demonstrations against the government, some of which 
turned into riots (the 1977 food riots).8 Demonstrations began early in the morning of 18 January 
in Alexandria. Factory workers marched into the city centre. When some demonstrators tried to 
head for the Governor’s Office and the headquarters of the ASU, the police reacted brutally. During 
the clashes with the police, the demonstrators set fire to the ASU building. Their anger was directed 
not only at President Sadat but at Vice President Hosni Mubarak. 
They attacked and ransacked restaurants, bars and shops. Another place which did not 
escape the anger of the mob was the summer residence, in a quiet and fashionable 
suburb, of La Vache Qui Rit, the nickname the rioters bestowed on Vice President 
Husni Mubarak; his fixed, bland smile reminded them of the laughing cow on the 
boxes of proceeded French cheese that had flooded the market in recent years (Hirst & 
Beeson 1981: 242). 
At the same time, demonstrations occurred near the capital city, Cairo. Workers in Helwan began to 
organise a peaceful and spontaneous demonstration and marched towards downtown Cairo. In the 
beginning there was no violence. The number of demonstrators was swelled by workers from Cairo 
City and university students. In Cairo, the police took the same measures as in Alexandria. 
                                                     
7  It is butane gas used for cooking. 
8  It should be noted that there had been pent-up discontent with the severe economic situations 
created by the infitah before the 1977 food riots. On 1 January 1975, the first major 
demonstrations since 1967 had occurred. The demonstrators shouted: ‘Feen al-Futuur (Where is 
our Breakfast?)’ “They had no breakfast, or, at least, they had a minimum wage which, at £E12 
a month, was less than one twelfth the ‘cover’ price for a New Year reveller and his wife at the 
Meridien” (Hirst & Beeson 1981: 231). 
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Accordingly, the demonstration turned violent and the opposition movement spread all over the city. 
In response to the riots, President Sadat demanded that the military intervene. Finally, the Sadat 
government decided to cancel the proposed subsidy-cuts, broadcasting a statement to this effect 
through radio (Gutner 1999: 18-19; Hirst & Beeson 1981: 242-244; Sadowski 1991: 156). 
The riots indicated that the government was unable to eliminate subsidies or to embark on 
radical institutional reform because such measures would change the structure of income 
distribution. Therefore, the government attempted to maintain the food subsidy programme. Right 
after the food riots, President Sadat announced that the government should: 
1 – find alternative means of securing the necessary resources to cover the deficit in 
the budget and reform the structure of economy within the framework of an integrated 
plan [and] 
2 – avoid any measures affecting the people’s food or clothing (Anon. 1977: 4). 
Moreover, it confiscated US$2 billion from the Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt 
(GODE), an Arab aid agency. The aim of this confiscation was to obtain resources to expand the 
subsidy system to frozen beef and chicken. The Ministry of Supply furthermore decided to deliver 
subsidised flour to rural areas although the benefits of this programme had previously only been 
distributed to urban residents (Sadowski 1991: 160). The IMF also allowed the Egyptian 
government to prioritise the stabilisation of social order and to temporarily suspend economic 
reforms. According to the Financial Times, the Egyptian government and the IMF reached an 
agreement about an extended credit facility of 400 million SDR. In addition, the IMF also agreed 
that the government could maintain food subsidies at the previous level of £E500-600 million a 
year (Tingay 1977: 6). 
After the 1977 riots the Sadat government had to take more care of food prices and the subsidy 
programme. On 2 May 1981, President Sadat mentioned that the government would increase 
expenditure on food subsidies in his speech. This speech was recorded as part of the May-Day rally, 
in which the President usually promised to increase social benefits to citizens, such as food 
subsidies, public sector wages and pensions (Anon. 1981b). Among the social benefits, food 
subsidies were the most important for the government because increasing food prices would affect 
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most citizens and might immediately lead to social unrest. The government stressed its continued 
commitment to food subsidies and to stabilising prices of commodities. The Deputy Prime Minister 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Abdul Razzek Abdul Meguid, said “these [subsidies for basic 
commodities] would not be reduced for any commodities, keeping them available to low-income 
people at reasonable prices” (Anon. 1981c: 3). Indeed, a new Five-Year Plan also gave the highest 
priority to food security and pricing policies. The plan confirmed that the government would 
stabilise food prices, “supporting price control and price monitoring agencies to maintain a healthy 
structure of absolute and relative prices” (MoP 1982: 147). 
The food subsidy programme changed its primary goal, from an institutional complement to 
the industrialisation project to a populist tool to divert criticism of the infitah during the Sadat era. 
This was because the Sadat government recognised that the expansion of the food subsidy 
programme was the most useful strategy for the government to alleviate popular discontent about 
inflation, as the infitah led to price hikes. Moreover, as pointed out in a World Bank report, 
conventional social welfare programmes (such as cash transfer and social insurance) only covered a 
small number of citizens in MENA countries (including Egypt) and their effects as social welfare 
programmes were restricted (Silva, Levin & Morgandi 2012: 56). Once this expansionary strategy 
was adopted, the populace became gradually more and more dependent on the food subsidy 
programme and stable food prices were critical for the survival of the authoritarian regime. The 
1977 food riots showed that the government really needed to continue this strategy in order to 
survive. As discussed in Chapter 2, President Sadat exploited a discourse of ‘socialism’ to 
legitimate his strategy, emphasising that his ‘socialism’ aimed to deliver social welfare benefits, 
enough food and accommodation in particular (Anon. 1978). By exploiting the discourse, the 
government reinforced mechanisms for income distribution represented by the food subsidy 
programme. This mechanism reinforced a discourse of the ‘social contract’ (Sadowski 1991: 157), 
which determined a pathway of change in the food subsidy programme in the Mubarak era. 
 
 
174 
4-3.  Change and Continuity of the Food Subsidy Programme in the Mubarak 
Era 
 
When President Hosni Mubarak took office in October 1981, the food subsidy programme was 
faced with a dilemma. This programme was imposing a heavy burden on the budget and the 
balance of payments. Expenditure on the programme had accounted for more than 10% of the total 
public expenditure since 1974 until 1981/82 and led to persistent budget deficits (see Figure 4.5). 
Moreover, imported wheat and flour for this programme caused scarce foreign exchange and 
increased the country’s foreign debt, which reached US$ 46 billion (Gutner 1999: 20). These two 
huge deficits – the budget and trade deficits – forced the government to implement drastic subsidy 
reforms immediately, which was financially supported by the IMF. However, the ‘social contract’ 
made it difficult for the government to rationalise the programme. The memory of the 1977 food 
riots forced the government to hesitate when planning drastic reforms. As a steep rise in food prices 
would alter the structure of income distribution and damage the populace, drastic reform that 
triggered a price hike and was regarded as the violation of the social contract might lead to social 
destabilisation. The Mubarak government therefore took measures to avoid steep rises in food 
prices. Although the government successfully reduced expenditure on food subsidies in the 1990s, 
the quality of subsidy reform was restricted. It could not change the universalist feature that every 
citizen could access subsidised baladi bread. This failure led to the expansion of the food subsidy 
programme the 2000s. As a result of food price hikes, Egyptians queued for subsidised bread. The 
government also increased the number of subsidised commodities at the expense of institutional 
efficiency as a poverty alleviation programme. 
 
 
4-3-1.  Subsidy Cuts and Economic Reform in the 1980s and 90s 
 
Despite the urgent need to solve the fiscal deficit problem through IMF loans, the government 
was reluctant to implement drastic reform in exchange for loans. Negotiations with the IMF did not 
reach agreement because there were differences of views between the two regarding (1) the 
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unification of exchange rates and (2) elimination of price controls over foodstuffs, both of which 
would lead to food price hikes. As the government imported foodstuffs (including wheat and flour) 
at an unrealistically high official rate, the unification of exchange rates would accompany the 
devaluation and trigger food price hikes. It also objected to the elimination of price controls over 
foodstuffs because it had considered the stable provision of foodstuffs at low prices to be critical 
for the survival of the authoritarian regime since the 1977 food riots. In October 1984, President 
Mubarak therefore ordered that the Ministry of Home Trade and Supply should take measures to 
maintain prices of macaroni and cooking oil and provide one-piastre bread abundantly to citizens in 
all areas. Also, he called for stricter control over the prices of foodstuffs. On 30 September 1984 
President Mubarak mentioned wheat prices as follows: 
“We must be aware of this problem and strive hard to limit our consumption of wheat 
grain and flour as wheat is a strategic commodity,” he said. 
“I am facing a great responsibility,” the President said, adding: “Our population is 
growing at the rate of more than one million per annum and I daily watch all things 
big and small to assure each Egyptian citizen a life of freedom and integrity” (Anon. 
1984b: 1). 
The Mubarak government was reluctant to implement drastic economic reform that would damage 
the stability of food prices, especially those of strategic commodities including wheat. 
Consequently, the Mubarak government left an unrealistically high official rate for the currency 
and failed to rationalise food subsidies, which was a factor in failed negotiations with the IMF 
(Walker 1985: 3). 
The government reluctance was also expressed in public statements. The Minister of Economy 
and Finance, S. Hamed, stated that the IMF staff should appreciate the government’s efforts to 
implement economic reform: 
The effort would have received a more favorable appraisal if sufficient weight had 
been given to the great social and political constraints with which the policymakers 
were faced and that were too well known to warrant elaboration. It sufficed to say that 
political stability and social equity, both real and perceived, were the sine qua non of 
sustained adjustment (IMF 1985: 7). 
The government reluctance indicated that it was important for the government to maintain the food 
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subsidy programme to keep food prices low. Therefore, it attempted to avoid economic reforms 
related to these two issues. In the summer of 1985, the IMF’s negotiators however asserted that, 
unless the government accepted the stand-by loan and implemented economic reform in the short 
terms, the country might be faced with a critical debt situation within one year (Momani 2005: 11). 
However, the Mubarak government only partly implemented the economic reform suggested by the 
IMF and would not raise prices of fuels (such as gas oil, kerosene and diesel fuel) and natural gas, 
which were highly subsidised by the government (Carr 1990: 244-245). 
Because of the severe financial situation, the Mubarak government was gradually forced to 
accept the exchange rate reform that the IMF suggested. In 1986, a decline in revenues from oil 
production and tourism led to economic stagnation and forced the government to start formal 
negotiations the IMF. The most important issue in the negotiation was the devaluation of the 
Egyptian pound. Whereas the IMF recommended that the Egyptian government should devalue the 
Egyptian pound and unify exchange rates, the Egyptian government stated that it was unacceptable 
to take these measures because they would increase prices of subsidised foodstuffs. In the late 
1970s, the country had already experienced gradual devaluation.9 Therefore, the government 
wanted to restrict the economic influence of the devaluation. The Mubarak government 
successfully reached a compromise with the IMF when the IMF negotiators flew to Cairo, and 
obtained a letter of intent from the Egyptian government (Walker 1987: 4). The two parties agreed 
to several reform plans.10 According to this agreement, the government was responsible only for 
partial exchange rate reform. Although banks were supposed to transact Egyptian pounds and 
foreign currency at the free exchange market rate (devaluation from £E 1.38 per US$ 1.0 to £E 2.16 
per US$ 1.0), the government did not apply this rate to imports of strategic goods, which 
constituted 45% of the government’s transactions, and continued to use the official rate (£E 0.7 per 
US$ 1.0) for these transitions (including imports of wheat, flour and sugar) (Momani 2005: 17-18; 
                                                     
9  At that time, the devaluation imposed a heavy burden on the exchequer by depreciating the 
currency by 56% between 1977 and 1979 because the government covered the increase in 
importing costs (Alderman, von Braun & Sakr 1982: 15). 
10  As for other terms that the Egyptian government and the IMF agreed to, see the IMF (1987: 
45-51). 
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Negm 1988: 9). Thus, the government protected imports of subsidised wheat from an effect of the 
devaluation to prevent a steep rise in prices (Momani 2005: 18). 
Nonetheless, the government hesitated to implement drastic reforms for fear such drastic 
reforms would trigger violent reactions. The 1977 food riots had indicated that the area of food 
subsidies should be a ‘sanctuary’ that the government could not enter. Even partial subsidy cuts 
might trigger political instability and damage the government’s legitimacy that was based on 
distributive justice (Salevurakis & Sahar Mohamed 2008). Reflecting the preferences of the ruling 
elite, therefore, subsidy reform was implemented implicitly to avoid triggering social unrest. The 
contents of the reform could be categorised into three: (1) ration card reform, (2) cash 
compensation and (3) ‘reform by stealth’ (Sadowski 1991). 
(1) Ration card reform: Prior to negotiations with the IMF, the Mubarak government had 
already embarked on subsidy cuts. A ration card system had been introduced in 1966, so that the 
government had data on monthly quotas of rationed goods in each family (Abdel-Latif & El-Laithy 
1996: 298). The government now divided the ration cardholders into two for a better targeted 
rationing mechanism in 1981. Whereas green cardholders could buy subsidised foodstuffs as in the 
past, the government reduced the subsidised ratio for red cardholders, who could purchase several 
subsidised goods (such as sugar, cooking oil, tea and rice) at less favourable rates than green 
cardholders. Furthermore, the government attempted to restrict the number of ration cardholders. 
The Ministry of Trade and Supply (MOTS) announced that the government would not issue ration 
cards to new-born babies after 1989. Another stealth strategy was to invalidate ration cards held by 
those who had already moved abroad or been dead. According to Ahmed et al. (2001: 7-9), these 
measures decreased the number of ration cardholders, from 99% in 1981/82 to approximately 70% 
in 1998, although the decrease was gradual and limited. 
(2) Cash compensation: Prime Minister Ali Lutfi (from September 1985 until November 
1986) proposed this scheme in which the government would abolish consumer subsidies and make 
direct payments to the vulnerable. Originally, the cash compensation was supposed to cover all 
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citizens. The government planned to compensate public sector employees with an annual bonus and 
rural residents with special grants through village banks. Prime Minister Lufti thought that this cash 
compensation would enable the government to withdraw financial support to the rich, such as the 
bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, and land owners, who accounted for approximately 23% of the total 
population. However, this scheme covered only public sector employees and increased their wages 
by 20% in June 1987. Thus, rural residents and poor urbanites ended up bearing the brunt of 
subsidy cuts and inflation triggered by the public-sector’s wage hike. This idea was partially 
implemented by Lufti’s successor – Atef Sedki (from November 1986 until January 1996) – 
because it was difficult to eliminate all food subsidies. Along with the cash compensation, the 
government raised the prices of some consumer commodities, such as cigarettes and sugar 
(Sadowski 1991: 163-164). 
(3) ‘Reform by stealth’: The government reduced expenditure on subsidised bread without 
any warnings. First, subsidised bread was replaced with a more expensive version. In 1984 the 
government introduced higher-quality two-piastre subsidised bread as well as the existing 
one-piastre loaf. At the beginning, people could purchase both types of bread. Second, the 
government gradually reduced the distributed amount of the one-piastre bread in the market. At the 
same time, the quality of the one-piastre bread was also downgraded. This process encouraged 
consumers to purchase the two-piastre bread. Third, the government stopped delivering one-piastre 
bread to the market. As a result, they automatically shifted from the one-piastre bread to the widely 
available two-piastre one. Fourth, this strategy was repeated until the price of subsidised bread 
became five piastres. This strategy enabled the government to increase the subsidised bread price 
from one to five piastres in 1989 without wide-spread objection. Furthermore, the government 
successfully reduced the loaf size of subsidised bread, from 168g to 160g (in 1984) and to 130g (in 
1991) (Ahmed et al. 2001: 9-10). 
Despite the government’s efforts to rationalise the food subsidy programme, the efficiency of 
the programme in tackling poverty alleviation was restricted. Leakage was one of the largest 
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problems in this programme. Although making a loaf of bread cost 2.8 piastres, the government 
only allowed bakers to charge two piastres. Bakers therefore attempted to make profits by utilising 
price gaps between three kinds of flour: 82% extraction (for baladi bread), 72% extraction (for fino 
bread) and pastry flour. The price of pastry flour was nearly double of fino flour and nearly triple of 
baladi flour, respectively. They bought low-quality flour at a low price in the market, sifted out its 
bran from it, and sold it as ‘higher-quality fino flour’. It is estimated that this illegal practice 
enabled bakeries to reduce their costs by more than 30%. Cheap subsidised bread distorted 
incentives in the countryside and encouraged farmers to use subsidised bread as animal feed, or a 
substitute for corn. A shortage of hard currency led to restricted imports of corn. Subsidised wheat 
flew into the black markets for these farmers because it was more profitable than delivering the 
wheat as ordinal subsidised bread in official markets (Sadowski 1991: 35-37). 
Although the programme still had such shortcomings, the Mubarak government would not 
implement further reform for fear of social unrest. According to an article in the Financial Times, 
the Egyptian government was concerned that the agreement with the IMF would endanger civil 
order. Mr Ibrahim Nafeh, editor-in-chief of al-Ahram, also asserted that the government should not 
rush the implementation of the IMF agreement at the expense of people’s lives: “Egypt is the 
master of its own decisions, the planner of its own programme and administrator of its own reform 
steps which it sees fit for its social and economic position” (Walker 1988a: 4). Reflecting the 
reluctance in the country, the government also asked the IMF for more time to implement the 
agreed reform plans. 
The Egyptian representatives expressed the view that the adjustment envisaged in the 
staff scenario was too rapid, and its impact would jeopardize economic growth and 
social stability. The pace of reform had to be geared to likely public reaction, and 
public tolerance had now been stretched to the danger point. They stressed that the 
Government was committed to economic reform, but that the adjustment effort would 
have to extend over a large number of years in areas such as the pass-through of full 
unification of the exchange system to the prices of essential commodities (IMF 1988: 
19). 
The government did not unify the exchange rates or taking further measures. Consequently, the 
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1987 Stand-By Agreement resulted in failure and the government did not implement radical 
subsidy cuts. 
Although a worsening debt situation in Egypt forced the government to ask the IMF for 
financial assistance and to begin negotiations with the IMF in 1988, the government repeatedly 
criticised the IMF. At a mass rally in a Nile Delta town, President Mubarak “likened the IMF to an 
unqualified doctor and charged that it prescribes a ‘huge dose’ of medicine that is detrimental to the 
health of the patient” (Walker 1988b: 6). At the rally he remarked that, although Egypt would need 
economic reform, “this reform must be in line with our social and economic situation and the 
standard of living” (Walker 1988c: 5). Furthermore, when he travelled to European countries to ask 
for help from governments, he expressed his concern to his European hosts that the IMF’s 
prescription would lead to social unrest (Walker 1988c: 5). His remarks indicated that the Egyptian 
ruling elite were concerned about the IMF’s pressure for radical economic reform, including 
decreasing the budget deficit, cutting consumer subsidies and unifying exchange rates. Their 
argument was strengthened by the recent Algerian riots, which had been triggered by price 
increases (Walker 1988d: 4). 
Such experiences pushed the Mubarak government into adopting contradictory measures 
regarding food subsidies. The government promised that Egypt would embark on economic reform 
to persuade its creditors to reschedule their loans in November 1988. Moreover, it informed the 
IMF of a reform plan to reduce the fiscal deficit, including subsidy cuts in November 1989. An 
IMF report mentioned that the government would reform a distribution system of subsidised and 
non-subsidised foodstuffs: 
In particular, 5 piastre bread had supplanted the 2 piastre loaf by July 1989 and the 
authorities planned to eliminate the tea ration, with distribution fully shifted to 
market-related prices by year-end. These measures were officially estimated to reduce 
food subsidies by about one third, equivalent to 1 percent of projected GDP (IMF 
1989: 15). 
The government however promised to increase subsidies for the vulnerable in the new budget plan 
in June 1989. This measure aimed to ease the negative impact of the devaluation on the vulnerable 
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(Cowell 1989). 
The government’s inadequate reform threatened food security. As a result of the government’s 
plans, the amount of two-piastre bread distributed in the market began to decline in January 1989. 
In Cairo bakeries, two-piastre bread was sold out by midmorning. In the country side, bakeries 
suffered from flour shortages and could operate for only two hours a day. Peasants rushed into 
small cities like Minya, where bakeries were still functioning. Their discontent easily tuned into 
anger towards the Mubarak government. Indeed, people in Minya and Bani Suwayf organised 
public protests, shouting anti-government slogans. The bread shortage stemmed from a feature of 
the food subsidy programme. As wheat prices in international markets rose, bakeries had more 
incentives to utilise subsidised wheat for non-subsidised bread or pastry because prices of the 
non-subsidised commodities were strongly connected to international wheat prices. Therefore, a 
price gap between subsidised bread and these (non-subsidised) commodities widened as wheat 
prices in international markets increased (Sadowski 1991: 35-36). To make matters worse, the lack 
of funding for importing wheat deteriorated the situation. According to agricultural experts’ 
estimations, Egypt needed to mobilise approximately 1.5 million tonnes of wheat for the next six 
months (from April to September 1989) until the government was due to receive US food aid in 
October 1989. The government however did not have enough resources to purchase wheat. 
Meanwhile, France and Canada suspended new sales of wheat to Egypt because the country did not 
meet payments on old loans (Slavin 1989: 7). 
Nonetheless, the government cheated the populace, claiming that it had no intention of raising 
food prices, continuing to deny the necessity of implementing subsidy reform. For example, the 
Minister of Supply remarked that this crisis was ‘factitious’ at a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1989. 
At the same meeting, he mentioned that the government had been already providing the sufficient 
amount of wheat to citizens: 
He [the Minister of Supply] asserted that the country’s wheat stockpiles are secured 
and that the execution of related accords is under way in order to get two million tons 
of wheat from Australia. In this connection, the Minister reviewed other accords 
reached with France and Italy on wheat supplies. The local output of wheat this year is 
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expected to reach 2,800,000 tons, said the Minister, adding that a number of measures 
have been taken to ensure the availability of flour to the public (Anon. 1989: 2). 
Moreover, Prime Minister Sidki publicly denied that the government would raise commodity prices 
in The Egyptian Gazette. He was “emphatic about the absence of any price raises in the planning 
stage and explained the plan being implemented by the government [did] not call for moving 
commodity prices up” (Anon. 1990a: 1). President Mubarak also referred to economic reforms 
proposed by the IMF in an interview with Al-Ghomhuria. He emphasised that the government 
disputed the two points – (1) raising the prices of some commodities and (2) moving up the 
exchange rate and would not accept these proposal that would trigger price hikes. 
“I stand in favour of pursing economic reform but only in as much as can be afforded 
by the ordinary citizen,” President Mubarak said, likening this matter to demanding a 
weight lifter who can lift only 100 kg to lift one full ton (Anon. 1990b: 1).11 
The government attitude towards subsidy reform in the 1980s was characterised by its reluctance to 
unify exchange rates and eliminate the price control policy. 
The Gulf War in 1991 however created a more favourable environment for the Egyptian 
government to embark on economic reform, including subsidy reform. In the war, Egypt 
co-operated with the multinational forces against Iraq under the leadership of the United States. In 
return for Egyptian co-operation, the United States and Paris Club members agreed to relieve Egypt 
from a heavy burden of debt, improving foreign exchange reserves. This situation enabled the 
country to embark on exchange rate reform with moderate change in the exchange rate, which 
meant that the government could eliminate subsidies for several commodities without a sudden rise 
in the prices (Momani 2005: 26). The government therefore aimed to eliminate subsidies for 
commodities that were considered to benefit high-income groups, such as meat (in 1990/91), fish 
and tea (in 1991/92), and rice (in October 1992). In addition, the government attempted to restrict 
types of subsidised flour to the low-quality variety (wheat flour for baladi bread) and abolished 
subsidies on two types of high-quality flour: fino bread and 72% extraction flour in 1992, and 
shami bread and 76% extraction flour in 1996 respectively. It was also recorded that, in order to 
                                                     
11  The original interview was recorded in Arabic and translated to English by The Egyptian 
Gazette. 
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reduce subsidy costs, the government took the tricky measure of mixing maize flour with 82% 
extraction wheat. Thanks to government’s efforts, subsidised commodities were restricted to four 
items: baladi bread, 82% extraction flour, cooking oil and sugar (Ahmed et al. 2001: 7-10). 
Furthermore, the government made progress in the rationalisation of the currency exchange system. 
In August 1989, it devalued the official exchange rate (the Central Bank pool) by 63.6% (from 
£E0.7 per US$1.0 to £E1.1 per US$1.0) as the first step. Next, the government carried out further 
devaluation of the official rate by 55% in July 1990. Finally the government successfully unified 
the exchange rates in October 1991.12 At the same time, the Egyptian pound was devalued by 
approximately 15% (Abdel-Khalek 1993: 10). 
The subsidy reform in the 1980s and 1990s had positive impacts both on the budget and on the 
social welfare system. The government’s efforts successfully reduced food subsidy costs. The ratio 
of the programme’s expenditure to the total government expenditure went down, from 25.0% in 
1980/81 to 7.0% in 1996/97 (Figure 4.5). It should be noted that the substantial effects of the 
reform were thought to be larger than the explicit data showed. This was because the government 
had covered the costs of imported foodstuffs both explicitly and implicitly, especially before 
eliminating an overvalued official exchange rate for importing the commodities in 1991/92. 
According to the World Bank’s estimation, the implicit food subsidies account for approximately 
40% of the total food subsidies (the explicit + implicit subsidies) in 1989/90 (Ahmed et al. 2001: 
10). Furthermore, the government succeeded in improving the programme’s efficiency as a poverty 
alleviation programme in two ways. First, the subsidy reform restricted the target of this 
programme to the vulnerable by eliminating subsidies for ‘luxury’ commodities. The four 
still-subsidised items (i.e., baladi bread, 82% extraction wheat flour, edible oil and sugar) were 
necessary for daily life of the vulnerable. Second, the subsidy reform reduced the number of ration 
cardholders. The percentage of ration cardholders in the population declined from more than 90% 
in 1981 to less than 70% in 1997. At the same time, the ratio of red cardholders also declined 
                                                     
12  However, the IMF found that the government still continued to use the former Central Bank rate 
in select transitions (Momani 2005: 46). 
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(Korayem 2001: 74-75). 
However, the reform was restricted for following two points. First, the government rejected 
the further devaluation of the Egyptian pound. Although the present overvalued exchange rate had 
a negative impact on export-led economic growth, the government persistently maintained the 
exchange rate to avoid price hikes of commodities, especially wheat. Gouda Abdel-Khalek (1993: 
21) also asserts that the Egyptian pound was overvalued against the US dollar by 20-25% between 
1991 and 1993. In June 1994, the mass media reported that the government would devalue the 
Egyptian pound in accordance with the IMF’s suggestion. This report promoted the selling of 
Egyptian pounds on the financial market. In response to such a situation, several ministers denied 
this report. For example, the Minister of Public Sector, Atef Obeid stated that the government 
would resist the IMF claims that the country should devalue to increase non-oil exports, showing 
evidence that exports in the country were already increasing: “We made it very clear we disagree 
[to the devaluation]. … We will do what is right for the Egyptian economy” (Nicholson 1994: 7). 
Another minister also mentioned that the Egyptian government would never devalue at any 
expense. Minister Boutros-Ghali supported the government claim at the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Washington, stating that the overvaluation of the Egyptian pound was necessary to 
protect the vulnerable. The government asked an Egyptian member of the IMF executive board, 
Abdel Shakour Shaalan, to support the Egyptian government’s assertion. Thanks to his support, the 
government successfully rejected the devaluation. Although the IMF staff considered the 
devaluation to be important for increasing exports and economic growth, the Mubarak government 
had successfully excluded their argument from agreements between Egypt and the IMF. This 
strategy sacrificed export-led economic growth, but the government successfully maintained stable 
provision of foodstuff and the food subsidy programme (Momani 2005: 61-62). 
Second, the government could not completely overcome the main shortcoming of the 
programme – the universalist feature of food subsidies. All citizens were still allowed to purchase 
subsidised baladi bread and flour. In reality, most Egyptians depended on subsidised commodities 
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(baladi bread, in particular). As indicated in Table 4.1, approximately 70% of Egyptians purchased 
subsidised baladi bread regardless their income. The data shows that even rich people depended on 
subsidised baladi bread. Consequently, this structure made it difficult for the government to 
implement drastic reforms that would leave only the vulnerable as beneficiaries. Moreover, even 
rationed items (such as sugar and cooking oil) were poorly targeted and distributed to those who 
did not necessarily need the programme’s assistance. It was assumed that the rationed items were 
distributed to ration cardholders, who were thought to really need the programme. Whereas some 
of the rich had green cards, the government failed to deliver ration cards to those who needed the 
programme because of lacked access to information on how to get a ration card (Gutner 1999: 
24-25; World Bank 1991: 57). Consequently, the universalist feature led to high delivery costs. The 
Egyptian food subsidy programme needed US$2.98 to deliver $1.00 of baladi bread to the needy in 
1997. It also cost US$4.64 to deliver US$1.00 of ration cooking oil to the needy. This data indicates 
that the Egyptian food subsidy programme was more inefficient as a poverty alleviation programme 
than those in other countries. The costs of food subsidy programmes in the Philippines, Brazil and 
Columbia were US$1.21, $1.19 and $1.58 respectively (Table 4.2). 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Share of Households Purchasing Subsidised Baladi Bread, by Region and 
Expenditure Quintile (1997) 
 
 
Region 
Per capita expenditure quintile 
Lowest    Highest  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Average 
 (percent of all survey households) 
Whole Country 75.5 66.8 68.2 71.6 75.7 71.1 
Metropolitan 98.6 94.8 86.0 93.7 89.6 92.5 
Other urban 91.4 84.4 83.8 80.1 82.4 83.7 
Rural 58.2 51.5 57.1 55.4 59.5 56.1 
Source: Ahmed et al. (2001: 33), Table 5.5. 
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Table 4.2: Efficiency of Food Programs (Cost to Deliver $1.00 Subsidy to the Poor) 
(A) Comparison between the 1990s (before the expansion) and the 2000s (after the expansion) 
Subsidised commodities 
Year 
1997 2005 
Baladi bread 2.98 5.20 
10-piaster bread  N/A 46.42 
Ration sugar 3.34 4.99 
Ration cooking oil 4.64 5.23 
Food items added in 2004  N/A 5.08 
 
(B) International Comparison 
Country Program Year Cost 
The Philippines Pilot food price subsidy scheme 1984 1.19  
  General rice price subsidy 1992 5.98  
Brazil Food subsidy (PINS) 1980 1.21  
  Preschool feeding and nutrition education 1980 2.38  
Columbia Food subsidy 1981 1.58  
Indonesia Feeding program 1982 2.48  
Tamil Nadu, India Weighing and feeding 1982 1.74  
Bangladesh Vegetable group development program 1992 1.62  
  Food for work program 1982 2.44  
  Food for education program 1994 1.59  
  Rural rationing program 1992 6.55  
Source: World Bank (2005: 29), Table 3.2. 
 
Changes to the food subsidy programme in the 1990s were characterised by the government’s 
balancing the IMF’s demands and the popular expectations. The IMF exerted pressure on the 
government to implement budget cuts and rationalise the food subsidy programme. In return for 
IMF loans, the IMF encouraged the Egyptian government to implement the devaluation of the 
currency, eliminate price controls and introduce subsidy cuts. However, the Egyptian population 
expected the government to provide foodstuffs at a reasonable price, which was regarded as part of 
the social contract. The IMF proposals might therefore threaten the social order. Consequently, the 
government adopted implicit measures to cut expenditure on food subsidies, avoiding drastic 
subsidy reforms. Although the government was subject to pressure to rationalise complex exchange 
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rates, it only reluctantly accepted the proposal little by little. It repeatedly attempted to avoid 
devaluation because devaluation would trigger commodity price hikes and, if the government 
continued to subsidise foodstuffs, increase the burden of the food subsidy programme on the 
exchequer. Thus, the implementation was not sufficient to boost the country’s export-led economic 
growth. The government’s behaviour indicated that food security was a critical issue for regime 
survival. The populace believed that drastic reform that might change the structure of income 
distribution was a violation of the social contract. 
 
 
4-3-2.  The Institutional Backlash?: The Food Crises and Institutional Expansion in 
the 2000s 
 
In the 2000s, the government was faced with two food crises in the shape of two steep rises in 
food prices, which automatically increased the importance of the food subsidy programme. The 
government took measures to expand the programme to ease the negative effects of the crises. The 
first crisis stemmed from a domestic factor: the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in 2003. The 
second crisis was triggered by a steep price rise in international market prices between 2007 and 
2008. The two crises encouraged the government to utilise the programme as a tool to ease 
discontent in order to avoid social unrest, as with the 1977 food riots. 
The First Crisis in 2003: This crisis was triggered by the devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
in 2003. Since 1991, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) had maintained a strict peg of £E3.39 to the 
US dollar. However, economists and bankers pressed to change the policy. The market exerted 
further pressure on the CBE to release part of the CBE’s currency reserves in response to a 
worsening of the trade deficit caused by an increase in imports of 8%. Consequently, the Egyptian 
currency reduced its value by 2% and fell to £E3.46 in March 1999 (Huband 1999a: 6). Although 
bankers had addressed the necessity of the devaluation for further economic development since 
then, the government was still reluctant to implement the devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
(Huband 1999b: 16). The pound was finally devalued four times in 2000 and reduced its value by 
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25% against the US dollar in 2000, but the unofficial rate of the pound continued to fall to £E5.10 
per US$ in June 2002. As the stability of the currency was based on fragile foundations, it was 
pointed out that the currency would continue to fall unless the government could restore confidence 
in it (Swann 2002: 48). Finally, Egypt shifted to a free-floating system in January 2003 
(Drummond 2003a: 11). Consequently, the 30% devaluation of the Egyptian pound led to an 
increase in prices of 28%, and of food-retail prices by 38% (Kraay 2007: 4). 
The increase in domestic food prices made the Mubarak government take several measures 
through the food subsidy programme because a rise in food prices might trigger social unrest. First, 
the government began to subsidise ten-piastre bread as well as the existing bread. As a result the 
population were offered an additional option for cheap bread. Second, in the next year, the 
government decided to increase the number of subsidised items to eleven by introducing subsidies 
for seven items: rice, ghee, pasta, broad beans, lentils, tea, and additional quantities of cooking oil 
(Trego 2011: 670-673).13 According to the Financial Times: 
While consumer price inflation is only 4 per cent, wholesale price inflation has 
reached 19 per cent. The CPI is kept artificially low as the basket includes the 
subsidised food, subsidised petrol and electricity and housing costs, all of which are 
controlled (Drummond 2003b: 54). 
This article indicates that the food subsidy programme helped to reduce consumer prices, especially 
those of foodstuffs. The government measures caused an increase in expenditure on the food 
subsidy programme, from £E 6.9 billion in 2002/03 to £E 10.3 billion in 2003/04 (El-Shennawy & 
Galal 2004: 3). 
Although the food subsidy programme protected the vulnerable from a sudden hike in food 
prices in the beginning of the 2000s, the expansion imposed yet another heavy burden on the 
exchequer. President Mubarak aimed to rationalise the social welfare system by replacing the food 
subsidy programme with ‘pure’ poverty alleviation programmes (such as direct cash transfer). The 
                                                     
13  This measure was temporary. As the new programme was criticised for its small impact on 
poverty alleviation, some of the subsidised items were replaced by commodities that were more 
efficient for poverty alleviation (Audet, Boccanfuso & Makdissi 2007). Whereas subsidies for 
ghee, pasta, broad beans and lentils were eliminated, a subsidy for an additional portion of sugar 
was introduced in 2006 (Trego 2011: 671-673). 
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appointment of Ahmed Nazif to Prime Minister in 2004 was a signal for the rationalisation of the 
social welfare system. The new prime minister embarked on further economic liberalisation, 
including the privatisation of public enterprises, tariff reduction and tax reform. Subsidy reform 
was also part of his economic reform plan. He planned to replace the existing food subsidy 
programme with an alternative poverty alleviation programme – a conditional cash-transfer 
programme in December 2007. However, a global rise in food prices (the second crisis) led to 
popular discontent towards the government, which forced President Mubarak to postpone the 
implementation of the new subsidy reform plan (Trego 2011: 671-673). 
The Second Crisis in 2007: This crisis was caused by a rise in global food prices in 2007. The 
global price rise directly affected the costs of food imports. The annual amount of imported wheat 
in 2007 was similar to that in the previous year, but the costs drastically increased from US$1.5 
billion to US$2.5 billion (Trego 2011: 670-671). Domestic food prices increase by 35.5% in August 
2008. Prices of foodstuffs, such as edible oil, cereals (i.e., wheat and rice), and lentils and milk, 
increased between 2006 and 2008, by 50%, 139% and 400% respectively (WFP 2008: 15). As food 
prices rose, the costs of the food subsidy programme automatically increased. Although those in 
middle-income groups had not purchased subsidised bread before the crisis, they began to buy 
cheap, subsidised bread (England 2007: 41). This increased the demand for subsidised bread and 
forced the population to queue for subsidised bread in shops. Around 78% of the consumers had to 
queue for bread over 30 minutes and 23% of them were forced to queue for over two hours (Trego 
2011: 671-673). The Financial Times reports that, in response to the price hike, not only workers 
and civil servants but those who were considered privileged (such as university scholars and 
doctors) participated in demonstrations to demand higher wages to meet the price hike (Saleh 
2008b: 11). 
The government’s fear that price hikes would trigger social unrest is pointed out in several 
newspapers. An analysis in The Economist suggests that, although emergency laws banned 
demonstrations that would threaten the social order, the price hike fuelled popular discontent and 
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encouraged Egyptians to participate in these demonstrations. In the summer of 2007, when the 
country experienced a dire shortage of drinking water, some people blocked roads and made a 
protest about the water shortage (a ‘revolution of the thirsty’). The price hike since 2007 worsened 
the situation and led to bloody clashes. The analysis concludes that this combination of reasons for 
popular discontent could seriously threaten the government (Anon. 2007: 45). Indeed, an analytical 
article in the Financial Times also pointed out that the price hike might destabilise society: 
Although most Egyptians are too young to remember the bread riots of 1977, since 
then successive governments have made it a priority to support the prices of some 
foods to pre-empt any boiling over of popular anger. 
“Of course officials are worried [about social unrest],” said Samir Radwan, an 
economist commissioned by the government to look into raising the minimum salary. 
“You can judge by the number of cabinet meetings they have been holding to deal with 
the price rises” (Saleh 2008b: 11). 
The government’s fear led to further expansion of the food subsidy programme. 
In the summer of 2008 the government dealt with the food-price crisis by enlarging the 
programme’s coverage. For instance, the government decided to issue green ration cards to those 
who had been red cardholders (middle- or high-income people). Next, the government resumed the 
registration for a rationing system, which had been suspended in 1989. The Ministry of Social 
Solidarity announced that the government was going to issue ration cards to young people who had 
been born during the period 1988-2005. This decision increased the number of ration cardholders 
by more than twenty million and made the food subsidy programme even more inefficient as a 
poverty alleviation programme (Trego 2011: 674). These measures meant that the government had 
strengthened the universalist character of the programme to avoid social unrest. Moreover, the 
government introduced several measures to ensure sufficient food supply. First, it demanded that 
bakeries owned by the military should produce subsidised bread for the population. Second, it 
began to use kiosks as new distribution points. This measure enabled the population to access 
subsidised bread more easily. A new delivery service of subsidised bread was introduced so that 
people did not have to wait for the bread in long queues. This delivery service reduced the number 
of bloody, violent clashes between consumers (Arishie 2008). Third, the government reduced tariffs 
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on imported foodstuffs and temporary suspended rice exports (Aboulenein et al. 2010: 13-17; 
Trego 2011: 672).14 These measures led to a steep increase in expenditure on the food subsidy 
programme (Figure 4.6). Expenditure on food subsidies reached £E 16.4 billion in 2007/08 and 
doubled in 2010/1011. At the same time, expenditure on subsidies for other foodstuffs also 
increased in 2010/11, accounting for more than 50% in the total expenditure on the food subsidy 
programme (CAPMAS 2014: 19). 
 
Figure 4.6: Expenditure on Food Subsidies (2003/04-2011/12) 
 
Source: CAPMAS (2014: 19), Figure 6. 
 
Along with the government expansionary measures, citizens were now more dependent on the 
food subsidy programme. Figure 4.7 indicates that the amount of annual consumption of 
subsidised baladi bread per capita gradually increased, from 774 loaves per person in 2003 to 1031 
loaves per person in 2011 (CAPMAS 2014: 41). This data shows that the food price crises 
                                                     
14  In addition to these measures, the government adopted a strategy to increase domestic 
agricultural products by providing subsidies to farmers in country side. 
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encouraged even those who had not purchased subsidised baladi bread to buy subsidised bread. It 
could be argued that this increase was caused by the universalist feature of the programme. 
Moreover, most Egyptians were economically vulnerable to external shocks (such as sudden price 
hikes) and immediately became programme beneficiaries when faced with external shocks. 
According to Africa Development Bank research, most of the people in the middle class are 
categorised as the ‘floating class’, which is the lowest subcategory of the middle class defined as a 
group whose daily consumption per capita is between US$ 2 and US$ 4, in African countries 
(including Egypt). Their consumption level is only slightly above the second poverty line in 
developing countries – US$ 2 per person per day (Mubila & Ben Aissa 2011: 2). Their data 
indicates that people in the floating class accounted for 60% of the total middle-class population in 
Egypt (Mubila & Ben Aissa 2011: 18). Consequently, most Egyptians in the middle class purchased 
more baladi bread during the food crises. 
 
Figure 4.7: Total Consumption of Subsidised Baladi Bread 
 
Source: CAPMAS (2014: 41), Figure 14. 
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The expansion had a negative impact on the sustainability of the food subsidy programme in 
two areas. First, the government sacrificed various policies for the programme’s expansion in terms 
of resource distribution. Magda Kandil (2010: 7) estimates that a global price hike would increase 
expenditure on food subsidies to £E16.8 million in 2009/10 and raise the proportion of food 
subsidies to GDP, from 1.3% in 2006/07 to 2% in 2008/09. Consequently, this expansionary 
strategy offset efforts at food subsidy reform introduced in the 1980s and 1990s and forced the 
government to implement fiscal adjustment. In 2008, the government attempted fiscal adjustment 
through “reduction[s] in energy subsidies (£E 7.5 billion), [an] increase in sales tax[es] on 
cigarettes (£E 1.3 billion), increasing development fees on vehicle licensing (£E 1.1 billion), 
increasing fees for use of cement raw materials (£E 1 billion), and [the] elimination of [several] 
income tax exemptions (£E 3.5 billion)” (MoF 2008: 5). Second, the expansionary measures 
damaged the cost-efficiency of the programme by distributing a larger amount of resources to 
non-needy households. As indicated in Table 4.2 (A), the institutional expansion in the 2000s 
exacerbated the inefficiency of the food subsidy programme as a means of poverty alleviation. The 
delivery cost of ten-piastre bread, which had begun to be subsidised in 2003, was over US$46.42 to 
deliver $1.00 to the needy. Table 4.2 (B) shows how costly the Egyptian food subsidy programme 
was as a poverty alleviation programme, in comparison with the international counterparts. 
 
 
4-4.  The Food Subsidy Programme and Path Dependence 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, although Egypt experienced structural change in the political and 
economic systems that had sustained the populist social welfare system, the populist feature of the 
social welfare system did not change because of path dependence. This tendency could be found in 
the case of the food subsidy programme. The Mubarak government had difficulties in 
implementing drastic subsidy reform. Consequently, the quality of subsidy reform in the 1990s was 
restricted and did not resolve the programme’s shortcomings. The food subsidy programme 
remained inefficient as a poverty alleviation means. Although several reform plans were proposed 
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by the World Bank until the collapse of the Mubarak regime in 2011,15 the Mubarak government 
could not implement these reform plans and, more importantly, maintained the universalist feature 
of the bread subsidy, which meant that all citizen could access subsidised bread.16 Although the 
government spent a lot on the programme, Egyptians were not satisfied with its quality. 
[In Egypt,] everyone complains about the subsidies that exist on many goods and 
commodities, the government more than most. These subsidies have been called a 
scourge on the budget, an impediment to development, and a backdoor for corruption. 
But apparently no one dares to do anything about them, mostly because the public 
backlash would be so fiery that ministers fear that they would lose their jobs if they 
tackled the problem seriously (Yehia 2013). 
Despite the shortcomings, the Mubarak government ventured to expand the programme to lessen 
the possibility of social unrest. The programme’s expansion offset the outcomes of the subsidy 
reforms in the previous two decades. The government’s behaviour confirmed that the logic of the 
social contract was still alive as well as the need to maintain the populist food subsidy programme. 
However, it should be noted that the robustness of the social contract did not necessarily deny 
the two hypotheses discussed in Chapter 1. Hypothesis 1 assumes that economic liberalisation 
encouraged the government to reform the food subsidy programme and to rationalise it as a poverty 
alleviation programme. Indeed, the IMF and the World Bank exerted pressure on the Mubarak 
government to cut the fiscal deficit and reform the programme. The ERSAP effectively obliged the 
government to reduce expenditure on the programme. However, it could not encourage the 
government to embark on explicit subsidy reform (i.e., the rationalisation of the programme) 
because explicit subsidy reform would trigger social unrest and threaten the regime’s survival. 
Instead, the government took stealthy and gradual measures to reduce expenditure on the 
programme. Simultaneously, it successfully objected to the devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
proposed by the IMF. In the 2000s, Prime Minister Nazif embarked on subsidy reform, attempting 
                                                     
15  See the World Bank (2010), for example. 
16  It should be noted that the government recently began to reform this universalist feature. In 
some governorates (i.e., Ismailiya, Port Said and Suez), a smart-card system was introduced in 
2014. In this reform plan, the government distributes smart cards to the needy to record the 
amount of bread allocated to each person and to avoid the leakage of subsidised flour at bakeries. 
The new system is expected to save 25% of expenditure on bread subsidies (El-Fiqi 2014). 
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to replace food subsidies by direct cash transfer (as Hypothesis 1 suggests). However, his attempt 
was overthrown by President Mubarak because his plan had a negative impact on the population, 
especially the vulnerable, in the face of a global food price rise in 2007. This indicated that the 
logic of the social contract was prioritised over the necessity of neo-liberal economic reforms, 
which might promote export-led economic growth. 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the introduction of multiparty elections would be a driving force 
for the expansion of the programme. Multiparty elections were an important factor for institutional 
expansion in the short term, as revealed in Chapter 3. The evidence could be observed especially 
when food prices were high. In August 2010, for example, Gamal Mubarak (a son of President 
Mubarak) mentioned, in an interview on state television ahead of the 2011 presidential election, 
that food subsidies were an important social welfare programme which eased the burden of rising 
prices: 
He defended the government's record in shielding Egypt’s poor from volatile food 
prices and said the NDP would continue backing a system under which a large portion 
of the population receives subsidised consumer goods (Fayed 2010). 
In October 2010, the Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros-Ghali also remarked: “There is no 
intention to decrease the subsidy for basic provisions and petroleum products” (Blair 2010). Mona 
El-Ghobashy (2010) analyses that the food subsidy programme was expected to work “to manage 
the economic turbulence and pacify the domestic arena for the upcoming elections”. Their 
statements indicated that the food subsidy programme was exploited to win the presidential 
election. 
However, it should be noted that this hypothesis only focused on the short-term change in the 
food subsidy programme, omitting the long-term effects of political structural change and populist 
welfare provision, as discussed in Chapter 3. Multiparty elections were channels for connecting 
the regime with the rising business class, not a means for the population to feed their views into 
government policies. Furthermore, long-standing welfare provision deprived the food subsidy 
programme of its ability to expand because of fiscal restrictions. Although the government needed 
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to implement drastic reforms to re-direct resources to a specific social class – the vulnerable, it 
would not (or could not) implement them. Consequently, the government’s promises before 
elections were not necessarily substantial. According to an analysis in the Al-Ahram Weekly, most 
party members referred to the importance of social justice and food subsidies, ahead of the NDP’s 
annual conference in November 2008, when food prices soared: 
[NDP Secretary-General Safwat El-Sherif claimed that] the new food subsidy system 
– forged by both the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and senior NDP 
officials – had successfully contained bread shortages and brought the prices of basic 
foodstuffs under control. 
Mustafa El-Said, NDP MP and chairman of the People's Assembly Economic 
Committee, claims that the ration card system … has been instrumental in containing 
public anger over the price of food (Essam El-Din 2008). 
As the case study in this chapter demonstrates, the government could not achieve what it promised, 
contrary to their discourse. It only spent heavily on an inefficient programme. This restriction was 
caused by the logic of the social contract, which was reinforced during the Sadat era. 
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Chapter	5	
Case	Study	(2)	–	The	Public	Employment	Programme	
 
This chapter focuses on a second case study – the public employment programme – and 
analyses how it changed between the Nasser and Mubarak eras. To make the nature of the 
institutional change clear, first, this chapter defines the public sector and the public employment 
programme in Egypt by reviewing current academic literature. It addresses why the Mubarak 
government maintained such an inefficient programme both for the regime’s survival and for the 
population’s welfare. Although the government spent heavily on the public employment 
programme, it did not help improve welfare provision and government employees expressed their 
dissatisfaction through strikes and demonstrations against government policies. These protests 
showed that the public employment programme did not make the Mubarak regime popular. This 
chapter considers why the public employment programme was maintained despite its inefficiencies. 
Second, this chapter explains the historical background (institutional change during the Nasser 
and Sadat eras). The Nasser government established the public employment programme, 
connecting it with ISI strategies and higher education policies (the job guarantee scheme). In the 
Sadat era, the programme was expanded during the infitah even though the aim of the infitah was 
to rationalise the public sector. The job guarantee scheme automatically increased the number of 
employees in the public sector by giving university graduates their jobs in the public sector. 
Moreover, the government did not reform the programme, but instead expanded public 
employment to compensate for an increasing income gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ 
during the infitah. 
Third, this chapter analyses change and continuity in the programme in the Mubarak era. It 
demonstrates that the government had to maintain the inefficient public sector that was expanded in 
the Sadat era because it failed to create new jobs in the private sector. Although it had to privatise 
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public enterprises to reduce financial burdens on the exchequer, privatisation was faced with 
significant opposition – mainly from unionists in the ETUF before the 2000s and from individuals 
after the 2000s. The plan nevertheless made constant progress, leading to the declining size of 
public enterprises. The government therefore increased the number of employees in the government 
sector. This increase showed that the social contract between the government and the population 
was still valid. 
 
 
5-1.  Public Employment as a Social Welfare Programme 
 
To discuss the public employment programme, it is first necessary to identify the ‘public 
sector.’ In Egypt, the public sector consists of four categories: (1) central government, (2) local 
government, (3) public authorities and (4) public enterprises (Ahmed 1984: 2; Dessouki 1991: 
259-260). Central government includes the general administration and public institutes, which are 
not independent entities and are responsible for public services, such as agricultural research and 
planning, higher education, and public health (Ahmed 1984: 2). Although the local government 
consists of 26 governorates and is administratively separate, it has little financial autonomy from 
central government. Public authorities “include activities such as the petroleum corporation, 
railways, the Suez Canal, ports, electricity and water supply” (Ahmed 1984: 2). These three are 
generally categorised as the government sector in government documents and statistics. The last 
category is public enterprises, which are usually referred to as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
are responsible for a wide range of industrial, commercial and agricultural activities. The fourth 
category is called the public business sector in government documents and statistics (CAPMAS 
1986-2012). 
The public employment programme functions as part of the social welfare system, although 
the programme is not considered a social welfare programme according to conventional 
understanding. The government employs a large number of workers and provides them with several 
benefits which can be regarded as de facto social welfare provision. Whereas workers in the public 
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sector were generally protected by labour contracts, many workers in the private sector were 
employed without written contracts. Employers in the private sector tended to violate labour laws, 
“relating to insurance and dismissals, maintaining full-time permanent workers on temporary work 
contracts to avoid these obligations as well as to keep down their employment numbers” (Posusney 
1997: 176). Consequently, the public employment programme provided workers in the public 
sector with an advantage in that labour laws were obeyed in the public enterprises compared to 
private firms. In addition to job security, the government offered public sector workers social 
insurance and various benefits. For instance, as accommodation for workers was lacking in urban 
areas, workers in public enterprises recognised the importance of the company-owned housing 
which they were entitled to live in (Posusney 1997: 174-176). These benefits accompanying this 
programme were attractive to the workers. 
This programme however has several shortcomings as a social welfare programme. First, the 
programme is regarded as a causal factor underpinning the huge fiscal deficit (El-Wassal 2013). 
Second, the programme is considered to be inefficient and out-of-date by the World Bank and the 
IMF. These international financial institutions have criticised the programme for its inefficiency 
and have suggested that the Egyptian government should implement public sector reform, 
especially the privatisation of public enterprises (Harrigan & El-Said 2009a). 
Despite the shortcomings, expenditure on the programme has accounted for a large amount of 
the total government expenditure. The government spent £E171 billion (approximately 25% of the 
total expenditure) on public-sector workers’ wages in FY2013/14 (MoF 2014). The ratio is not high, 
in comparison to counterparts in the MENA region, such as Jordan (52.1%) and Morocco (40.3%), 
but it is still higher than in other countries outside the MENA region, shown in Figure 5.1. The 
public sector is still one of the most important sectors and has accounted for approximately 40% of 
the country’s workforce (El-Wassal 2013: 1-2). 
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Figure 5.1: Compensation of Public Employees as a Percentage of Government Expenditure 
in Egypt and Selected Countries (2010) 
 
Source: El-Wassal (2013: 8), Figure (4) 
 
When analysing the public employment programme, a puzzle emerges. Although the 
government has maintained the huge size of the programme, workers in the public sector are not 
satisfied with their current working conditions. Since the mid-2000s, the country has experienced a 
significant increase in the number of strikes and sit-ins. Public sector workers have also expressed 
their dissatisfaction at low levels of pay. Indeed, many workers in the public sector fell under the 
national poverty line (Abdelhamid & El Baradei 2009: 9). This puzzle leads to a question: why did 
the Mubarak government maintain such an inefficient institution? The Mubarak government spent 
heavily on the public employment programme, but did not achieve its goal of mobilising public 
sector workers in support of the authoritarian regime. Instead, their low wages decreased their 
purchasing power and some of them resorted to collective action such as demonstrations and 
strikes. 
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5-2.  Development of the Public Employment Programme: From Nasser to Sadat 
 
The programme was established under the Nasser presidency and categorised as an industrial 
programme in the social welfare system. Although this programme aimed to provide educated 
youth to the public sector during the Nasser era, it led to an overstaffed public sector. President 
Sadat’s infitah had a significant impact on the programme as well as the social welfare system as a 
whole. Although the Sadat government tried to rationalise the public sector through the infitah, the 
infitah had a positive feedback effect, leading to the expansion of the programme and an ongoing 
commitment to ‘socialist’ distributive justice. 
 
 
5-2-1.  The Institutional Establishment in the Nasser Era 
 
The public employment programme was gradually developed as one of the industrial 
programmes in the social welfare system after the 1952 Revolution (the permissive condition for 
the development of the social welfare system). However, it was not expanded until the Suez crisis 
in 1956 (the first productive condition for the development of the social welfare system). Before 
the Suez crisis, the Nasser government expected the private sector to play a pivotal role in the 
country’s industrialisation, as explained in Chapter 2. The public sector at that time was therefore 
smaller than that in the 1960s. The conflict with Britain and France encouraged the Nasser 
government to nationalise British and French companies. This led to the first expansion of the 
public sector. After this initial expansion the Nasser government nationalised other private 
companies around the country and dramatically expanded the public sector. At the same time, 
etatist industrialisation increased the number of employees in the government sector as well as the 
public sector as a whole, as indicated in Table 5.1. Between 1962 and 1972, the annual growth rate 
was 7.5% and exceeded the annual growth rate of the national work force (2.2%) during the same 
period. As the number of employees in the government sector increased, the government increased 
the number of agencies and ministries. For example, ministries doubled from 15 to 30 between 
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1952 and 1970 (Waterbury 1983: 242-243). 
Civil service wages … grew at a rate well in excess of the national wage bill: for the 
period 1962 to 1971, the rate was 13.6 percent per annum in the civil service as 
opposed 8 percent per annum nationally. The civil service share in total wages rose 
from 28 percent to 38 percent over the same period (Waterbury 1983: 244). 
 
 
Table 5.1: The Number of Employees in the Government Sector, 1951/52-1969/70 (thousands) 
Year 1951/52 1956/57 1962/63 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1969/70 
Number 350 454 770 891 1,035 1,036 1,200 
Sources: Calculated by Author, based on Ayubi (1982: 287), Table 1 and Waterbury (1983: 242), 
Table 11.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Wages and Salaries in the Government Sector, 1951/92-1969/70 (£E thousands) 
 1951/52 1956/57 1962/63 1965/66 1969/70 
(A) Expenditure on Wages 96,159 127,434 199,564 311,406 404,235 
(B) Total Current Expenditure 149,422 238,029 516,857 524,197 1,658,378 
(C) Percentage (A/B) 64.4% 53.5% 38.6% 59.4% 24.4% 
Sources: Ayubi (1980: 250-251), Table 7 and Table 8. 
 
Arab socialism ideologically supported the expansion, as discussed in Chapter 2. Although 
Arab socialism did not give organised labour substantial political power, it addressed the need for 
government partnership with organised labour and endowed it with several economic privileges 
related to the public employment programme. First, wages and salaries in the government sector 
steadily increased following the Suez Crisis and the introduction of ‘socialist measures’. Table 5.2 
indicated that expenditure on wages in the government sector drastically increased, from £E 96 
million in 1951/52 to £E404 million in 1969/70, although total government expenditure also 
expanded at the same time. This wage increase was disproportionate to the general increase in 
wages. Whereas the general wages increased by approximately 67% from 1962/63 to 1969/70, 
wage increases in the government sector were 102% (Ayubi 1980: 250). Second, Arab socialist 
policies had a positive impact on labour conditions in public enterprises as well as the government 
sector. In 1959 the government introduced a new wage regulation scheme and created consultative 
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councils. The councils were expected to resolve disputes on wages between employers (public 
enterprises in particular) and trade unions through mediation, conciliation or compulsory arbitration. 
Consequently, workers’ wage levels were improved because trade unions became more powerful. 
In 1963 the government established a unified job evaluation scheme to determine the wage levels 
of each employee in public enterprises, many of which were newly nationalised at the beginning of 
the 1960s. Under the unified job evaluation scheme, a ‘cost-of-living allowance’ was integrated 
into basic pay, which meant that workers’ wages were protected (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 29-30). 
Moreover, the introduction of Arab socialist policies encouraged the government to create a 
mechanism for distributing profits in public enterprises to their employees (the profit-sharing 
scheme). Whereas approximately 40% of net profits were transferred to the treasury, some of which 
were used for collective welfare services provided by the state, 8% of the net profits were kept for 
employees. In this scheme, public enterprises paid less than £E 50 to an employee and 20% of this 
amount – £E 20 – was paid in cash. The workers’ share amounted to £E 10.1 million in 1962/63 
and was estimated to exceed £E 16 million in 1964/65 (Lotz 1966: 140-143). 
The public employment programme in Egypt could be characterised by an institutional 
connection with the higher education system (the job guarantee scheme). This scheme began to 
guarantee public sector jobs to university graduates after the extensive nationalisation programmes 
in 1961-62 and was formalised by Law 14/1963. In 1964, furthermore, this scheme was extended to 
those who graduated from vocational secondary schools and technical institutes (Assaad 1997: 
86-87). The institutional connection was part of the government strategy of organisational 
proliferation. According to Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Emma Murphy (1996), in less developed 
countries such as MENA countries, where the bourgeoisie was weak, the state’s co-option of 
working classes and new middle classes was important for two reasons. It enabled the state to 
utilise their human resources for economic independence through industrialisation. At the same 
time, the state obtained their political support by distributing resources to them. The institutional 
linkage strengthened the logic of industrialisation by the state. The job guarantee scheme constantly 
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absorbed the youth into the state, which established new middle classes and converted them into 
Nasser’s powerful supporters. 
The programme was faced with its first crisis in the second half of the 1960s, when Egypt 
experienced a budget crisis because of military expenditure. Furthermore, the capacity of the public 
employment programme gradually reached its limit because of budgetary constraints and 
overstaffing. In a May-day speech in 1965, Nasser stated that the public sector was faced with 
difficulties and needed reform and that industrial production needed to be boosted (Anon. 1965). 
Nevertheless, the public employment programme continued to absorb more and more young 
workers into the public sector. 
 
 
5-2-2.  The Further Institutional Expansion in the Sadat Era: the Infitah and the 
Positive Feedback Effect 
 
The aim of the infitah was to maximise profits of the state by rationalising and privatising 
public enterprises. However, the privatisation of public enterprises was not acceptable to union 
activists and triggered a conflict with them in 1974. When a public-owned company, the United 
Wholesale Textile Trading Company (UWTTC), decided to sell two factories to a private 
co-operative, workers in the company refused to work for their new owner. During this conflict, 
lawyers hired by the Commerce Workers Federation (CWF) claimed that “the transfer would 
deprive them of numerous benefits associated with public sector employment, in particular periodic 
raises and promotions, annual vacations, and sick leave” (Posusney 1997: 178). Although the 
government passed Law 111/1975 the following year, labour unionists successfully defended their 
interests. 
During the parliamentary debate, defenders of the public sector succeeded in adding 
an article (No. 10) limiting share sales to those public sector firms which already had 
some private participation, known as ‘joint companies’ (sharikat mushtarikah), except 
in the case of firms incurring losses which had been scheduled for elimination. … 
Moreover, Article 10 specified that the state’s overall share in such firms could not be 
reduced through the subscriptions, although the role of private shareholders in their 
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management could be expanded (Posusney 1997: 179). 
Thus, union activists successfully prevented the Sadat government from privatising public 
enterprises and maintained the public employment programme. 
The infitah superficially succeeded in the rationalisation of public enterprises. Handoussa, 
Nishimizu & Page (1986) argue that the productivity in some public sector industries was enhanced 
during the infitah, during which the import substitution sector experienced high productivity 
growth. Their research however pointed out that this sector did not experience investment in new 
factories and firms during the infitah and that its industrial capacity was established before the 
infitah. The import substitution sector experienced a low rate of capacity utilisation because of a 
shortage of imports before the infitah, but the infitah eased state controls and liberalised trade and 
foreign exchange controls. Furthermore, the infitah led to increased demand for import substitution 
sector products. Their research suggests that the productivity growth during the infitah was 
unsustainable because the improvement in productivity did not accompany the innovation of 
technology in public enterprises. 
Two causal factors created a positive feedback mechanism, preventing the rationalisation of 
the public sector and excessively expanding public employment: (1) the job guarantee scheme and 
(2) an increase in external resources. The first factor – the job guarantee scheme encouraged 
Egyptians, those in the new middle class in particular, to invest in education. In the Nasser era, the 
government reformed the education system, giving the population more opportunities to gain an 
education. Consequently, more children enrolled in elementary schools after the 1952 Revolution. 
The first group that benefitted from Nasser’s education reform was referred to as the ‘Nasser years 
cohort’. In the late 1960s and 1970s, those in this group entered universities and became eligible 
for the job guarantee scheme. The fact that university tuition fees were abolished in 1963 made it 
more rational for Egyptians to invest for their children in higher education. They encouraged their 
children to enter universities and obtain their jobs in the public sector. (Richards 1992: 8). Indeed, 
university enrolments increased approximately 3.5 times in 1971-1984 (Richards 1992: ii). 
Moreover, a wage gap between the public and private sectors attracted university graduates to the 
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public sector. According to Posusney (1997: 175), “Workers in the public sector [public enterprises] 
earned about 1.5 times the wages of those in the private sector, with the difference being more 
pronounced when only manufacturing workers are considered”. Although Law 24/1972 stipulated 
that large firms in the private sector should offer the same minimum wages as those in the public 
sector, the wage gaps between the public and private sectors became wider (Posusney 1997: 176). 
 
Table 5.3:  Applicants for Employment in the Public Sector, Compared with Requested 
Appointments and Graduates by Level of Education 
Graduation 
Year 
Graduates 
(A) 
Requested 
(B) 
Appointments 
(C) 
(B)/(A) 
(%) 
(C)/(B) 
(%) 
(A)/(C) 
(%) 
(thousands) 
Higher Education 
1976 38.2 29.8 19.0 78.0% 63.8% 49.7% 
1977 43.6 39.5 20.8 90.6% 52.7% 47.7% 
1978 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1979 56.5 43.8 25.1 77.5% 57.3% 44.4% 
1980 56.5 63.2 28.9 111.9% 45.7% 51.2% 
1981 60.2 55.0 25.5 91.4% 46.4% 42.4% 
1982 64.1 43.4 30.2 67.7% 69.6% 47.1% 
1983 N/A 45.8 25.3 N/A 55.2% N/A 
Intermediate Education 
1976 102.0 52.6 68.9 51.6% 131.0% 67.5% 
1977 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1978 127.2 68.2 81.7 53.6% 119.8% 64.2% 
1979 128.8 82.1 85.1 63.7% 103.7% 66.1% 
1980 143.9 75.9 82.0 52.7% 108.0% 57.0% 
1981 154.6 75.0 93.9 48.5% 125.2% 60.7% 
1982 N/A 44.4 114.0 N/A 256.8% N/A 
Source: Fergany (1991: 39), Table 3 
 
The second factor was an increase in external resources (see also Chapter 2), which enabled 
the government to fund this programme. According to Fergany (1991: 36-40), more than 60% of 
graduates sought jobs in the public sector in the second half of the 1970s. Although the programme 
seemed less attractive for graduates of intermediate schools than for university graduates, 
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approximately half of graduates of intermediate schools also applied for the programme during the 
same period (see Table 5.3). At the same time, this data shows that the government failed to create 
alternative job opportunities for the youth other than public employment. Furthermore, an increase 
in external resources enabled the government to meet the increasing demand for higher education 
by constructing new universities, such as Tanta University (in 1972), Mansoura University (in 
1972), Zagazig University (in 1974), Helwan University (in 1975), El-Minya University (in 1976), 
Minufiyya University (in 1976) and Suez Canal University (in 1976). The construction of these 
new universities created a spiral of expanding public employment by increasing the supply of 
labour keen to enter the public sector (Richards 1992: 9). 
However, the institutional linkage between public employment and higher education reached a 
stalemate. First, the institutional linkage led to a sharp increase in demand for education and low 
quality of elementary education. Although the government was able to meet the demand by 
increasing the number of educational institutes, the increase was not matched by an improvement 
in quality. The Egyptian education system had several shortcomings, such as overcrowding, poor 
facilities and poorly trained teachers. These shortcomings resulted in poor quality graduates who 
gain high marks in rote-memorised examinations (Richards 1992: 15). The institutional distortion 
was exacerbated by the government strategy of mobilising the new educated middle class through 
providing them with public sector job opportunities. The distortion has had a significant impact on 
the imbalance of spending on schools and higher education. Despite the fact that only 6% of 
students at all levels enrolled in higher education, universities received approximately one-third of 
total education spending in 1999. This made a marked contrast with East Asian countries, where 
only 15% of education spending was distributed to universities (Richards & Waterbury 2008: 
120-121). Consequently, the public education system in Egypt became less beneficial to people on 
low incomes. While wealthier parents tended to enrol their children in high-quality private schools, 
low income parents were forced to enrol their children in low-quality public schools. Many parents 
hired private tutors to compensate for the poor public education system and to enhance the chances 
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of students gaining places of universities, especially in prestigious faculties such as medicine. Low 
income parents, however, could not afford to hire tutors. Thus, the public education system tended 
to reproduce the class structure (Richards 1992: 20). 
This problem was particularly serious in universities. Although the government increased the 
number of university students, it did not improve university facilities and staff working conditions. 
Teaching staff often needed to commute from Cairo or Alexandria to regional campuses. 
Nonetheless, their wages remained low compared to their work. Generally speaking, a full 
professor earned only £E 120 per month and had to supplement his/her income by selling lecture 
notes and books to his/her students (Waterbury 1983: 240). University facilities also remained poor, 
as the government did not invest in new facilities or refurbish existing classrooms: 
Cairo University, which was designed for 35,000 students, now handles about 90,000. 
Its engineering faculty was designed for 700 students but in 1977 had 9,000; its 
medical faculty should accommodate 300 but deals with 1,700. It is possible for an 
Egyptian medical student to complete his medical studies without ever having seen a 
cadaver. Again at Cairo University teacher-student ratios range between 1/70 and 
1/666 (Waterbury 1983: 238-239). 
The low quality of university education directly influenced the quality of the work carried out in 
the public sector. 
Second, the institutional linkage led to a waste of human resources and increasing 
unemployment. Although, in practice, the government suspended the job guarantee scheme in the 
1970s, it did not mean that the scheme was abolished. The Ministry of Manpower and Vocational 
Training asked public sector institutions to hire graduates, but the requests from the institutions did 
not match the number of applicants. The ratio reached 5:1 by 1981 (Handoussa & El-Oraby 2004: 
4). Consequently, the waiting time increased from 10 months to more than seven years in 1992. To 
obtain a qualification for the job guarantee, graduates must register as unemployed at the Ministry 
of Labour and declare that they are unemployed every twelve months. As Egypt did not have a 
comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme, only young people who obtained their families’ 
support could remain unemployed. The number of unemployed university graduates drastically 
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increased, from less than 5,500 in 1960 to around 57,000 in 1976 and approximately 236,000 in 
1986 (Richards 1992: 16-17). As pointed out by Alan Richards (1992: 17), “Gunnar Myrdal’s 
telling remark, ‘Unemployment is a bourgeois luxury’ certainly applies to Egypt”. 
Third, the institutional linkage led to the hypertrophy of the unproductive public sector.1 
Although the government exempted public enterprises from the job guarantee scheme in 1978, they 
were still inefficient. In the 1978 reform, Law 48/1978 gave managers more flexibility over 
recruitment and employment. Public enterprises, however, were reluctant to dismiss excessive 
‘unproductive employees’, such as administrative staff, because such dismissal might lead to 
strikes and demonstrations. Whereas skilled workers accounted for approximately 80% of the total 
employees in the private sector, almost half of the employees in the public sector worked in 
unproductive sectors such as administration offices in 1978. 
To take a particular example, in textiles, clothing and leather, skilled workers 
accounted for 93 per cent of employment in the private sector, whereas the percentage 
was only 64 per cent in the public sector. Skilled workers totalled only 43 per cent of 
employment in the paper industry in the public sector (private sector 78 per cent), 40 
per cent in the food sector and 31 per cent in chemicals (Handoussa 1983: 9). 
This was partly because increasing demand for higher education was mainly covered by an increase 
in supply in non-vocational fields, especially law and commerce, as indicated Table 5.4. These 
fields were “the receptacles for those whose scores precluded entry to more prestigious faculties” 
(Waterbury 1983: 237). Students in these fields tended to flood into unproductive public sector jobs, 
which created unproductive jobs. What made it worse was that wages in the public sector increased 
regardless of performance. For instance, wages rose by 20% in 1979 alone. Average earnings in the 
public sector in 1984/85 became 3.6 times higher than those of 1977 (Zaytoun 1991: 225). 
Consequently, the public sector (including government bureaucracies and public enterprises) 
                                                     
1  It should be noted that the job guarantee scheme could only partly explain the hypertrophy of 
the unproductive public sector. The government has employed a number of people with low 
literacy skills from elementary schools. “In the category ‘other clerical staff’, 23 per cent have 
only primary schooling, 16 per cent less than an intermediate degree, 3.5 per cent have a higher 
education that is below university level (diploma) and only 1.3 per cent a university degree or 
its equivalent. In the category ‘government executive’, 23 per cent have primary schooling, 16 
per cent less than an intermediate education, 38 per cent have a diploma and only 19 per cent a 
university degree or its equivalent” (Handoussa 1983: 8). 
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continued to hire unproductive but costly workers. 
 
Table 5.4:  Distribution of Students in Institutes of Higher Education by Specialisation, 
1968/69 to 1976/77 
Specialisation 
1968/69 1976/77 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Science 67,359 38.6% 148,695 32.8% 
Arts 55,705 31.9% 270,441 59.6% 
Others 51,349 29.4% 34,500 7.6% 
Total 174,413 100.0% 453,636 100.0% 
Source: Waterbury (1983: 238), Table 11.1. 
 
Increasing labour costs were compensated for by two measures. The first measure was an 
increase in the number of temporary-contract workers. According to Mohaya Zaytoun (1991: 
229-230), not only public enterprises but government bureaucracies hire workers on temporary 
labour contracts, who are less costly than permanent workers. Table 5.5 indicates that temporary 
workers became important section of the workforce in many public enterprises, accounting for 
approximately 20% of the total workforce. The construction sector was particularly dependent on 
temporary workers (8.68% of the total workforces). As shown in the table, the average earnings of 
temporary workers were much lower than those of permanent workers (except within the land 
reclamation sector). It should be noted than the category of ‘temporary workers’ includes various 
types of work, from foreign experts with high salaries to occasional workers with considerably 
lower wages. A significant income gap between permanent and temporary workers could be found 
in the cotton sector, in which many agricultural workers were employed as temporary workers for 
short periods. The same tendency could be observed in employment in the government sector. As 
the government sector did not opt out from the job guarantee scheme at that time, in order to cut 
labour costs, it needed more non-permanent workers than public enterprises. 
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Table 5.5:  Average Earnings and Number of Workers in Some Public Enterprises 
 A B C D E F 
Temporary 
Workers 
Total 
Workers 
Temporary 
Workers 
(%) 
Temporary 
Average 
Earnings 
Permanent 
Average 
Earnings 
D/E 
Percentage 
Cotton 
(1985/86) 
4,225 19,125 22.1% £315 £3,064 10.3% 
Construction 
(1982/83) 
68,241 77,037 88.6% £1,647 £2,857 57.6% 
Land 
Reclamation 
(1985/86) 
2,334 11,737 19.9% £2,200 £2,158 101.9% 
Electricity 
(1984/85) 
2,323 7,503 31.0% £1,306 £2,125 61.5% 
Irrigation 
(1985/86) 
2,449 11,691 20.9% £1,617 £2,852 56.7% 
Food 
Industry 
(1980-81) 
15,469 92,646 16.7% £394 £847 46.5% 
Source: Zaytoun (1991: 230), Table 73. 
 
The second measure was controlling wage increases. As the government sector was under 
more pressure to hire graduates after 1978, it needed to control workers’ wages at the same time. 
Gerald Starr (1983) reveals a trend of annual wages for government employees in the 1970s by 
using “the index calculated from the annual budgets and the one calculated from the Ministry of 
Planning estimates of average annual wages for ‘social services’” (Starr 1983: 8). According to his 
calculations, government wage policies favoured the workers with lower educational qualifications. 
Figure 5.2 shows monthly wages for government employees beginning work in 1970. By 1980 
single workers with university degrees had seen their wages drop to 96% of those in 1970 in spite 
of their promotions, while workers without qualifications received 1.5 times more wages as a result 
of their promotions in the 1970s (Starr 1983: 6-10). 
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Figure 5.2:  Calculated Monthly Wages (including cost-of-living allowances) for Government 
Employees Entering Employment in 1970 
 
Source: Starr (1983: 9), Table 5. 
 
The Sadat government did not rise to the challenge of tackling the problems. Instead, it 
perpetrated rather than reformed the public employment programme, especially after the food riots 
in 1977 (discussed in Chapter 4). For example, President Sadat remarked that the government 
promised an increase in public sector wages at the May-Day rally in 1981 (Anon. 1981b). The only 
way of increasing employment was to export workers to other Arab countries, particularly the 
Persian Gulf countries, Iraq and Libya. Egyptian migration to other Arab countries was 
characterised by a high ratio of professional occupations (such as engineers, teachers and 
pharmacists), “constituting 28.8% of 1968 and 36.6% of 1973, as compared to production workers 
(mainly construction workers) who constituted 20.8% and 24.4% respectively and agricultural 
workers constituting no more than 0.9% of the total flow in 1968 and 3.4% in 1973” (Amin & 
Awny 1985: 99). This data shows that many workers with university degrees left the country to find 
work and sent back remittances. Migration eased the pressure on the government to reform the 
labour market. However, this dependency on migration proved unsustainable by the end of the 
1980s. A sharp decline in oil prices reduced employment opportunities in Gulf countries. Also, the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war encouraged Iraqi workers to return to the labour market in Gulf countries 
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and decreased demand for Egyptian workers. Accordingly, the unemployment rate increased in 
Egypt (El-Naggar 2009: 41-42). 
 
 
5-3.  Economic Liberalisation and the Institutional Robustness in the Mubarak 
Era 
 
The Gulf War was a turning point for the public employment programme as well as the social 
welfare system as a whole. The war revealed that the existing labour market structure was not 
sustainable any longer for two reasons. First, the war destroyed opportunities to export human 
resources to Arab countries, reducing the demand for Egyptian migrants in Iraq and Kuwait. 
Consequently, many Egyptian migrant workers had to return to the country and were unemployed 
(El-Naggar 2009: 42). Second, the government could not continue absorbing young workers 
through public employment because this programme was regarded as an inefficient programme that 
would impose a heavy burden on the exchequer by the IMF. The IMF suggested that the 
government should implement public sector reform, especially privatisation of public enterprises 
(Momani 2005: 45). 
At the same time, the war provided the country with an opportunity to accept a structural 
adjustment reform package and financial aid (not only from the United States but Paris Club 
members and the IMF), as mentioned in Chapter 3. Such financial aid enabled the Mubarak 
government to implement economic reform whilst minimising social instability through social 
safety nets. Finally, the Egyptian government accepted the implementation of a structural 
adjustment programme, known as the ERSAP. The public employment programme was a typical 
example of wasted and inefficient social expenditure. Although public enterprises suffered from 
deficits, which were covered by the state, they employed a number of redundant workers. Also, as 
explained above, the government sector also absorbed a great number of university graduates 
despite the fact that financial austerity was supposed to curb employment in the government sector. 
In order to deal with the fiscal deficits, the government needed to reform the huge public sector 
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(not only public enterprises but government bureaucracies). 
Nevertheless, the public employment programme survived the Mubarak era, although it shrank 
in size. To explain this path-dependent change, first, this chapter explains that the Mubarak 
government did not succeed in creating new jobs in the private sector. Consequently, the public 
employment programme became the ‘last resort’ for absorbing the workforce even during 
economic liberalisation. Second, it analyses employment in public enterprises. Although the 
government attempted to privatise public enterprises, this was hindered by organised labour. In the 
2000s, the power of organised labour declined. However, the government was faced with collective 
action that was not controlled by official trade unions. Although the government successfully 
privatised several public enterprises up until the 2000s, it could not sell all public enterprises. Third, 
it focuses on employment in the government sector. As the number of employees in public 
enterprises declined, the government increased employees in the government sector. This indicated 
that the government maintained the programme to avoid political instability. However, their wage 
levels were unsatisfactory because of inflation. This caused the political instability that the 
government was trying to minimise. 
 
 
5-3-1.  The Egyptian Labour Market in the Era of Economic Liberalisation 
 
Youth exclusion from the labour market was remarkable. First, the informal sector became 
more important. As the ratio of informal jobs to new jobs in the labour market has increased, new 
participants in the labour market have unwillingly given up trying for jobs in the formal sector. The 
Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) in 2006 data indicates that the youth found it more 
difficult to get a permanent job than before. As indicated in Figure 5.3, more than 80% of new 
participants in the labour market gained a permanent job in 1970s. The ratio has declined since then. 
In 2006, 41% of new participants worked in non-permanent roles, which included temporary work 
in the formal sector, or seasonal or casual work (irregular labour) (ERF & CAPMAS 2007). As 
they could not afford to stay unemployed, they were forced into insecurity. The Egypt Human 
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Development Report 2010 analyses that unemployment rates significantly declined between 2006 
and 2009, not because there was increasing number of jobs in the labour market, but because the 
deterioration of working conditions discouraged people to seek jobs in the labour market (UNDP & 
INP 2010: 149). 
 
Figure 5.3:  A Ratio of Young Workers Who Started Their Jobs in the Formal Sector 
(1970-2005) 
 
Source: ERF & CAPMAS (2007) 
 
Second, the percentage of young unemployed people also increased. According to the Egypt 
Human Development Report 2010, unemployment rates were high especially for secondary and 
university graduates. More than 25% of university graduates were unemployed in 2008/09. 
“Unemployment was more pronounced among the poor, where 29% of poor educated persons of 
age 18-29 were unemployed and one out of four educated non poor was unemployed” (UNDP & 
INP 2010: 82). The report indicates that more than 80% of the unemployed were under the age of 
29 and 82% of them had no previous work experience. 
The unemployment rate for youth [aged] 15-24 in Egypt in 2007 was 24.5%. This 
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compares to world average of 11.9% in 2007 and an average of 23.8% for North 
Africa, the region with the highest unemployment rates in the world (UNDP & INP 
2010: 148). 
 
Although the Mubarak government promoted economic liberalisation to further economic 
growth, it failed to utilise human resources in the country for two main reasons. The first reason 
was a problem on the supply side. The government could not create adequate systems for 
vocational training. Although there were vocational training centres for youth in Egypt, the centres 
were disaggregated among several ministries, such as the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Social 
Solidarity, Housing, Manpower and Emigration, Agriculture, Health, and Culture. At the same time, 
the Ministry of Education provided basic technical and vocational education to youth 
(approximately 1,500 technical and vocational schools) and the Ministry of Higher Education was 
responsible for 47 Middle Technical Institutes and Technical Colleges. Furthermore, training 
courses offered by these ministries were out-of-date and not well-organised. Their programmes 
lacked clear standards in the curriculums and did not catch up with ongoing technological 
development. The trainers lacked adequate vocational training skills (UNDP & INP 2010: 166). 
These shortcomings were highlighted in the Egypt Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP & 
INP 2005: 103). 
The second reason was a problem on the demand side. The government failed to create enough 
private sector jobs enough to absorb young newcomers to the labour market. The government did 
implement several active labour market programmes. The example was small and middle enterprise 
(SME) development programmes. SME development is important for further economic growth in 
Egypt because SMEs create more than 70% of new jobs in the country. The Small Enterprise 
Development Organisation (SEDO), for example, was founded under the SFD to provide credit and 
business support services to SMEs. The SEDO provided £E 1.4 billion for SMEs, assisted over 
70,000 enterprises and created estimated 210,000 permanent and 70,000 temporary jobs. However, 
the programmes were not successful in active labour market policies because the failure rate of 
these enterprises was high (approximately 80%). Moreover, these programmes are not sustainable 
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because they are dependent on external funding (De Gobbi & Nesporova 2005: 33-44). 
Another example of an active labour market programme was the Public Works Programme, 
which is implemented by the SFD. This programme aimed to construct or improve infrastructure 
(such as roads, sewage and water supply) in rural areas and in deprived urban areas. 
Simultaneously, this programme aimed to absorb unemployed workers. The programme 
successfully created more than 6,000 permanent jobs and more than 10,000 temporary jobs 
between 1994 and 2000. The Shorouk Programme, which was directly launched by the government, 
also created approximately 59,000 permanent and 123,000 temporary jobs during the same period 
(El-Megharbel 2008: 189-190). Most of the jobs, however, were temporary. It could be asserted 
that the programmes did not contribute to an increase in permanent jobs. 
These government policy failures created the ‘waithood’ phenomenon, which can be defined 
as “a period during which they simply wait for their lives to begin, most notably by queuing for 
long periods of unemployment during which they live with parents and are financially unable to 
pursue marriage or home ownership” (UNDP & INP 2010: 3). To ease popular discontent, the 
government maintained the huge size of the public sector through the public employment 
programme. 
It might be true that the ruling elite also recognised the importance of public sector reform, as 
addressed in the Egypt Human Development Report 2005, which was published by the INP, a 
government research institute, and the UNPD: 
There is a consensus that civil service reform, a reassessment of the number of 
employees in government and their reallocation from administrative to productive jobs 
in the delivery of services are urgently needed. Furthermore, redundant labor has led 
to low marginal productivity and overlapping job responsibilities, which raises the cost 
of conducting business to producers and investors, a situation that is aggravated by 
civil servants’ low real wages which in turn encourages corruption. In addition, the 
current incentive and promotion structures do not effectively motivate workers, based 
as they are on seniority and personal connections rather than merit, performance, and 
productivity (UNDP & INP 2005: 103). 
Nonetheless, the government had no choice but to maintain the public employment programme 
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because it failed to create jobs in the private sector. 
The number of beneficiaries of the public employment programme in the 1990s and 2000s 
rose despite the needs to downsize the public sector. Figure 5.4 indicates that the number of 
workers in the public sector (i.e., the government sector and public enterprises) doubled, from 
approximately 3.1 million in 1983 to 6.3 million in 2011. The number of workers in public 
enterprises declined because of privatisation. Public enterprises downsized, decreasing their 
employees by approximately 200,000. In contrast, the number of workers in the government sector 
in 2011 was 2.5 times as large as that in 1983. The government attempted to absorb new 
participants in the labour market by expanding the government sector (CAPMAS 1986-2012). 
 
 
Figure 5.4:  The Number of Employees in the Public Sector (1983-2011) 
 
Source: CAPMAS (1986-2012) 
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5-3-2.  Employment in Public Enterprises 
 
Public sector reform, especially the privatisation of public enterprises, became part of the 
ERSAP. Overstaffed public enterprises were obstacles to public sector reform. In 1994 many 
positions in public enterprises were overstaffed as follows: senior managers (25%), office workers 
in the administrative development units (47%) and production supervisors (62%). The SFD 
reported that half of the workers in public enterprises were redundant. In addition, there was a lack 
of management skill. Managers were recruited from the state bureaucracy and higher ranks of army, 
and judged according to their loyalty and seniority. Therefore, their professional skills were not 
taken into consideration when they were appointed. Patronage networks also helped people without 
managerial training gain roles on the executive boards of public enterprises (Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 
106). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, political structures changed in the Mubarak era to pro-capitalist. 
Partial political liberalisation favoured businessmen who benefitted from the infitah by furthering 
their own interests and influencing public policy in their favour. Also, the introduction of 
multiparty elections enabled big businessmen to seek seats in parliament. At the same time, the 
structural changes weakened the political influence of organised labour, although it was still an 
official partner of the authoritarian regime. In the 1990s the government attempted to exert further 
control over organised labour through several laws. Moreover, the government controlled organised 
labour by co-opting union leaders into the ruling structure. This measure aimed to prevent workers 
from policy making in the NDP. 
Although Egyptian trade unions were marginalised, they still had enough political power to 
resist the government’s unpopular privatisation plan. According to a survey of six thousand public 
sector workers, conducted by the Al-Arabi newspaper in 1996, “91.2 percent of workers were 
opposed to privatization. Of 8.8 percent who support the program, 80.6 percent were against the 
sale of public sector companies to foreigners and only 35.5 percent were willing to accept the sale 
of their own enterprise” (Paczynska 2009: 187). 
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Agnieska Paczynska (2009) claims that Egyptian trade unions successfully influenced policy 
debates and the process of privatisation by comparing the country with three other country cases: 
Poland, Mexico and the Czech Republic. Whereas trade unions in Egypt and Poland succeeded in 
shaping government policies, their counterparts in Mexico and the Czech Republic had little impact 
on the policy debates. In Paczynska’s theoretical framework, Egyptian trade unions were successful 
not only because they had resources, such as legal prerogatives and financial autonomy, but 
because the ruling party had failed to control its subsidiary trade unions fully. The nature of 
Egyptian corporatism obliged the government to make more concessions with organised labour 
during structural adjustment. Weiss & Wurzel (1998: 106) point out similar feature regarding 
workers in Egyptian public enterprises: 
The work force is capable of being militant if it suspects that any decisions are being 
taken to reduce its benefits. In fact, it is difficult for management to make any kind of 
positive changes, and the work force currently has effective control of the business to 
the detriment of both the business and the very work force whose interests the 
militants are trying to protect. 
Although the government attempted to prevent the workers’ ‘true’ voices from coming to the 
surface by co-opting union leaders into the ruling party, it failed and had to take their views on 
privatisation into account. 
The Mubarak government was faced with its first challenge from organised labour in 1991, 
when the government proposed a legal framework for privatisation, or Law 203/1991. Unionists 
were opposed to the law because it would lead to drastic public sector restructuring and change the 
Egyptian labour market. To deal with their claims, the government held several meetings with 
union representatives, during which it made concessions. Public-enterprise workers obtained not 
only guarantees against mass layoffs, but also financial benefits, such as additional social insurance 
coverage and retention of profit-sharing. Moreover, the government promised to consult trade 
unions regarding any future decisions that might change public enterprises and to compensate any 
workers harmed by the reform (Paczynska 2009: 170-171). As a result, this law was amended by 
unionists in the ETUF and the privatisation process was scaled back. The World Bank and the IMF 
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were unsatisfied with the government’s insistence that it had no intention of firing employees 
working for public enterprises. This decision made it more difficult to resolve the problem of 
excess labour in these enterprises (Paczynska 2009: 172). The IMF and the World Bank, therefore, 
ratcheted up the pressure on the Mubarak government in 1992. “The IMF postponed the final 
review for the stand-by loan originally planned for December 1992, a condition for debt relief by 
the Paris Club. Only after a positive IMF evaluation in March 1993 did the World Bank agree to 
disburse the second tranche of the structural adjustment loan originally scheduled for June 1992” 
(Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 121). The government, nonetheless, decided to postpone the privatisation 
process, for example, with the excuse of the uncertainty over new ministers and the forthcoming 
presidential elections.2 The government agreed with the IMF that the government would sell 22 of 
314 companies under Law 203/1991 by the end of 1993, with assets of LE 910 million. The 
government however sold only two bottling plants (El-Nasr Bottling and Egyptian Bottling). 
Moreover, the government promised that the privatised plants would not dismiss employees. In 
1993 the government postponed the privatisation process three times (Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 122). 
Other donors were also disappointed at the slow progress. In June 1994 the US Embassy in Cairo 
stated in a newspaper: “A demonstration of renewed government commitment to the reform 
program is necessary to stimulate private sector interest in the Egyptian economy and to create a 
climate which encourages economic growth” (Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 123). 
The second challenge by organised labour was resistance to the new labour code, which was 
key to the success of the privatisation plan. For successful privatisation of such unprofitable public 
enterprises, their new owners needed to dismiss a number of employees. From the viewpoint of 
private employers, however, existing labour laws excessively protected employees and severely 
restricted flexibility in the management of companies. Private investors expected that the new 
labour code would deregulate dismissal rules. “The law [the old labour code] stipulated that 
workers, once hired, could be fired only under certain conditions, specifically if ‘the worker had 
                                                     
2  For example, “when a Saudi investor offered to purchase part or all of the Suez Cement 
Company no decision was made. The sales of El-Nasr Bottling and Egyptian Bottling were not 
finalised for the same reasons” (Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 135). 
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been finally sentenced for crime or misdemeanor involving dishonesty and immorality’” 
(Paczynska 2009: 173). The old labour code also prevented public-enterprise managers from laying 
them off. Therefore, the government drew up a revised labour code (Weiss & Wurzel 1998: 122). In 
response, trade unionists claimed that the new code should allow workers to strike because strikes 
had been forbidden since the 1950s. However, the government rejected their claim because of fears 
of strikes turning into social unrest and revolt. Therefore, although the law was first proposed in 
1993, organised labour continued to prevent the law from passing through Parliament. The 
stalemate continued for ten years after 1993 (Paczynska 2009: 173-179). 
Consequently, the government had to take other measures to tackle the problem of 
unprofitable public enterprises. Although it recognised the necessity of laying off redundant 
workers in loss-making public enterprises, the lack of the new labour code made layoffs impossible. 
The government therefore attempted to create a voluntary retirement scheme. It organised a 
committee, consisting of the Minister of Labour, representatives of the holding companies and 
ETUF’s representatives, in January 1997. Negotiations in the committee however resulted in 
stalemate because of two issues: the level of compensation and the character of this programme 
(whether it was voluntary or compulsory). The negotiations reached a compromise in May 1997, 
but the scheme had several critical problems. For instance, the SFD was criticised for not 
adequately supporting those who retired from public enterprises under this scheme. In mid-July 
1998 labour activists distributed a leaflet to workers in a public enterprise, Helwan Iron and Steel. 
The leaflet claimed that the early retirement plan was irrational because the workers who retired 
early would receive lower pension benefits than if they continued to work until retirement age. The 
leaflet persuaded the workers to reject the early retirement scheme. Consequently, the privatisation 
process remained sluggish and patchy (Paczynska 2009: 179-185). 
The political influence of organised labour declined as political structures became more and 
more pro-capitalist. Until the mid-2000s organised labour successfully resisted privatisation, as 
Paczynska argues. She argues that the historical relationship between the ruling parties and trade 
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unions had a significant impact on the privatisation process regardless of the polity, whether 
democratic or authoritarian. In Egypt, “despite growing political repression, organized labor 
succeeded in modifying the privatization program during the design phase, shaped other pieces of 
legislation directly affecting the pace of divestures, and significantly slowed the implementation of 
the public sector restructuring program” (Paczynska 2009: 7). However, the fact that the new 
labour code was finally enacted in 2003 revealed the declining political power of unions. Although 
the ETUF succeeded in postponing the enactment of the new labour code, it was ultimately forced 
to agree to it. While the new code still provided that the ETUF was the sole national centre of 
Egyptian trade unions, it regulated a ‘temporary contract’, which weakened the political power of 
the ETUF. Workers on temporary contracts were not eligible to participate in trade unions. As 
public enterprises no longer needed to employ new workers on permanent contracts, they regularly 
hired them on temporary contracts. Accordingly, the number of workers on temporary contracts 
exceeded that of workers on permanent contracts in some public enterprises. In some work places, 
the labour local committees were not able to represent a majority of the workers. As the ETUF was 
based on political support from formal workers, an increase in the number of temporary-contract 
workers led to the erosion of its base (Solidarity Center 2010: 28-29). 
Furthermore, with the appointment of Ahmed Nazif as Prime Minister in 2004, the country 
experienced further economic liberalisation. Faced with a second wave of privatisation, the national 
centre (the ETUF) gradually made more concessions with the government. Joel Beinin (2009b) 
highlights those examples of workers’ collective action since the mid-2000s. The first case was a 
struggle at a public enterprise, the ESCO Spinning Company in Qalyub (north of Cairo). By 2005 
the company managed to reduce the workforce to 3,500 by combining a hiring freeze with an early 
retirement scheme. In October 2004 employees working at Qalyub spinning mill went on strike 
because they saw an announcement that the mill would be sold to a private investor (Beinin 2009b: 
78). 
ESCO workers believed that they and the broader public were the real owners of the 
enterprise, not the state managers. Gamal Sha‘ban, a skilled worker with twenty-three 
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years seniority asked, “With what right was the sale [of this mill] conducted?” Many 
ESCO workers had twenty to thirty years’ service and believed that this entitled them 
to retain their jobs rather than be replaced by new workers (Beinin 2009b: 78). 
The NDP negotiated with the strike leaders and agreed to offer “the strikers seasonal contracts 
guaranteeing them all the benefits given to workers under the new unified labour law [Law 
12/2003], LE 10,000 per worker in lieu of an early retirement package and wage arrears for the last 
three months” (Rady 2005). 
The second case was an industrial strike at in the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in 
Mahalla al-Kubra in December 2006. Prime Minister Nazif declared that the government would 
raise the annual bonus for public sector workers, from E£100 to two months’ salary in March 2006. 
This declaration pleased the workers because 1984 was the last time their annual bonuses had been 
raised. However, the result was disappointing. In December public enterprises provided the 
employees with only E£100, or more precisely E£89 after tax deductions. On 7 December 2006 
thousands of workers started to protest in the front of the factory. The police were reluctant to 
suppress the protest because of the number of participants. Faced with so many protestors, 
government officials decided to offer a 45-day bonus. Also, the government promised that the 
government would not privatise the company and that, when the company made more than E£60 
million in annual profits, 10% of the profits would be distributed to the employees. After this 
protest, the leaders started a campaign to kick out local union officials who had been opposed to the 
protest because union activists believed that they were controlled by the security services. More 
than 13,000 workers supported the campaign and signed a petition for the official’s impeachment. 
The petition was rejected by the ETUF because it would lose control over independent trade unions 
and threaten the corporatist principle that the state (the ruling party, in particular) should control all 
trade unions. This movement shed light on how workers lost trust in the ability of the national 
centre to protect their rights (Beinin 2009b: 79-83). 
The third case was a strike in Mahalla al-Kubra in September 2007. This strike occurred at the 
same company as the second case – the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company. The workers 
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resorted to strikes twice in one year. The second protest was more militant than the first one. The 
protest occurred as the company abandoned promises made after the first protest in December 2006. 
The protestors claimed that although it made approximately £E 200 million in profit in 2007/08, the 
company did not provide enough bonuses to its workers. It only paid a 20-day bonus. According to 
their assertion, the profits were equivalent to 150 days’ pay. Finally, the workers won at least a 
130-day bonus after a six-day strike. Moreover, the workers were given the right to negotiate 
directly with government representatives, including ETUF chief Husayn Mugawir, bypassing the 
official trade-union committee (Beinin 2009b: 83-86). In the 2000s the Mubarak government 
suffered from increasing numbers of workers’ collective action that was not authorised by the 
national centre despite an increase in their wages. Their collective action damaged the centralised 
structure of trade unions. So the government had to make concessions to them to keep the 
corporatist structure and to avoid the new locally-based leadership from organising movements 
against the government. 
It should be noted that the fact that the privatisation plan was unpopular among the populace 
as well as public sector workers obliged the government to hold back from drastic privatisation. 
This unpopularity was related to the political structural changes in the Mubarak era, explained in 
Chapter 3. In crony capitalism, the ruling elites exploited economic policy, including privatisation, 
as a tool to maximise economic rents. Whereas, this strategy strengthened the informal connections 
between the government and big business, many Egyptians believed that such neo-liberal economic 
policy was corrupt. They linked the word of ‘privatisation’ to the word ‘corruption, such as selling 
off public enterprises to government cronies and foreigners at ‘bargain-basement prices’. To 
improve people’s perceptions of privatisation, therefore, the NDP announced that all citizens (over 
the age of 21) would be entitled to receive a share certificate to show ownership of public 
enterprises. The Minister of Investment, Mahmoud Moheiddin stated: 
Once they have received the [Certificate] they will have the right to sell it to a number 
of banks or investment funds or other institutions. ... Or they will have the right to 
hold on to it until registration has been completed and it could be traded on the stock 
exchange (Saleh 2008a: 10). 
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This demonstrates that the government recognised that privatisation could trigger social unrest and 
therefore provided substantial incentives to citizens to go along with it. 
To summarise, although the privatisation plan made gradual and constant progress, the 
Mubarak government did not drastically implement it for two reasons. First, employees in public 
enterprises organised opposition movements against privatisation. Before the mid-2000s strong 
opposition also came from the inside of the regime, especially the ETUF. As it constituted part of 
the authoritarian regime, it was difficult to exclude them from decision making. Consequently, it 
hesitated to privatise public enterprises because labour activists within the regime might initiate 
anti-privatisation movements. After the mid-2000s the government confronted unauthorised 
collective action, as the ETUF’s control over individual trade unions had declined. As their living 
conditions worsened, workers in public enterprises resorted to collective action although the 
actions were not authorised by the central committee of labour federations. The Mubarak 
government and the ETUF therefore had to negotiate directly with them to resolve the problems. 
Second, the privatisation plan was unpopular among the populace because privatisation was 
thought to strengthen corrupt relationships between the ruling elites and big businessmen. 
Consequently, the government had to take measures to improve popular perceptions of privatisation. 
These two reasons made the government reluctant to implement drastic reform, leading to survival 
of the large public sector despite fiscal constraints. 
 
 
5-3-3.  Employment in the Government 
 
Jobs in the government sector were still attractive to young graduates because of the job 
security and higher wages. When the government announced that the government would exclude 
graduates also employed in the private sector from this scheme in 1992, many workers in the 
private sector resigned in order to keep their entitlement to government sector jobs (World Bank 
2004: 35). Moreover, when the government prepared five employment and training programmes 
for public employment, approximately 4.4 million people, a quarter of the labour force, rushed to 
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submit a job application, although many of them were already employed in the private sector 
(Radwan 2002: 14). These cases indicate that the youth in the country still preferred public 
employment to employment in the private sector because of the more attractive wages and job 
security in the public sector. 
Tarek El-Ghamrawy & Ziad Amer (2011) reveal that wages in the public sector (including the 
government and public enterprises) were higher than those in the private sector and that the gap 
continued to increase from 2002 to 2007, using data in the CAPMAS wage bulletin. Their research 
furthermore confirms the same trend by using the 2006 ELMPS, which includes data on individual 
wages. This survey also reveals the difference not only between the public and the private sectors, 
but between the government and public enterprises. Whereas workers in the domestic private sector 
earn £E2.6 per hour on average, their counterparts in the government and public enterprises earns 
£E4.3 and £E4.7 respectively. Although the wages were lower than those in joint-venture and 
foreign companies, their wages were still better than those of workers in the domestic private sector. 
In addition to wages, the public sector provides more substantial job security to the workers than 
those in the private sector. Whereas only 24.9% of workers in the private sector were formal 
workers (defined as workers having a legal job contract), 97.6% of government workers and 94.0% 
of workers in public enterprises were categorised as formal workers. Informal workers are forced to 
work in insecure conditions and tend not to enjoy various wage and non-wage benefits that formal 
workers receive (El-Ghamrawy & Amer 2011: 4-6). 
However, it should be noted that their conclusion needs further consideration. Mona Said 
(2007) reached a different conclusion from El-Ghamrawy & Amer (2011), using the same data – 
the 2006 ELMPS. Crude estimates indicate that male workers both in government and public 
enterprises improved their relative position between 1988 and 2006. However, analysis of gender 
differences reveals a different conclusion. In comparison with male workers in the private sector, 
male government workers did not enjoy substantial wage premium, while female workers in the 
government and public enterprises received a wage premium (Figure 5.5). 
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Figure 5.5:  Crude and Corrected Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(A) Male 
 
 
(B) Female 
 
1 – Crude Gap in 1988      2 – Corrected Gap in 1988    3 – Crude Gap in 1998 
4 – Corrected Gap in 1998      5 – Crude Gap in 2006    6 – Corrected Gap in 2006 
 
Source: Said (2007), Table 4. 
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Figure 5.6:  Ratio of Government Wages to Total and Current Public Expenditure 
 
Note: After 2004/05, this research uses total expenditure instead of current expenditure because the 
government stopped to divide the expenditure into two – current and capital expenditure. 
Sources: CBE (1983-2002/03) and CBE (2004/05-2012/13). 
 
Therefore, the Mubarak government still attempted to employ more young people than 
necessary. For example, the General Authority for Free Zones and Investment employed more than 
1,400 workers, although half of them were estimated to be underemployed (Handoussa & El-Oraby 
2004). Nonetheless, the number of government employees had increased even during the ERSAP 
(see also Figure 5.4) because the government needed to absorb youth into the government sector to 
compensate for the lack of sufficient jobs in the private sector. The Mubarak government therefore 
suffered from a heavy financial burden of the programme and needed to reduce the fiscal deficit. In 
the budget for FY 1990/91, the government estimated that, whereas expenditure on subsidies and 
pensions would increase by 73.7% and 35.2% respectively, that on wages of government 
employees would grow by 14.2% (below the annual inflation rate) (CBE 1990/91a: 39). It however 
suffered from increasing expenditure on employees’ wages. Budget implementation during the first 
seven-month indicated that expenditure on the wages rose by 16.4%, reaching £E 3.5 billion. The 
ERSAP increased citizens’ living costs and, accordingly, forced the government to compensate for 
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the increase to government employees (£E 900 million). At the same time, the government had to 
meet the increase in the number of government employees (CBE 1990/91b: 41-44). Since FY 
1991/92, the ratio had gradually increased until FY 2001/02. The government continued to spend 
more than a quarter of the total current expenditure on the wages of government employees. This 
data indicates that the government could not cut overall expenditure on wages (Figure 5.6). 
However, the financial restriction had made the government unable to raise government wages 
in accordance with inflation rate. When the real wage in 1999 was calculated by comparing 
consumer prices in 1999 with those in 1964, it was considerably lower than the real wage in 1964 
(Table 5.6). Furthermore, the government attempted to control the government wage bill in another 
way: 
Incentives and overtime payments in the public sector are used as a way of raising the 
average wage rather than as a reward for individual performance. Promotion in the 
government and public sector depends essentially on seniority (through the system of 
wage increments), and also on budget constraints, which may restrict the number of 
positions allocated to various employment grades every year. In this case, the 
employee receives the same wage (the grade-wage limit) until budget conditions allow 
for promotion (Handoussa & El-Oraby 2004: 7). 
 
Accordingly, the current level of real wages was not satisfactory for workers in the 
government sector. By using a survey targeting government employees, Doha Abdelhamid & Laila 
El Baradei (2009: 18-19) reveal that 82% of the respondents were not satisfied with their salary and 
that 97% believed their total salary was below the market value. In addition, the survey illustrates 
to what extent the respondents were satisfied with their bonus and incentives. 75% did not think 
that their bonuses and incentives were determined by clear criteria; 98% did not think that increases 
to bonuses and incentives kept up with inflation rates and rising prices; and 87% were dissatisfied 
with the President’s decision in May 2008 regarding wage increases. Government employees also 
experienced deteriorating working conditions in the 2000s although their wage levels were higher 
than those in the private sector. 
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Table 5.6:  Real Government Wages in 1999 
 1964 1999 in 1964 Prices 1999 in 1978 Prices 
Grade Salary Range Salary Range Salary Range 
First Under Secretary 1800-2200 73.51 179.44 
Under Secretary 1400-1800 59.3 144.77 
Director General 
1200-1500 
42.36-65.06 103.41-158.83 
Grade 1 32.19-58.96 78.59-143.94 
Grade 2 876-1440 23.72-53.88 57.91-131.53 
Grade 3 684-1200 16.27-45.41 39.71-110.85 
Grade 4 540-960 11.47-3423 22.99-83.55 
Grade 5 420-780 12.20-26.09 29.78-63.70 
Grade 6 330-600 11.86-21.01 28.95-51.29 
Grade 7 240-480 – – 
Grade 8 180-360 – – 
Grade 9 144-300 – – 
Grade 10 108-288 – – 
Grade 11 84-180 – – 
Grade 12 60-84 – – 
Source: Handoussa & El-Oraby (2004: 8), Table 4. 
 
Indeed, government employees resorted to collective action because of their deteriorating 
working conditions. For instance, municipal real estate tax collectors established an independent 
trade union. They were employed by local municipalities and their salary was considerably lower 
than their counterparts directly employed by the Ministry of Finance. In December 2007 
approximately 3,000 workers from the municipal real estate tax collecting service (and their family 
members) carried out an 11-day sit-in at the front of the ministry and other government offices in 
Cairo. As a result of their actions, the Minister of Finance, Yusif Butros Ghali, promised to give 
them a bonus equivalent to two months pay. They also won a dramatic wage hike of approximately 
325%, which made their wages equivalent to their counterparts in the General Tax Authority. This 
protest was not supported by the General Union of Bank, Insurance and Finance Employees 
(GUBIFE), an ETUF affiliate. Most of the GUBIFE-affiliated local union committees of municipal 
tax collectors did not support the protests because they were illegal. For this reason the tax 
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collectors had to organise their own strike committee. Other government employees also resorted to 
strikes. In February and March 2009 administrative workers in public education institutions 
organised strikes in several local schools and education authorities. On 9 March 2009 they 
demonstrated in front of parliament in order to gain the same pay increases as teachers in public 
schools. In May 2009 postal workers went on six-day strikes to achieve pay increases. The postal 
workers were dissatisfied with the considerable wage gap between workers in the Egyptian 
Telecommunications Company (ETC) and the postal service, although both sets of workers were 
employed by the same ministry. Postal workers’ basic wages had not increased in five years 
(Solidarity Center 2010: 31-34). These cases indicate that even government employees, whose 
working conditions were much better than their counterparts in the private sector, were forced to 
resort to collective action because of their deteriorating living standards in the 2000s. 
A survey conducted by Abdelhamid & El Baradei (2009) demonstrates that workers in the 
government sector did not earn adequate wages. 76% of the respondents could not save. In 
response to a question about whether their total government salary covered their total needs, 98% 
answered ‘disagree’ or ‘to a certain extent disagree’. The next question asked if their monthly 
wages covered their basic needs. 83% chose ‘disagree’, 44% chose ‘to a certain extent disagree’. 
80% of them did not receive sufficient monthly wages to purchase foodstuffs for themselves and 
their family members. The survey moreover reveals that 39% of the respondents had other sources 
of income. 41.3% of these workers were financially supported by family members, 19% earned 
from their properties and real estate, 14.3% had another job, and 14.3% borrowed money.3 The 
also elicits information about their government job salary as a percentage of their total income. 
16% stated that government pay accounted for 70-90% of their total income; 22% stated that 
government pay accounted for 40-60%; and 7% stated that their government pay accounted for 
                                                     
3  It should be noted that the percentage (39%) should be carefully interpreted. “The percentage 
may be more than that as not all respondents may have felt safe enough, or willing enough to 
declare such information to the interviewers, lest they get themselves in unwarranted troubles. 
As noted earlier, because of the sensitivity of the issue of having a second job, many refused to 
specify what type of job and very few specified what type of sundry sources of income they had” 
(Abdelhamid & El Baradei 2009: 20). It means that more government employees might depend 
on a variety of income generating opportunities. 
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20-30%. Their average ratio of the government pay to their total income was approximately 80% 
(Abdelhamid & El Baradei 2009: 18-20). 
In summary, the government drew back from implementing drastic reforms and maintained a 
large and overstaffed bureaucracy. However, as it did not have sufficient resources to pay civil 
servants, their wages were limited and working conditions deteriorated. Although the number of 
workers in public enterprises declined as a result of privatisation, the government absorbed a large 
number of youth into the government sector. However, poor working conditions fuelled their 
collective action, such as strikes and the formation of independent trade unions. These protests 
undermined the ETUF’s control of all subsidiary trade unions. In the long term, the public 
employment programme was not able to function as a tool for mobilising government employees, 
despite the fact that the government continued to spend large amounts of money on the programme. 
Although the government’s behaviour was seemingly irrational in the long term, it revealed that the 
social contract was still important politically. 
 
 
5-4.  The Public Employment Programme and Path Dependence 
 
Like the food subsidy programme featured in the previous chapter, the public employment 
programme was influenced by path dependence and did not change the populist features 
established during the Nasser era and reinforced during the Sadat era. In the Nasser era, this 
programme was established to support industrialisation. The Nasser government established the job 
guarantee scheme for two purposes. First, it attempted to help the industrialisation project by 
supplying the public sector with high-quality human resources (i.e., educated graduates). Second, it 
aimed to obtain the political support of the new middle class by guaranteeing public sector jobs to 
university graduates. At the same time, this scheme created a positive feedback mechanism. In the 
Sadat era, the mechanism expanded the size of the public sector and placed burdens on the 
exchequer. The government did not change the scheme because an increase in external resources 
enabled the government to expand the programme easily. As a result of the expansion, the public 
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sector however absorbed more youth workers than it needed. The government had to take measures 
to control wages: (1) an increase in the number of temporary-contract workers and (2) limited wage 
increases. Although the government adopted such ad hoc strategies, it did not implement drastic 
reforms of the public sector. Instead, the government regularly promised public sector workers 
wage increases after the 1977 food riots and maintained an inefficient bureaucracy. 
In the Mubarak era, the public employment programme survived even though the country 
experienced structural change in the political and economic systems that sustained the existing 
social welfare system (see Chapter 3). Additionally, IMF pressure to drastically reform the public 
sector (such as privatisation of public sector and restructuring of overstaffed bureaucracy) failed to 
bring about drastic reform. Employment in public enterprises gradually shrunk as privatisation 
gained pace. However, the pace of privatisation was slow for two reasons: (1) opposition 
movements against the privatisation and (2) the unpopularity of the plan among the populace. 
Before the mid-2000s, the ETUF successfully rejected government proposals related to 
privatisation. After the mid-2000s, the government was faced with unauthorised collective action 
that was not controlled by the ETUF. Moreover, the privatisation plan was unpopular among the 
populace because of perceptions of corrupt relationships between the ruling elites and big business. 
As public enterprises were privatised, the government attempted to absorb graduates by further 
expanding the overstaffed government sector. However, it did not have sufficient resources to pay 
to civil servants and it therefore had to control their wages. This measure worsened the working 
conditions of government-sector workers, led to their dissatisfaction and fuelled their collective 
action against the government. The government behaviour indicated that the logic of the social 
contract was still alive. 
The robustness of the social contract was obvious from the fact that the Mubarak government 
regarded May Day speeches as one of the most important opportunities for displaying the 
government’s commitment to workers’ affairs, such as their working conditions, as a successor of 
the Nasser regime (Anon. 1981a). On 1 May 1981 President Sadat declared that the government 
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would raise monthly wages for public sector employees from £E 20 to £E 25 (Anon. 1981b). As 
these wage increase were motivated by inflation, the government addressed the linkage between 
price hikes and public sector wage increases (Anon. 1981d). More recently, “May Day 2008, for 
example, saw a 30 percent increase in public sector worker salaries, in part to compensate for 
higher world food prices”, as Lisa Blaydes (2011: 80) remarks. This was also reported in the New 
York Times: 
During a speech Tuesday, the eve of May Day, to the official Trade Union Federation 
in Cairo, [President] Mubarak said, “We had talked about a 15 percent raise, but 
decided on 30 percent. The government will have to find the resources” (Anon. 2008). 
The evidence indicates that the social contract, reinforced during the Sadat era, forced the Mubarak 
government to continue its active commitment to employment in the public sector, despite its fiscal 
restrictions. 
However, it should be noted that the robustness of the social contract did not necessarily 
disprove the two hypotheses discussed in Chapter 1. Hypothesis 1 assumes that economic 
liberalisation encourages governments to implement public sector reform and privatisation. 
However, it did not lead to the restructuring of the public sector in Egypt. Rather, the development 
of crony capitalism prevented such drastic reform. The government developed economic policies 
that furthered its own interests and rewarded its supporters (such as big businessmen). Radical 
reform might decrease the resources channelled to the elites and threaten the survival of the 
authoritarian regime. Moreover, privatisation triggered workers’ collective action that often 
destabilised the social order. Consequently, the government was reluctant to implement radical 
economic reforms. Even during structural adjustment, the government rejected the IMF’s proposals 
for drastic economic reforms and postponed privatisation. The government’s behaviour indicated 
that maintaining political stability was prioritised over economic reform and pressure from 
international aid donors, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United States. 
Hypothesis 2 addresses that the idea that multiparty elections encourage governments to 
mobilise public sector workers by increasing their wages and bonus. This hypothesis was correct in 
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the short term. Although the public employment programme imposed a heavy burden on the 
exchequer, it was necessary to raise the wages of public sector employees ahead of elections. 
Before the parliamentary election in 1984, for example, the Mubarak government promised 
employees in the government and public enterprises that it would increase their monthly wages by 
£E 5.0 (Anon. 1984a). Such decisions were often announced before parliamentary elections. Lisa 
Blaydes (2011) demonstrates that the government did not announce wage raises in years when 
there were no elections. She also provides the readers with several narratives about the Mubarak 
government’s promises: 
In 2000, public sector companies and ministries announced bonuses for their 
employees prior to parliamentary elections. The year 2005 – another parliamentary 
election year – saw a number of announcements regarding increases to public sector 
bonuses as the election season approached. For example, an annual bonus of 15 
percent of salary for all public sector employees and retirees was announced, and the 
government promised that, after five years, the bonus amount would become part of 
the base salary. In addition, Minister of Finance Yusuf Butrus-Ghali also announced a 
15 percent exceptional bonus (‘ilawa khassa) that would benefit 1.8 million public 
sector employees [italics in original] (Blaydes 2011: 82). 
Moreover, elections effectively delayed the process of privatisation. Ahead of the presidential 
election in 2011, the government announced that it would indefinitely postpone the privatisation 
programme in May 2010 in response to protests triggered by unemployment and high inflation 
(El-Ghobashy 2010). The logic of multiparty elections, addressed in Hypothesis 2, strengthened 
path dependence by making the government pull back from drastically reforming the public sector. 
However, this hypothesis did not pay attention to the long-term effect of the change. Several 
factors – maintaining social order and winning elections – forced the Mubarak government to 
increase expenditure on this programme. This choice led to the erosion of this programme. The 
leading characters shifted from organised labour to the business class, which exploited elections as 
channels to strengthen relationships in the political arena. The government gradually regarded 
organised labour as a potential challenger and intensified control over it. However, the government 
did not have adequate resources to conciliate organised labour. Economic compensation through 
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wage raises was inadequate for most workers in the public sector. As the government continued to 
increase the number of low-paid, underemployed workers, the workers’ wage rises did not keep up 
with inflation rate. Thus, these workers suffered from economic difficulties despite the fact that the 
Mubarak government constantly promised them wage raises. 
The path-dependent change in the public employment programme has had a significant impact 
even after the collapse of the Mubarak regime. Widespread poor working conditions in the public 
sector sparked off a number of labour protests and strikes, which indirectly weakened the Mubarak 
regime and led to the Arab Spring in 2011. The newly elected Morsi government could not resolve 
the public sector problems. Instead, it attempted to re-nationalise six land reclamation companies, 
which had been privatised during the Mubarak presidency (Anon. 2011). Indeed, the amount of 
expenditure on public employment increased during the Morsi era. Now the new government is 
faced with a dilemma: whereas public sector workers demand an increase in their wages, wage 
increases are likely to impose a heavy burden on the budget (El-Wassal 2013; Omar & Abdel Latif 
2011). The new governments – whether the democratically-elected Morsi government or the Sisi 
government – are faced with the same dilemma as the Mubarak government. Unless the 
government resolves the dilemma, it will remain difficult to implement radical reforms in the 
public sector and the public employment programme. 
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Chapter	6	
The	Egyptian	Social	Welfare	System	and	Its	Implications	 	
for	Theories	of	Authoritarian	Social	Welfare	
 
This chapter discusses the implications of social welfare development in Egypt for (1) 
historical institutionalism and (2) welfare-state studies. To achieve this goal, first, the chapter 
discusses the importance of informal institutions under authoritarian rule as well as in democracies 
by considering why the hypotheses (indicated in Chapter 1) cannot always explain the 
development of the social welfare system in the Mubarak era. It demonstrates that an informal 
institution – the populist social contract – altered the preferences of political leaders and their 
survival strategies, which led to a difference between what these two hypotheses anticipated and 
the actual changes that occurred in the Egyptian social welfare system (as revealed in the previous 
chapters). Also, the chapter demonstrates that the original timing and sequence of change in 
Egyptian political and economic structures made the institutional legacy critical for change in the 
social welfare system during the Mubarak era. 
Second, this chapter discusses implications for welfare-state studies. As the existing literature 
on the welfare state focuses primarily on democratic cases (the ‘democratic bias’), it excludes 
authoritarian cases (like Egypt) from the analysis. The present thesis overcomes such bias and 
reveals that the pattern of social welfare development in Egypt is distinct from that in Western 
countries and newly democratised countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. Also, 
this chapter focuses on the concept of ‘equifinality’, a term which means that there are multiple 
causal paths leading to the same outcome. Most scholars in the field of historical institutionalism 
assume that the development of social welfare systems creates beneficiaries and interest groups that 
exert pressure on governments. According to the conventional understanding, this process results in 
path dependence. However, the Egyptian case lacked the conditions that would lead to such path 
239 
dependence. As Egypt is an authoritarian country, it lacked an open political arena that would 
enable interest groups to influence the government. Nevertheless, the Mubarak government chose 
to maintain the inefficient social welfare system. In other words, the Egyptian case indicates a 
different logic of path dependence in the development of social welfare systems. The Mubarak 
government was bound by the populist social contract, which was established in the Nasser era and 
reinforced in the Sadat era. 
 
 
6-1.  Implications for Historical Institutionalism 
 
One of the theoretical implications for historical institutionalism is that, different from what 
rational-choice institutionalists assume, informal institutions play an important role under 
authoritarian rule as well as in democracies. In the Egyptian case, an informal institution of the 
‘social contract’ prevailed over predicted causal mechanisms (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). 
Hypothesis 1 assumes that economic liberalisation turns social welfare systems into effective 
instruments for poverty alleviation. Economic liberalisation and drastic social welfare reform are 
proposed by international donors such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United States. As there 
are fewer obstacles to reform than in democracies, political leaders can easily rationalise social 
welfare systems in authoritarian regimes. Hypothesis 2 assumes that political liberalisation (and 
the introduction of quasi-competitive elections, in particular) encourages authoritarian leaders to 
exploit social welfare systems as their ‘machine’ for targeting specific groups (or social strata) with 
generous welfare provision, which ensures that they win quasi-competitive elections. 
Despite the fact that the country experienced dramatic changes to the political and economic 
structures that had been the basis of the Egyptian social welfare system since the Nasser era, the 
social welfare system maintained its populist features, unlike the predictions made in the two 
hypotheses above. The economic structure in Egypt changed in a wave of economic liberalisation 
(from etatism to an open economy) during the Mubarak era. The Mubarak government embarked 
on structural adjustment in the 1990s and adopted further economic liberalisation policies in the 
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2000s under the leadership of Prime Minister Nazif and Gamal Mubarak (a son of President Hosni 
Mubarak). This economic liberalisation policy led to crony capitalism. As the economic structure 
changed, the political structure in turn altered its features. The Mubarak regime shifted its ruling 
coalition from pro-labour to pro-crony capitalist. It co-opted the business elite, who increased their 
wealth in the infitah and the period of economic liberalisation, into the ruling party (the NDP) and 
government. The Mubarak government also pursued a developmental state, prioritising economic 
growth over income distribution. In contrast to the business elites, organised labour gradually 
became an obstacle to economic reform, although it was still an official partner of the regime (see 
Chapter 3). 
Dramatic change in the political and economic structures, however, strengthened the logic of 
the social contract, which was consolidated by a dramatic increase in social expenditure during the 
Sadat era, and led to the continuation of the populist social welfare system. Social deprivation 
caused by the political and economic structural changes obliged the Mubarak government to 
maintain the existing social welfare system. While the fiscal deficit prevented the government from 
further expanding the system, the discourse of the social contract (and distributive justice, in 
particular), which had been strengthened in the Sadat era, made it difficult for the government to 
concentrate its resources on poverty alleviation by reforming social welfare programmes. Two 
cases discussed in this thesis – (1) food subsidies and (2) public employment – showed that the 
logic of the ‘social contract’ had a significant impact on the development of individual social 
welfare programmes. 
Food Subsidies: Although the Mubarak government successfully cut expenditure on the food 
subsidy programme in the 1990s, the logic of the ‘social contract’ was revealed by food crises in 
the 2000s. In the 1990s, the government struck a balance between the IMF’s demands and popular 
expectations. The IMF suggested that the Egyptian government should rationalise and reduce 
expenditure on this programme. At the same time, the IMF encouraged the government to 
implement the devaluation of the currency and the elimination of price control measures. However, 
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as Egyptians expected the government to provide foodstuffs at a reasonable price, which was 
regarded as part of the social contract, the IMF proposals threatened the social order. The 
government, therefore, adopted implicit measures to cut expenditure on food subsidies, thereby 
avoiding drastic subsidy reform. Although the government was put under pressure to rationalise 
complex exchange rates, it only reluctantly accepted the proposal little by little because currency 
devaluation would trigger commodity price rises. In the 2000s the food subsidy programme was 
drastically expanded as a result of two steep rises in food prices. The government utilised the 
programme as a tool to ease the discontent of the population and to avoid social unrest, as with the 
1977 food riots. The government’s behaviour indicated that food security was a critical issue for the 
regime’s survival (see Chapter 4). 
Public Employment: Like the food subsidy programme, the public employment programme 
did not change its populist features. In the Mubarak era, the IMF encouraged the government to 
drastically reform the public sector (such as the privatisation of the public sector and the 
restructuring of overstaffed bureaucracy). Despite such pressure, however, drastic reforms were not 
implemented. Although employment in public enterprises gradually shrunk, the pace of 
privatisation was slow because of (1) opposition movement against the privatisation plan and (2) 
unpopularity of the plan among the populace. Moreover, the government attempted to absorb 
university graduates by expanding the overstaffed government sector because privatisation led to a 
decline in the number of workers in public enterprises. Due to fiscal restrictions, however, the 
government lacked the resources to raise the wages of workers in the government sector. Such 
measures did not resolve their economic difficulties. Poor working conditions led to their 
dissatisfaction and fuelled their collective action against the government (see Chapter 5). 
Another implication for historical institutionalism is the importance of timing and sequences. 
Although the informal institutional legacy – the populist social contract – made a difference 
between what the two hypotheses anticipated and the actual changes in the Egyptian social welfare 
system, the timing and sequence of change in Egyptian political and economic structures made the 
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institutional legacy more critical for path dependence in the social welfare system during the 
Mubarak era, as historical institutionalism demonstrates. As Charles Tilly (1984: 14) remarks, 
‘“when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen’” [italics in original]. Paul 
Pierson (2004: 64) also addresses the importance of the temporal ordering of events or processes in 
analysing the historical development of institutions: 
Initial steps in a particular direction may encourage further movement along the same 
path. Over time, “roads not chosen” may become increasingly distant, increasingly 
unreachable alternatives. Relatively modest perturbations at early stages may have a 
large influence on these processes. In many cases, the significance of early events or 
processes in the sequence may be amplified, while that of later events or processes is 
dampened. Thus, when a particular event or process occurs in a sequence will make a 
big difference [italics in original]. 
 
In Egypt’s case, the following sequence of events after Arab socialism played an important 
role in path-dependent change, in contrast to the predictions in the two hypotheses. The events were 
(1) an increase in external resources in the 1970s, (2) the absence of drastic political change 
(Mubarak’s succession following the Sadat regime) and (3) a decline in external resources. 
The first key event was an increase in external resources in the 1970s. In the late 1960s 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser recognised that his economic policy had failed and had to be revised. 
His successor, Anwar al-Sadat, embarked on the revision – the infitah. However, this economic 
policy increased the income gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. At the time, an increase 
in external resources characterised the country as a ‘semi-rentier’ state: 
[In Egypt,] it is estimated that about 45 per cent of its GDP is represented by 
exogenous … elements in the form of oil revenues, workers’ remittances, foreign aid, 
Suez Canal revenue and tourist expenditure. It is also to be noticed that most of these 
revenues accrue directly to the state or the government. The epithet of semi-rentier 
state is, thus, not far-fetched (Beblawi 1987: 393). 
This feature encouraged the Sadat government to compensate the ‘have-nots’ by expanding 
populist welfare provision, as the compensation strategy to the ‘have-nots’ was an easy, pain-free 
means of obtaining popular support for the regime. Consequently, this strategy strengthened the 
populist features of the social welfare system. 
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This legacy discouraged the Sadat government from adopting a developmental state strategy, 
unlike that in East Asian countries (World Bank 1993) or Mexico (Hansen 1971). The 
developmental state model assumes the autonomy of a bureaucracy, which was protected from 
excessive pressure from interest groups and politicians, and could facilitate a credible commitment 
to economic growth in the long term. 
The East Asian developmental states gave substantial well-designed export subsidies 
to industries they favored and granted tariff rebates that cheapened imported raw 
materials and machinery. States intervened to systemize economies through indicative 
(suggestive) planning – that is, planning via subsidies, grants and tax inducements 
rather than state fiat. States regulated the entry of firms into key industries and 
restricted intercompany competition. Foreign investment was restricted and regulated 
(Peet & Hartwick 2009: 64). 
Authoritarian leaders in East Asia utilised economic growth to justify their authoritarian rule, but 
their welfare programmes were underdeveloped. Mexico also adopted a developmental state model 
and stabilised its authoritarian regime by obtaining ‘performance legitimacy’ through high 
economic growth (Hansen 1971). 
In contrast, Egypt possessed few incentives to boost economic growth in this way, despite the 
fact that it had a huge bureaucracy. Generally speaking, export-led industrialisation needed to 
rationalise the social welfare system and distribute more resources to education than to social 
welfare in order to stimulate economic development in industries for manufacturing exports. The 
rationalisation of the social welfare system was thought to trigger social instability, including 
demonstrations and riots. Indeed, the Sadat government experienced food riots in 1977 when it 
attempted to rationalise the food subsidy programme that was drastically expanded during the 
infitah. In the mid-1970s the government came under pressure to reduce expenditure on food 
subsidies. An agreement with the IMF promised that the Egyptian government would implement 
economic reform, including cutting subsidies for consumer goods, in return for an IMF loan. As the 
subsidy cuts triggered food riots in the capital city of Cairo, the government decided to suppress the 
riots by using the military (Sadowski 1991: 154-156). Finally, the Sadat government was forced to 
cancel subsidy cuts after the food riots and maintain the expansionary programme, which imposed 
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a heavy burden on the budget (see Chapter 3). Consequently, the Sadat government had to 
continue the expansion of the populist social welfare system, which had a negative impact on 
economic growth and destroyed the possibility of export-led industrialisation. 
The second and third characteristic events were the absence of drastic political change (from 
Sadat to Mubarak) and a decline in external resources in the 1980s, respectively. The combination 
of these two events was peculiar to Egypt’s case and the main reason why the populist social 
welfare system survived during the Mubarak era despite economic liberalisation measures that 
were implemented after the 1990s. Although President Sadat was assassinated in 1981, Mubarak 
succeeded him without any political change, which meant that the new government inherited the 
populist legacy (especially the populist social welfare system). The amount of government revenue 
decreased from approximately 60% of GDP in 1981 to only half of that in the late 2000s (Soliman 
2011: 3). Although the government needed to retrench the populist welfare system that had been 
reinforced during the Sadat era, it was faced with a dilemma. Drastic economic and social reforms 
might contribute to economic growth by reforming the economic structure (from etatism to an open 
economy) and rationalising the social welfare system. In addition, economic growth might be a 
new source for legitimacy (the developmental state strategy). However, these reforms were 
expected to be painful for the Mubarak government, as they would destroy the populist legacy, 
which legitimised its rule. The government feared that drastic reform would trigger popular protests, 
like the food riots in 1977. However, the populist legacy continued to have a negative impact on 
both the exchequer and the economy. As the government’s only way of preserving its legitimacy 
was preserving populist welfare provision, the government chose this route despite the negative 
financial impact. As the infitah changed the political structure with a shift of the ruling coalition 
(from pro-labour to pro-capitalist), organised labour was marginalised in the political structure. 
However, as organised labour was co-opted into the corporatist structure, it did not cut its ties with 
organised labour and distributional justice was still a source of legitimacy. The Egyptian 
authoritarian regime could be characterised as ‘post-populist authoritarianism’ (Hinnebusch 2006). 
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This contrasted with the situation in Latin American countries, which experienced drastic 
political change (i.e., coup d’état) and returned to bureaucratic authoritarianism. Argentina and 
Brazil went through “the end of the period of extensive, horizontal industrial growth based on 
substitution for imports of finished consumer goods” (O’Donnell 1973: 57-58). Simultaneously, 
technocrats, whose presence in political decision-making had increased in this stage of 
industrialisation, had a significant role in public policies (especially economic policy). They began 
to regard such industrialisation policies as one of the biggest obstacles to furthering economic 
growth. In order to remove such obstacles, they were allied with military technocrats and overthrew 
the existing ‘populist’ regimes. After this coup d’état, technocrats had an incentive, which was 
based on neo-liberal philosophy, to encourage foreign capital investment (O’Donnell 1973). 
As such economic reform made progress, the retrenchment of social welfare programmes was 
noticeable in Latin America. In Chile, the establishment of the Pinochet government had a 
significant impact on social welfare programmes. His government changed the ISI model and 
adopted a neo-liberal economic policy in response to the assertion of the business class. The 
economic reform was radicalised by technocrats, who advocated the neo-liberal doctrines of Milton 
Friedman. In spite of opposition within the government (e.g., social bureaucrats and a military 
junta), they shifted the budget for social protection to targeted anti-poverty programmes (Haggard 
& Kaufman 2008: 107-110). “Overall cuts in social spending meant substantial losses for families 
just above the poverty line, who depended on state-sponsored social protections to maintain their 
standard of living. As a consequence, inequality and poverty increased in Chile, despite high 
growth rates achieved in the late 1970s and again in the second half of the 1980s” (Haggard & 
Kaufman 2008: 108). Furthermore, in the 1980s, the government began to restructure the pension 
system. In the 1990s these reforms were known as the ‘Chilean model’ and became an important 
point of reference for debates on welfare reform in Latin America. In Brazil, the military 
government utilised the rationalisation of social welfare programmes as a tool for controlling its 
opponents. Cash benefits to informal-sector workers remained minimal, in comparison with 
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formal-sector workers and civil servants (Haggard & Kaufman 2008: 100-103). In these countries, 
a change in authoritarian leaders enabled the new leaders to cut their ties with populist institutional 
legacies, such as friendship with organised labour. Thus, the leaders in the Latin American 
countries could implement drastic social welfare reforms in exchange for economic growth, as 
Hypothesis 1 anticipated. 
The combination of the two events – the absence of drastic political change (from Sadat to 
Mubarak) and a decline in external resources in the 1980s – had a significant impact on the 
long-term relationship between competitive elections and populist welfare provision in a different 
way from what Hypothesis 2 anticipated. First, a decline in external resources prevented the 
government from increasing populist welfare provision by exploiting external resources. This 
meant that the government lacked sufficient resources to use in elections as ‘pork barrel’ politics 
with a specific social group. Second, the absence of dramatic political change made it difficult for 
the Mubarak government to abandon the populist legacy by implementing drastic social reform. 
This choice meant that the Mubarak government reduced the possibility of increasing resources for 
the expansion of the populist social welfare system through economic growth. As Haggard & 
Kaufman (2008) explain, political liberalisation under authoritarian rule promoted the expansion of 
the social welfare system in several Latin American countries. In Brazil, the gradual political 
liberalisation strategy had a positive effect on redistribution and the development of social welfare 
programmes. In 1979 the government established a programme to expand medical clinics in 
impoverished rural areas and enlarged the free healthcare services it offered to all citizens. By the 
end of the 1970s, more than 90% of the population was covered by the social security and 
healthcare services. Economic growth enabled some Latin American governments to expand their 
social welfare systems. Developmental states in East Asia also successfully expanded their social 
welfare systems by using the fruits of economic growth. 
In contrast, Egypt’s authoritarian government continued to adopt a populist distribution 
strategy under conditions of fiscal restrictions and limited economic growth. Although the 
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government continued to spend on populist welfare provision for elections (as predicted by 
Hypothesis 2), a decline in distributive resources made it difficult to deliver sufficient benefits to 
electorates and revealed a failure in the social welfare system – enduring fiscal misallocation, as 
Markus Loewe (2000) points out. The social welfare system could not always provide benefits to 
those who really needed them. Some scholars claim the Egyptian social welfare system was 
unfriendly to the vulnerable (Loewe 2000). Others assert that the lack of a long-term strategy 
eroded the middle class. Most people in the middle class were neglected despite their economic 
difficulties. The social welfare system had only insufficient resources to protect them from various 
types of social risks. Accordingly, these people were pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in the 
labour, health and housing markets (Bayat 2006). Furthermore, as most social welfare programmes 
benefited not only the needy but also the middle class and the upper-middle class, they did not do 
much to alleviate poverty. The most significant case was the food subsidy programme (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
 
6-2.  Implications for Welfare-State Studies 
 
What implications does the present thesis have for welfare-state studies? One of the significant 
implications is that it ‘finds’ a third pattern of social welfare development. Periods related to social 
welfare development can be classified into two categories: (1) the welfare evolution period (from 
1945 until the 1970s) and (2) the welfare reform period (after the 1980s). This classification can be 
found both in ‘orthodox’ works focusing on the welfare state in Western countries (Huber & 
Stephens 2001) and recent studies analysing social welfare in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
East Asia (Haggard & Kaufman 2008). Table 6.1 indicates the relationship between periods of 
social welfare development and polities (democracy or authoritarianism) in each case. 
Classic works on the welfare state, such as Korpi (1983) and Esping-Andersen (1990), 
identified the first pattern of social welfare development. Although, as Esping-Andersen (1990) 
demonstrates, social welfare systems in Western countries can be categorised into several types, 
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their most significant similarity is that they experienced the dramatic expansion of social welfare 
systems in the welfare evolution period under democratic conditions. This period overlapped with 
the ‘golden age’ of capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1994; Huber & Stephens 2001), during which they 
enjoyed economic prosperity. As the level of globalisation at the time was lower than that after the 
end of the Cold War, governments could invest in the drastic expansion of social welfare systems, 
which led to further economic growth by stimulating consumption. At the same time, high 
economic growth increased the number of urban wage workers. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
democratic conditions enabled labour unions and leftist parties to play a critical role in developing 
their social welfare systems at this stage of welfare-state development (the power resource 
mobilisation model). 
 
Table 6.1:  Relationship between Polity and Outcomes of Social Welfare Reform in Three 
Cases 
 
Polity (Democracy / Authoritarianism) 
Outcomes of  
Welfare Reform 
Period of  
Welfare Evolution 
Period of  
Welfare Reform 
Western countries 
(the first pattern) 
democratic  democratic 
retrenchment & 
institutional robustness 
Latin America, 
Eastern Europe & 
East Asia (the 
second pattern) 
authoritarianism democratic 
path-dependent 
expansion 
Egypt  
(the third pattern) 
authoritarianism authoritarianism 
retrenchment & 
institutional robustness 
Source: Author. 
 
After the ‘golden age’ of capitalism, social welfare systems in Western, industrialised 
countries were faced with crises. Low economic growth rates encouraged their governments to 
rationalise social welfare systems and were thought to cause the retrenchment of social welfare 
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provisions. However, changes in social welfare systems are limited and path-dependent, although 
governments struggle to implement radical welfare reform in many cases. Also, expenditure on 
social welfare programmes in these countries did not always decline in the 1980s and ’90s. The 
United Kingdom, for example, experienced an 18-year Conservative government, during which the 
political influence of the labour movement declined because of high employment and changes in 
labour laws. Many expected that the Conservative hegemony would lead to social welfare cutbacks 
and the retrenchment of the British welfare state. The British welfare state did however survive, 
although there was retrenchment in housing and pension policy (Pierson 1996: 159-163). The 
erosion of the welfare state is thus a myth, not a reality (Castles 2004). 
Paul Pierson (1996) claims that the retrenchment of the welfare state did not change as much 
as many scholars expected and that the new politics of the welfare state works in a different way 
from the old politics – the evolution of the welfare state. He addresses the importance of ‘policy 
feedback’ when explaining the new politics of the welfare state (Pierson 1992, 1996). The 
development of social policy created beneficiaries and encouraged them to organise various types 
of interest groups, which resisted social policy reform in political arena. Democratic institutions 
provide interest groups with opportunities to resist social policy reform. Also, the social corporatist 
legacy, particularly in Germany, enabled beneficiaries of social policies to resist welfare 
retrenchment by their exploiting the corporatist structure. In this structure, they can easily reject the 
government’s proposals as electoral institutions are exclusive and policy-making authority is 
decentralised (Green-Pedersen & Haverland 2002: 45-46). The argument addresses the importance 
of institutions as veto points for the retrenchment of social welfare systems in democracies.  
Recent welfare-state studies reveal the second pattern of social welfare development as 
research interest has been expanded to non-Western countries following the ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation (Huntington 1991). Social welfare systems in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
East Asia can be categorised as this pattern of the development. A significant feature of this pattern 
is that, as these countries experienced the period of welfare evolution under authoritarian rule, the 
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logic of social welfare development in these countries was different from that in Western, 
democratic countries. Survival strategies of authoritarian leaders played a pivotal role in the 
development of social welfare systems in these countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, political 
leaders adopted the organisation proliferation strategy to co-opt urban workers and peasants in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe, which led to the expansion of social welfare systems. In 
contrast, political leaders were allied with industrial capitalists and distributed rents to them in East 
Asia. Consequently, the political leaders did not have the incentive to expand social welfare 
systems. Instead, they invested in education to train highly skilled workers (Haggard & Kaufman 
2008).  
In the period of welfare reform, these countries experienced economic liberalisation and 
democratic transition. In contrast to Western countries, they expanded social welfare systems and 
increased social welfare expenditure after the 1980s. As explained in Chapter 1, economic 
liberalisation led governments to recognise that social welfare systems were important tools for 
compensating the losers in economic liberalisation. Democratic transition encouraged the loser to 
organise political and social movements for further welfare provisions. As democratic transitions 
created opportunities for subordinate actors (the launching organisations) to utilise institutional 
structures for their own interests, the expansion of social welfare systems was influenced by 
institutional legacies from the mid-twentieth century. Although scholars in welfare-state studies 
have widened their interest recently, from Western industrialised countries to non-Western 
countries (which were called the Third World), their work still has a ‘democratic bias’, as the power 
resource mobilisation model indicates. 
This thesis overcomes this ‘democratic bias’ and reveals that the pattern of social welfare 
development in Egypt is distinct from both of the other two patterns. Egypt experienced the period 
of welfare evolution under authoritarian rule, and the survival strategies of political leaders played 
a pivotal role in the development of the social welfare system. Similar to Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, this country adopted the organisational proliferation strategy, which expanded the 
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social welfare system and increased social welfare expenditure. In contrast to these countries, 
however, the Egyptian economy had been liberalised under authoritarian rule since the 1970s. 
Consequently, the Egyptian social welfare system did not experience dramatic expansion during the 
period of welfare reform. 
Interestingly, when comparing the first pattern (Western countries) and the third pattern 
(Egypt), both of these two instances experienced path-dependent changes in social welfare systems. 
It might be undeniable that the quality of social welfare programmes in Egypt is much lower than 
that in Western countries because of the different level of economic development in each case. In 
both instances, however, economic crises and neo-liberal economic reform did not lead to the 
drastic retrenchment of social welfare systems. As revealed in the present thesis, although the 
Mubarak government recognised the necessity of implementing the rationalisation of the social 
welfare system, it failed in carrying out drastic social welfare reform. The Egyptian social welfare 
system changed path-dependently and its populist features were not altered. 
However, it should be noted that a causal mechanism that led to path-dependent changes in the 
Egyptian social welfare system was different from that in Western countries. Path dependence in 
Western social welfare systems can be explained by the ‘veto player’ model (Tsebelis 2002), in 
which veto players (e.g., labour unions and interest groups) can effectively prevent governments 
from implementing the institutional changes they do not want by utilising their political resources. 
In contrast, the ‘veto player’ model was not applicable to the Egyptian case. An informal institution 
– the populist social contract – changed the preferences of authoritarian leaders and discouraged 
them from implementing drastic social welfare reform that would ensure their survival. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, under authoritarian rule, popular reactions – whether organised 
movements or unorganised protests – function as a signal, and authoritarian leaders reactively 
choose their survival strategy in response to the reactions. Take the 1977 food riots, for example, in 
which a large number of unorganised citizens participated in demonstrations against subsidy cuts. 
An announcement on such cuts triggered these riots. The food riots damaged the legitimacy of the 
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Sadat government and led it to cancel the subsidy cuts. Moreover, authoritarian leaders chose their 
precautionary strategy, avoiding drastic reforms in advance, especially after the food riots. As 
revealed in Chapter 4, the Mubarak government drastically expanded the food subsidy programme 
when faced with steep food price hikes in the 2000s. This was because the Mubarak government 
recognised that such price increases would trigger popular discontent and demonstrations against 
the government. Thus, it attempted to maintain social order by delivering food at reasonable prices 
to the populace via food subsidies. As explained in Chapter 5, the robustness of the public 
employment programme can be explained by the same logic. Whereas the government privatised 
public enterprises and reduced the number of workers in them, it simultaneously increased the 
number of workers in the government sector. The government’s choice was thought to be focused 
on compensation for restructuring public enterprises. Although the government was afraid of 
strikes organised by trade unions, which posed a potential challenge to authoritarian rule, it was 
also afraid that the increasing numbers of unemployed citizens would join wider demonstrations 
against the government. As a result, such path dependence led to a misallocation of resources, 
which eroded the basis of authoritarian rule. 
These different causal mechanisms can be explained by the concept of ‘equifinality’ (George 
& Bennett 2005), which is also referred to as ‘multiple, conjunctural causation’ or just ‘multiple 
causation’. “Equifinality is the idea that there are multiple causal paths to the same outcome” 
(Mahoney & Goertz 2006: 236). This concept indicates that there are two separate paths to robust 
and enduring social welfare systems. In democracies, institutions provide the beneficiaries of social 
welfare programmes with opportunities to resist the retrenchment. Democratic environments enable 
their resistance to the retrenchment because democracies allow people to create and participate in 
associations, which exert pressure on governments. In addition, interest groups often send their 
representatives to legislative bodies, through which they may be able to achieve what they want to 
do. In contrast, institutions did not always provide the people with opportunities to prevent 
retrenchment in Egypt’s case, which was considered authoritarian. There, the parliamentary system 
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is weak and ineffective. The lack of effective democratic institutions enhanced the importance of 
collective action outside the institutions (such as demonstrations and protests) in the politics of 
welfare retrenchment in Egypt. This thesis thus revealed that there is another dynamics of 
path-dependent change in social welfare systems, which is applicable only to authoritarian cases. 
 
 
6-3.  A Summary of the Argument 
 
In summary, the implications of the present thesis for theory can be classified into two 
categories. The first set of implications is related to historical institutionalism. The thesis reveals 
that informal institutions (like the populist social contract) had a significant impact on the 
development of a social welfare system under authoritarian rule as well as that in democracies. The 
two hypotheses (discussed in Chapter 1) assume that political leaders under authoritarian rule 
exercise discretion over how they exploit social welfare systems for their survival. In contrast, the 
thesis shows that Egyptian authoritarian leaders chose their survival strategies, taking into 
consideration an informal institutional legacy – the populist social contract in this case. The 
populist social contract prevented the Mubarak government from rationalising the social welfare 
system (Hypothesis 1) or exploiting it for elections (Hypothesis 2). Additionally, the timing and 
sequence of change in Egyptian political and economic structures made the institutional legacy 
more critical for path dependence in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era. 
The second set of implications is related to welfare-state studies. The thesis overcomes such bias 
and reveals that the pattern of social welfare development in Egypt is distinct from that in Western 
countries (the first pattern) and newly democratised countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
East Asia (the second pattern). In the Egyptian case, survival strategies played a pivotal role in 
changes that occurred in the social welfare system both in the period of evolution and of reform. 
Also, it reveals that, although pathways of social welfare development and the quality of welfare 
provisions in Western countries and Egypt were quite different from each other, the outcomes of 
welfare reform since the 1980s were similar. In Western democracies, path dependence in social 
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welfare systems was primarily caused by pressure from below. Beneficiaries and their organisations 
(or interest groups), who were veto players, exerted pressure through parliaments and political 
parties to prevent the achievement of public policies that were not favourable to themselves. In 
contrast, authoritarian leaders in Egypt chose their survival strategies and avoided drastic welfare 
reform in response to signals of popular reactions, such as organised movements and spontaneous 
riots. Consequently, the causal mechanism featured in this thesis led to a similar outcome to that in 
democratic welfare states (‘equifinality’). 
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Conclusion	
 
This thesis reveals how and why the social welfare system in Egypt was altered during the 
Mubarak era. The existing literature anticipated that structural changes to the political and 
economic systems would have a significant impact on the social welfare system during the 
Mubarak era and alter its role. It suggested two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that economic 
liberalisation would change the role of social welfare systems from populist provision to a minimal 
instrument for poverty alleviation (Hypothesis 1). It assumes that economic liberalisation, which 
was promoted by international donors such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United States, 
would accompany the rationalisation of the social welfare system and that this strategy of 
rationalisation would be also benefit the authoritarian leader, Mubarak. Obeying such prescriptions 
would allow the Mubarak government to enhance the reputations of these international donors. At 
the same time, the rationalisation would improve the efficiency of the social welfare system, which 
might ease popular discontent and enhance the durability of the authoritarian regime. The second 
hypothesis is that political liberalisation, in the form of the introduction of quasi-competitive 
elections in particular, would encourage the authoritarian leader to exploit the social welfare system 
as the ‘machine’ for distributing generous welfare benefits to specific social groups to win 
quasi-competitive elections (Hypothesis 2). This hypothesis assumes that, as the multiparty 
electoral system made elections more competitive even under authoritarian rule, the authoritarian 
leader would have to take measures to win elections more actively than before. 
This thesis demonstrated that, in contrast to these two hypotheses, an informal institution – the 
populist social contract – prevented the Mubarak government from implementing drastic welfare 
reform and led to path dependence. The government used the social welfare system principally as a 
means of preserving political stability or of avoiding instability in the short term. Although the 
rationalisation of the social welfare system was advocated by international donors and the 
government seemingly initiated such reforms, these reforms did not result in significant reductions 
256 
in social expenditure. Despite a decline in external resources, the government continued to avoid 
fully engaging in deep structural reform. 
This path dependence can be explained by an unresolvable dilemma that the Mubarak 
government was caught in. Economic liberalisation allowed the government to create a new ruling 
coalition with the business class. It needed to deliver welfare benefits more efficiently to the needy 
through the rationalisation of the social welfare system. However, the government still relied on a 
legacy of claims to redistributive justice for its legitimacy, which made it difficult to implement 
drastic reforms that could improve efficiency. As the government feared direct political protests, it 
increasingly drove the social welfare system as a mechanism to compensate for the effects of 
liberalisation by spending heavily on the distorted social welfare system. The strategy was itself a 
fundamental contradiction and inherently unsustainable. As a result, a decline in distributive 
resources revealed a failure in the social welfare system – enduring fiscal misallocation and neglect 
of social problems, such as unemployment and poverty. 
This research draws two main conclusions. First, although the informal institution – the 
populist social contract – made a difference between what these two hypotheses anticipated and the 
actual change that occurred in the Egyptian social welfare system, the original timing and sequence 
of change in Egyptian political and economic structures made the institutional legacy critical for 
the change in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era, as historical institutionalism 
suggests. In Egypt’s case, the following sequence of events that resulted after the populism 
sustained by Arab socialism played an important role in path-dependent change, unlike what the 
two hypotheses anticipated: (1) an increase in external resources in the 1970s, (2) the absence of 
drastic political change (Mubarak’s succession following the Sadat regime) and (3) a decline in 
external resources. Second, this thesis reveals a causal mechanism of change in social welfare 
systems under authoritarian rule that are different from those of democracies. In democracies, the 
development of social welfare systems creates beneficiaries and interest groups that exert pressure 
on the government. This process causes path dependence, as many studies on historical 
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institutionalism have revealed. In contrast, the populist institutional legacy, which had been 
established in the Nasser era and reinforced in the Sadat era, encouraged the authoritarian 
government to take measures to avoid political instability in Egypt’s case. The government engaged 
in anticipatory measures, avoiding drastic reforms that would trigger anti-government protests. This 
tendency was reinforced especially after the food riots in 1977. Although the government spent 
much money on social welfare, this strategy failed to alleviate popular complaints about the social 
welfare system. 
Simultaneously, the findings of this research contribute to theoretical development both in 
historical institutionalism and welfare-state studies. The first set of implications concerns historical 
intuitionalism. This thesis reveals that informal institutions (like the populist social contract) had a 
significant impact on the development of a social welfare system under authoritarian rule as well as 
that in democracies. This informal institution altered the preferences of political leaders and their 
survival strategies and made the actual changes in the Egyptian social welfare system different 
from the anticipated causal mechanisms (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). Additionally, this thesis 
demonstrates that, as historical institutionalists have shown, the original timing and sequence of 
change in the Egyptian political and economic structures made the informal institutional legacy 
critical for the change in the social welfare system during the Mubarak era. 
The second set of implications pertains to welfare-state studies. As the existing literature on 
the welfare state has focused generally on democratic cases (the ‘democratic bias’), it excludes 
authoritarian cases (including the Egyptian case) from the analysis. This thesis reveals that the 
pattern of social welfare development in Egypt is distinct from that in Western countries and newly 
democratised countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. In contrast to the other two 
patterns, Egypt developed a social welfare system without a democratic transition. Although there 
were few obstacles for political leaders in Egypt in comparison to those in democratic countries, a 
populist institutional legacy restricted their behaviour and encouraged them (President Mubarak in 
particular) to maintain populist welfare provision, despite the inefficiency of the existing, populist 
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social welfare system. As the existing literature has paid scant attention to the dynamics of social 
welfare systems under authoritarian rule, this finding provides a new perspective on studies on the 
welfare state. 
Also, this thesis focuses on the concept of ‘equifinality’. Although pathways of social welfare 
development in Western countries and Egypt were quite different from each other, outcomes of 
welfare reform since the 1980s were similar. In Western democracies, path dependence in social 
welfare systems was primarily caused by pressure from below. Beneficiaries and their organisations 
or interest groups (i.e., veto players) exerted pressure through parliaments and political parties to 
prevent the achievement of public policies that were not favourable to themselves. However, the 
Egyptian case lacked the conditions that might lead to such path dependence. As Egypt is an 
authoritarian country, it lacked an open political arena that could enable interest groups to influence 
the government. Nevertheless, the Mubarak government chose to maintain an inefficient social 
welfare system. Authoritarian leaders in Egypt chose their survival strategies themselves and 
avoided drastic welfare reform in response to signals of popular reaction, such as organised 
movements and spontaneous riots. Although the causal mechanism that worked in Egypt was 
different from that in Western industrialised countries, both Egypt and Western countries achieved a 
similar outcome. 
It should be noted that this research has several limitations. First, this thesis explained what 
impact the logic of the social contract had on social welfare programmes, focusing on two ‘old’ 
types of social welfare programmes (i.e., the food subsidy programme and the public employment 
programme) that were established during the Nasser era. Therefore, this research does not consider 
how the Mubarak government exploited new types of social welfare programmes (represented by 
the SFD) that were established in the 1990s for the purpose of poverty alleviation. It is expected 
that these new social welfare programmes would be comparatively free from the logic of the 
‘populist’ social contract. Although this thesis omits such new programmes from the analysis as it 
aims to examine path dependence on the Egyptian social welfare system, investigating these 
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programmes would shed more light on distributional politics in Egypt and enable us to comprehend 
the whole social welfare system in the country. 
Second, this thesis does not focus on clientelism and patronage. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
clientelism is still widespread and plays a critical role in distributive politics in MENA countries 
(including Egypt). In the MENA region, for example, people expect MPs to be a mediator between 
them and the state for their individual interests (such as government licenses, public housing and 
admission to universities) (Lust 2009). Nonetheless, this thesis omits clientelism from the analysis 
for two reasons. First, social welfare programmes are strongly connected with the universal values, 
such as social rights, however vacant these concepts may be, especially under authoritarian rule. 
Additionally, as social welfare programmes benefit most of the population, they are rarely used as a 
means for clientelism. Although patronage in social welfare benefits can be observed at the micro 
(or street) level, such individual patronage has little impact on changes in the social welfare system. 
Therefore, this thesis has excluded patronage and clientelism from the analysis. 
Third, this research focused only on the social welfare programmes offered by the government, 
ignoring private welfare activities. It might be undeniable that cultural and religious factors have a 
significant impact on the content of social welfare in a country. More specifically, Islamic 
initiatives for social welfare (such as waqf and zakah) have played an important role in poverty 
alleviation in MENA countries. Recent studies reveal that private welfare activities, particularly 
those provided by faith-based organisations, have made significant strides in poverty alleviation in 
MENA countries (Baylouny 2010; Clark 2004; Jawad 2009). However, analysing the relationship 
between cultural and religious factors, and social welfare is beyond the aim of this thesis. Therefore, 
such factors were not analysed here. 
How can Egypt replace the populist ‘social contract’ with a new one? Although this research 
does not discuss the social welfare system changes that occurred after the ‘Arab Spring’, the 
findings suggest how Egypt can escape from the ‘fetters’ of the populist social contract. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the original timing and sequence of political and economic changes made 
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the social contract’ more critical. Two elements might play a significant role in the replacement of 
the social contract: (1) a drastic political change and (2) a new source for social welfare. 
Concerning the first element, Egypt experienced two political shifts – the January 25 
Revolution in 2011 and the 2013 coup d’état. Although achieving social justice via the social 
welfare system is still one of the most important issues for the Egyptian government, it has begun 
to improve the efficiency of the social welfare system. Let us consider the food subsidy programme, 
for example. As explained in Chapter 4, the Mubarak government could not change the 
universalist feature of the programme for fear that such a reform would trigger anti-government 
demonstrations (such as the 1977 food riots). During the Mubarak era, therefore, the efficiency of 
the programme was restricted because of this universalist feature, which meant that every citizen 
could access subsidised baladi bread. However, this universalist feature has been altered since the 
2011 revolution. The Morsi government started a pilot programme of introducing smart cards to 
control the ration system of subsidised foodstuffs (especially baladi bread) in Port Said in 2013. 
The smart cards enable only cardholders to purchase subsidised bread. Following this initiative, the 
Sisi government attempted to introduce the smart card system to the whole country in April 2014 
(Anon. 2014). It is expected that this reform will improve the efficiency of the food subsidy 
programme. At the same time, their efforts might indicate that the Egyptian government has 
gradually emerged from the ‘fetters’ of the populist ‘social contract’. 
The other element is whether the government can find (or make) a new source for the 
expansion of the social welfare system. Now that the country does not have enough external 
resources to expand the social welfare system, it needs to create a new source for social welfare 
through economic growth. As indicated by cases in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia, 
high economic growth enables governments to rationalise and reform social welfare systems, 
which can improve the quality of social welfare. However, the growth rates of the Egyptian 
economy are not high. It seems that whether the Sisi government is able to achieve high economic 
growth and distribute its benefits to the populace may play an important role in the successful 
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replacement of the social contract and the stabilisation of a new one. 
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